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Special Section:
Hungary and International Relations in the
Interwar Years, 1919-1940
Introduction
In many respects the interwar decades constitute a unique period in the
evolution of Hungary. What distinguishes this age from the previous four
centuries above all is the fact that from the end of the First World War in
November of 1918 to Hungary’s involvement in the Second World War in
the spring of 1941 the country was an independent entity and conducted its
own foreign affairs. Such a situation did not exist, except for certain brief
periods during some of the wars of independence against foreign rule,
during the four centuries that separate the time of Hungary’s Jagiellonian
kings of the early sixteenth century and the conclusion of World War I. It
should be added here that for Hungary the period between 1867 and 1918
was one in which the country — in respect to external affairs — was not
ruled by the Habsburg Court but shared responsibility for foreign policy
(including a diplomatic service) with the Austrian half of the dual-
monarchy of Austria-Hungary. For the purposes of understanding some of
the papers in this special section we should also add that for Hungary the
interwar era lasted almost two years longer than it did for many countries
in Europe as the country did not get involved in World War II for some
twenty-two months after September of 1939.
The predominant theme of Hungarian foreign policy in the period
that separates the end of the First World War and the spread of fighting to
the Balkans and Russia in the Second, was determined by the peace
settlement that concluded World War I. As is well known, in the aftermath
of that war the peacemakers, the victorious Western Allies, imposed one-
rous terms on the vanquished Central Powers, terms which included terri-
torial losses — and that no country lost more of its lands than Hungary.
Revising the territorial provisions of the post-war peace settlement became
the cornerstone of interwar Hungarian diplomacy and heavily influenced
Budapest’s dealings with the outside world not only concerning diplomatic
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matters but, as we’ll see in one of the papers in this section, in cultural
contacts as well.
The studies featured here make it clear that in interwar Hungary
both public opinion and scholarly judgement blamed the ill-fate that befell
the country — above all the dismemberment of the historic Hungarian
kingdom — on the decisions of the victorious Allied powers. In doing so
Hungarians largely ignored the fact that in the years and decades leading
up to 1920 their country’s leadership, and even its Magyar-speaking
general public, regularly ignored the political and cultural sensitivities of
the numerous nationalities living within the Kingdom — or managed to
annoy these groups — or at least their intellectual elites. The dismember-
ment of Hungary was not so much the deed of vengeful or ignorant
western leaders — even if some of them had grudges against Hungary’s
elite and were less than well-informed about the affairs of East Central
Europe — but more of the consequence of long-term historical processes
that had been taking place in the Middle Danube Basin of Central Europe
for many generations. Perhaps the most important cause of these develop-
ments stemmed from early modern times when during the Ottoman occu-
pation of southern and central Hungary many regions became depopulated
— and after Christian armies, mainly under Habsburg leadership, drove
out the Turks from there the Imperial Court in Vienna decided to replace
the missing inhabitants predominantly by newcomers from the Balkans
and from the Habsburgs’ German possessions. Hungarians were not wel-
come in these ancient Magyar lands, neither as landlords nor as settlers.
Hungarian preoccupation with the revision of the post-World War
I territorial peace settlement on the whole didn’t serve the Hungarian
nation well. As illustrated by the three studies in this special section of this
volume, this preoccupation diverted attention from the nation’s myriad
socio-economic problems and often hindered in the establishment of good
relations — or the keeping of such relations in the few instances that they
had been achieved — with certain countries that sometimes exercised at
least some influence in international affairs in the interwar period, among
them the United States, Turkey, and Great Britain. The interplay between
Hungary and these three countries during all or a part of the interwar era is
the main theme of the three studies in this special section and we hope that
what they say contributes to a better understanding of this critical period of
Hungarian history.
Nándor Dreisziger
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Revisionist Expectations toward the USA and
Hungarian History Writing: A Case Study of
Jenő Horváth (1881-1950)
Éva Mathey
Signed on June 4, 1920 in the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles, the
Treaty of Trianon dismembered historic Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy became a bygone idea. The terms of the treaty fundamentally
affected the geo-political status of the new Hungarian state and defined the
foreign policy of Hungary inasmuch as it limited the government’s scope
of action. Contemporary Hungarian public opinion understandably reacted
to the Trianon Peace Treaty with great despair and refused to accept its
terms which were considered to be unfairly punitive. Regardless of class
and status, interwar Hungarian society viewed the revision of the Treaty of
Trianon as the only possible solution for Hungary’s future. Trianon came
as a “shock on Hungary’s collective psyche,”1 and created a serious emoti-
onal “dislocation” in the Hungarian mind. The trauma which the postwar
settlement inflicted was unparalleled within living memory.
Hungarian history writing between the wars assumed a significant
role in helping the Hungarian nation come to terms with the trauma of
Trianon.2 Seeking answers for the ill-fate of the Monarchy, offering
explanation for what had happened, Hungarian historians between the wars
made an attempt to furnish the process of ‘healing’ from the shock of
defeat: they wanted to prove wrongs done to Hungary, provide evidence
and justification for revision.3 Trianon, and therefore revisionism, served
as major focuses of their inquiry. One of the most prominent figures in this
field between the wars was Jenő Horváth.
Jenő Horváth produced an extensive and voluminous body of
scholarship on the problems of Trianon in particular, and on Hungarian
and world history in general. At the same time he held several high-
standing offices in various professional as well as social circles. His
academic significance demonstrably makes him one of the “official”
historians of Trianon in the interwar period.4 Before we look at his oeuvre,
we must introduce the man and his background for the sake of English
audiences. Horváth received his doctorate in history and Latin from Buda-
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pest University in 1905. Having an excellent command of English, French
and German, first he wished to become a career diplomat. When such
ambitions failed, he opted for his second love, history, which he began to
teach at various Hungarian secondary schools. His academic interest in
and commitment to the profession of the historian manifested themselves
at a very early stage of his career. Two substantial and voluminous pieces
of his early scholarship demonstrate this: A történelem bölcselete. Tanu-
lmányok a történettudomány alapelveiről és az emberi művelődés irány-
eszméiről [The Wisdom of History. Essays on the Basic Principles of
Historiography and the Guiding Concepts of Human Culture] (1907) and
A XIX. század alapvetése. A nagyhatalmak megalakulása 1648-1715.
Köztörténeti tanulmány [The Core Principles of the 19th Century. The
Formation of the Great Powers 1648-1715. A Study in Public History]
(1910). Both attracted the attention and acknowledgment of professional
circles. Appointed Professor of History at the Nagyvárad Law Academy in
1912, Horváth turned his attention to world and diplomatic history. The
end of World War I and the crisis which set in from the fall of 1918 forced
Hungarian historians to react to the events of the war. Amidst the turmoil
caused by the defeat and the military collapse of the Central Powers, and
in response to the Hungarian fears of the prospective unfavorable peace
settlement, Horváth published his first Trianon work, Magyarország füg-
getlensége és területi épsége. A nagyváradi jogakadémia felhívása a
nyugati egyetemekhez [The Independence and Territorial Integrity of
Hungary. The Appeal of the Nagyvárad Law Academy to the Western
Universities]. Published both in Hungarian and English, the pamphlet
aimed at informing the learned public about Hungarian policies toward her
nationalities and Hungary’s claim to her territorial integrity on the basis of
the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination.5
The end of the war and the dismemberment of historic Hungary
affected Horváth’s career both directly and indirectly. Since Nagyvárad
(Oradea) became part of Romania, he had to give up his professorship
there. Like everybody else, he was devastated by the Treaty of Trianon,
which came to serve as a formative impact on his professional life after
1920. As a result, he devoted his career to the study of Hungarian history
during and after the war in order to reveal the causes of the Hungarian
tragedy, to answer yet unanswered questions, to set right and challenge
“the apparent […] myths, legends, […], and lies” about Hungary’s role in
and responsibility for the war.6 Horváth could serve these ends as
managing director of the Magyar Külügyi Társaság (Hungarian Society for
Foreign Affairs). First as editor, later as editor-in-chief of the society’s
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scholarly journal, Külügyi Szemle [Foreign Policy Review], he took active
part in the organization and the promotion of Hungarian science, politics
and culture at home and abroad. As professor of modern world and Hun-
garian history at several Hungarian universities (i.e. Pázmány University,
József Nádor Technical University, the University of Economics and the
Ludovika Academy) he published major essays and books on the causes
and consequences of Trianon. His works drew on mainstream histories of
World War I and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919–20, and on the
memoirs, diaries and statements of contemporary Hungarian and foreign
politicians. He also relied on the contemporary press and capitalized on his
professional contacts and personal relations with several mainstream Hun-
garian politicians, including Count Albert Apponyi.
One of his first works, Magyarország és a nemzetiségi kérdés
1815- 1920 [Hungary and the Question of Nationalities 1815-1920],7 dealt
with the problems of nationalities in Hungary, while A trianoni béke
megalkotása 1915-1920. Diplomáciai történelmi tanulmány [The Making
of the Treaty of Trianon 1915-1920. A Diplomatic Historical Essay]
offered a thorough analysis of the circumstances under which the peace
treaty was made and presented to Hungary for signature. The book arti-
culated the belief that the Monarchy did not fall by “her own weight,”8 but
rather due to the propaganda of the nationalities abroad.9
Horváth’s more inclusive and more voluminous Trianon works
included the almost hundred-page long historical analysis “Diplomatic
History of the Treaty of Trianon” in Justice for Hungary, a prestigious
collection of scholarly essays written by contemporary intellectuals advo-
cating the revision of the Trianon Treaty published by the Külügyi Tár-
saság. His Trianon monographs: A Milleniumtól Trianonig. Huszontöt év
Magyarország történetéből, 1896-1920 [From the Millennium to Trianon.
Twenty-Five Years of Hungarian History, 1896-1920]; and the two-
volume A magyar kérdés a XX. században [The Hungarian Question in the
20th Century] were comprehensive analyses of Hungarian history before,
during and after World War I.10
These works, which form the basis of the present survey, presented
a comprehensive account of Hungarian history during and after the war,
and offered answers to the question ‘why Trianon happened?’ Horváth’s
Trianon synthesis paid special attention to America’s role in and response-
bility for the peace treaty.  Within this context, Horváth’s works focused
on several significant issues and events in Hungarian history in relation to
American war and peace policies. These tenets served as the major
thematic cores and building blocks of the revisionist arguments and
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expectations toward the United States. Horváth’s interpretation and
synthesis of these helped create and keep alive the popular myth of the US
as a possible ally of Hungary in frontier revision. The historical narrative
he generated served as reference points for semi-official and popular
accounts and lent authority to the revisionist narrative(s) in general.11
With respect to the role of the US, Horváth focused on six major
themes: (1) the United States of America did not wish to dismember the
Habsburg Monarchy (negotiations for separate peace, the original Fourteen
Points and the Four Principles, the Inquiry’s recommendations to Wilson);
(2) Wilson changed his policy toward the Monarchy because he had fallen
victim to the propaganda of the representatives of the would-be successor
states, mainly to the influence of Thomas G. Masaryk; (3) Austria-
Hungary and the US wished to end the war on the basis of the Fourteen
Points of January 8, 1918; (4) American proposals for peace at the peace
conference in Paris were more favorable than those of the Allies; (5) the
US did not accept and approve the Trianon peace treaty (the US Congress
refused to sign the post-war treaties); and (6) the separate US-Hungarian
peace treaty did not mention the Trianon boundaries.
The belief that the United States of America did not wish to dis-
member the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was one of the major tenets in
Horváth’s works. He systematically tried to support his case by the citation
and the interpretation of numerous statements and political manifestos by
influential American politicians, above all, President Wilson.
In the context of the peace proposed by the Central Powers on Decem-
ber 12, 1916 and the Allied reply of January 10, 1917 demanding the dis-
memberment of the states of the Central Powers, 12 Horváth discussed
President Wilson’s “Peace Without Victory Address” to Congress of Janu-
ary 22, 1917. He emphasized Wilson’s idea of the free development of
nations, the idea of nationality as the guiding principles of the “peace
without victory” proposed in the president’s message.13 With this Horváth
wished to demonstrate the American standpoint concerning the future of
the Monarchy. He even cited Secretary of State Robert Lansing’s state-
ment that
[President Wilson] is trying to avoid breaking with Austria in order to
keep the channels of official intercourse with her open so that he may
use her for peace. […] It is the President’s view that the large measures
of autonomy already secured for these older units is [sic] a sufficient
guaranty of peace and stability in that part of Europe so far as national
and racial influences are concerned […].”14
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Horváth emphasized that even before the US had officially entered
the war she stated that she did not want to dismember the Monarchy.
Furthermore, he pointed out that the US “held out the prospect of keeping
the empire of Chares IV intact.”15 (The fact that the US was not a belli-
gerent at that time, and therefore could not officially influence such
decisions of the Allies was ignored by Horváth.)
In reference to Wilson’s Message to Congress on January 22, 1917,
Horváth noted that the USA was willing to enter the war provided that
both groups of belligerents accepted the American principles of national
self-determination as the basis for the peace settlement.16 Colonel Edward
Mandel House, Wilson’s closest friend and adviser, was also quoted as
recommending the preservation of the Monarchy if it were willing to break
with Germany.17 Horváth cited Wilson’s December 4, 1917 address (US
President’s call for the declaration of war on the Habsburg Monarchy) to
buttress this point:
We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way
to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of
ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically.
We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only
desire to see that their affairs are left in their hands in all matters, great
and small.18
President Wilson’s January 8, 1918 message to Congress, in which
the Fourteen Points were stated as America’s official war aims for the first
time, became a key element in Horváth’s argument. Point Ten provided
the most significant building block of the revisionist expectations toward
the US. By declaring that “[t]he peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place
among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be
accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development,”19 Wilson, in
Horváth’s words, “saved” the Monarchy from dismemberment.20 Thus,
Wilson’s doctrine of national self-determination and the principles de-
clared in the Fourteen Points turned out to be the alpha and the omega of
the reasoning in Horváth’s analysis and were presented as the ultimate
guarantees by the USA for keeping the Monarchy intact. Even more so,
Horváth said, because the USA was not bound by the secret treaties made
during the war.21
As Horváth emphasized, in Point Ten of the Fourteen Points
Wilson clearly stated that the US did not wish to dismember Austria-
Hungary. Horváth failed to point out, however, that the principle of
national self-determination came to be considered and interpreted by the
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peoples and states of Central Europe as the key to their independence and
freedom of action. Wilson’s principle of national self-determination lent
itself to various interpretations, and even the president did not formulate its
exact and explicit meaning.22 Horváth, on the other hand, did not mention
important circumstances which made the first official declaration of US
war aims necessary. Soviet Russia abandoned the war, preparations for the
Brest-Litovsk agreement started, while negotiations for a separate peace
between the Allies and the Monarchy failed again. All these development
contributed to Wilson’s declaration of the Fourteen Points.
American wartime policies toward the Monarchy were not
motivated by altruism, but by shrewd calculation and political strategy.23
Consequently, the image of the US as the benevolent savior of the
Monarchy, so strongly supported by Horváth, lacks evidence. Horváth did
not indicate that the Fourteen Points was not an idealistic program of war
aims, but a pragmatic and tactical move.  The way how Point Ten, the
most important point with respect to the future of the Monarchy, was
drafted illuminates this properly.
President Wilson’s private task force, the Inquiry, prepared the policy
proposals and comprehensive plans for the president concerning certain
geographic units, among them the Monarchy.24 Its memorandum, “War
Aims and Peace Terms,” threatened the Monarchy with dismemberment
yet at the same time also implied that the Inquiry did not consider such
action necessary.25 The Inquiry’s recommendation that “[t]owards Austria-
Hungary the approach should consist of references to the subjection of the
various nationalities, in order to keep that agitation alive, but coupled with
it should go repeated assurances that no dismemberment of the Empire is
intended”26 eventually served as the basis for Wilson to draft Point Ten.27
This reveals that the consideration behind Point Ten was to increase the
willingness of the Monarchy to negotiate a separate peace and win her
away from Germany.
Horváth’s belief that with the Fourteen Points Wilson “saved” the
Monarchy, therefore, was one-sided. He knew about the Inquiry’s report
and should have been aware of the American strategy toward the Monar-
chy. Still, he misrepresented this important issue. Concerning the work of
the Inquiry, Horváth used Ray Stannard Baker’s Woodrow Wilson and the
World Settlement as his primary source in which Baker published the
reports of the Inquiry.  Horváth’s quoting the Inquiry’s document that
“[o]ur policy must consist in refusing to accept the dismemberment of
Austria-Hungary”28 was presented to demonstrate America’s insistence on
keeping the Monarchy intact. The comparison of the quotation in Horváth
The Revisionist Expectations of Jenő Horváth 13
with the original source, however, reveals that Horváth was bent on
adapting history to theory. Once the respective quotation in Baker had
been checked and compared with the one in Horváth and it turned out that
Horváth omitted certain and very substantial parts of the document as
written in Baker’s book. The original reads as follows:
Our policy must therefore consist first in a stirring up of nationalist
discontent, and then in refusing to accept the extreme logic of this
discontent which would be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. By
threatening the present German-Magyar combination with nationalist
uprisings on the one side, and by showing it a mode of safety on the
other, its resistance would be reduced to a minimum, and the motive to
an independence from Berlin in foreign affairs would be enormously
accelerated.29
Questions emerge. What explains such treatment of historical sources
on Horváth’s part? What explains Horváth’s selectively presented quota-
tion? Since Ray Stannard Baker’s three-volume book was listed as a
primary source in Horváth’s works, the Hungarian scholar clearly had
direct access to it, if not in Hungary, then abroad. It is therefore highly
unlikely that he used another source that misquoted Baker. It is more likely
that the “unconditional” stand of the United States on the side of the
Monarchy was so important to him that he deliberately manipulated the
statement. The attempt to separate the Monarchy from the German alliance
just did not really fit Horváth’s image of the US. Moreover, Horváth’s
treatment of the Baker quotation relating to the Inquiry’s recommendation
is not the only indication that he tended to ignore some facts and
overemphasize others.
By the summer of 1918 President Wilson abandoned his policy of
non-dismemberment. In his works Horváth dealt with Wilson’s change of
policy toward the Monarchy, and offered a unique interpretation. He
contended that Wilson’s change of attitude and policy toward the
Monarchy in the spring of 1918 was the result of foreign pressure from
British (mainly the New Europe group and Crewe House), French and
associated political circles, and the propaganda against the Monarchy
conducted by the representatives of the future successor states. Horváth
said that Wilson was misled and made to believe that the annexation of
territories of the Monarchy was the legitimate actions of the aspiring small
states longing for independence on the basis of the Wilsonian logic of self-
determination.30 Horváth even accused President Wilson of misjudging the
Central European situation and accepting the “fictitious” secret treaties
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made by Masaryk during the war. Wilson’s “careless mistake,” Horváth
asserted, contributed to the tragedy of Hungary.31 He thus created the myth
of Wilson the victim, wistfully manipulated and influenced by external
forces. Masaryk was presented as the arch enemy, who won “over Wilson
from self-determination to annexation.”32 “He induced the President to
abandon his Fourteen Points, and entangled him in the secret stipulations
of the Russian Slav plans, thus inaugurating the Wilson tragedy.”33
War expediency, military and political reasons explained Wilson’s
new policy toward Austria-Hungary. These included the successful
Bolshevik revolution; the Brest-Litovsk agreement between the Central
Powers and Russia on March 3, 1918 which meant the collapse of the
Eastern front, giving the Germans access to Russian supplies and allowing
them to focus entirely on the Western front; the dander to American
interests in the Far East by Japan. These factors made international
cooperation in the Far East, thus, US intervention in Siberia, in the name
of collective security, necessary. Added to this the Sixtus Affair34 in April
1918 meant the breakdown of the secret peace talks with Vienna. At the
same time, in the spring of 1918, the propaganda of the nationalities was
also set into motion. In April the Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian
Nationalities met in Rome where the representatives of the nationalities
called for self-determination.
Despite these events, however, until May 29 Wilson did not give any
sign of sympathy toward the subject peoples of the Monarchy. Finally,
military events in Siberia helped Wilson resolve the dilemma inherent in
the conflict between his former policy toward the Monarchy and political-
military necessities.35 Aiding the Czechoslovak Legion36 in Siberia
provided grounds both for US military intervention in the Far East, and, as
a consequence, “rewarding” the Czechoslovaks with independence. On the
very day, May 29, when news about the Legion’s first decisive battle
reached the State Department, Wilson also indicated that he had decided to
reverse his Austro-Hungarian policy as there was no further hope of a
separate peace.37 That notwithstanding, it was only in September that the
US recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as the de facto bellig-
erent government. This led to the American sanctioning of the dismember-
ment of the Habsburg Empire, and the recognition of the rights of its
subject peoples to political independence.38
What follows from the above is that the influence of nationality
propaganda and especially that of Thomas Masaryk on Wilson’s change of
policy was greatly exaggerated in Horváth’s works. At the same time this
interpretation was a very convenient one inasmuch as such a conviction
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also served as an important ground on which Hungary could expect the US
to right the wrongs resulting from dismemberment.
Horváth’s assumption that the Monarchy ended the war on the basis of
the Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918 which, in his view, applied even
after November 3 and 13, the armistice of Padua and the military conven-
tion of Belgrade, constituted another major element of the expectations
toward America relative to the revision of the Treaty of Trianon.39 He
based his argument on the diplomatic exchanges between the Foreign
Office of the Monarchy and the State Department between the middle of
September and the middle of October 1918. Foreign Minister Count István
Burián, Horváth said, approached Wilson and initiated peace on Sep-
tember 14, 1918 on the basis of the Fourteen Points.40 Washington rejected
Burián’s note even before it was officially delivered by Swedish Minister
W. A. F. Ekengren on September 16.41 Wilson’s reply of September 16,
according to which the US had “stated the terms upon which [she] would
consider peace,”42 was misinterpreted by Horváth. Horváth stated that
Count Burián accepted Wilson’s reply on October 5 and argued that
Austria-Hungary ended the war on the basis of Wilson’s principles.43 The
documents of the State Department collectively published as Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, to which Horváth
had access and used as a major primary source, proved that Burián’s letter,
which arrived in Washington on October 7, did not include any acceptance
of Wilson’s note. It was the Monarchy’s actual (or second) peace proposal
addressed to the President.44
Horváth carried his argument further by drawing the surprising
conclusion that by this diplomatic exchange a binding international agree-
ment was endorsed between the Monarchy and the US. By blending these
events, Horváth also claimed that thereby Austria-Hungary and the US
mutually agreed to end the war on the basis of the principles as expressed
in the Fourteen Points of January 191845 and Austria-Hungary ended the
war without any territorial losses.46 These beliefs were mistaken. As a
professor of international law and diplomacy Horváth should have known
better, especially in light of the documents in the Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States. The claim that the original Four-
teen Points still stood and that they provided the basis for the peace
negotiations by no means was true in the fall of 1918. Wilson’ official
reply to the Austrian peace note on October 18 explained the American
position.47 Horváth had to be aware of Wilson’s October 18 reply to
Burián’s second peace note as the document was also included in the very
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same volume of the Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States. Still, he ignored this important detail.48
Horváth’s interpretation of the events clearly reflected wishful think-
ing. As the official historian of the world war, someone who was close to
government circles and the political elite, Horváth should have known that
in late October Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Andrássy was officially
informed that Point Ten was no longer valid, and no longer formed the
basis of the armistice and the peace. Moreover, Horváth had to know about
the Official American Commentary on the Fourteen Points prepared by
Walter Lippmann and Frank I. Cobb.49 The commentary put American
plans for peace on a new basis and explicitly contained the information
regarding the readjustment of US policies toward the Monarchy, including
its effect on Point Ten. The Germans knew about the specific inter-
pretations of the Lippmann–Cobb commentary, as the German news ser-
vice had intercepted the coded wireless message that communicated the
commentary to Wilson.50 And this information must have been com-
municated to the Ballhauzplatz. If not through the German channel, then
from David Hunter Miller’s book, My Diary at the Conference of Paris
Horváth could get the information that the Fourteen Points had been
modified. Horváth quoted Miller saying in connection with the Monar-
chy’s peace proposal that its “[o]nly basis is President Wilson’s Fourteen
Points, as modified.”51 But Horváth apparently gave no consideration to
Miller’s comment at all.
Horváth’s misrepresentation of Burián’s peace proposal and of
Wilson’s October 18 reply has another noteworthy feature. Horváth
emphasized that the anti-Hungarian propagandists and “annexationist
agents” in general and Thomas Masaryk in particular persuaded Wilson to
break his previous promise and reject the Hungarian peace initiatives.52
This helped underline the conviction that Wilson acted contrary to his
personal wishes and that the US originally wished to treat Austria-Hungary
in a more favorable way.
Horváth also dealt with America’s role at the Paris Peace Con-
ference and the American recommendations for peace with regard to
Hungary.53 He pointed out that Wilson and the American Delegation to
Negotiate Peace insisted on the peace settlement being made on Wilson’s
terms, and Wilson refused to endorse Allied war aims, thus, their (harsh
and punitive) conditions for peace.54 American conduct at the peace
conference in Paris favorable to Hungary, therefore, created another
building block of Hungarian revisionist expectations toward the US.
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Relying on Miller’s My Diary, but without going into detail
concerning American recommendations, Horváth presented only a few
selected aspects of the American peace plan for Hungary. For example, he
mentioned that the American proposals recommended a plebiscite in
Transylvania for the non-Romanians and free access for Hungary to the
Adriatic and the Black Sea.55 Horváth correctly emphasized that the
American Delegation at Paris put forth more favorable plans regarding the
future boundaries of Hungary than the Allies. President Wilson proposed
for an umbrella treaty for the Central Powers to end the war. He believed
that with the help of experts the League of Nations should have the
responsibility to settle the territorial questions and draw the final
boundaries in the future. Wilson’s idealistic program, however, was not
realized and the Allies made separate peace treaties with the defeated
powers.56
The eventual territorial recommendations for Hungary prepared by
the members of the American delegation reflected a less biased, and a
somewhat more objective approach than those of the Allies.57 This
notwithstanding, the final boundaries of Hungary set in the Treaty of
Trianon and the ones proposed by the Americans showed only slight
differences. In any case, the future boundaries of Hungary were decided by
default by the territorial committees of the peace conference in which the
Americans were also represented,58 and the American proposals were not
taken into consideration and failed to affect Hungary’s final borders.
President Wilson and the American Delegation had a lesser significance in
the territorial negotiations and they went along the major line proposed by
the Allies and successor states.
In connection with the defeat of the American recommendations
Horváth does not fail to mention one important issue: Wilson’s pet project,
the League of Nations. Horváth pointed out that despite Wilson’s defeat at
Paris, the League of Nations, as stipulated in Article 19 of its Covenant,
made provisions for possible future frontier readjustment.59 Given the
political-diplomatic power relations in Europe after the war, it was not
likely that the League would assist any changes in the status quo created
by the peace treaties. That the United States would have any say in the
changes was even less likely, because the US Senate, which favored
isolationism, refused to ratify the peace treaties drawn up in Paris
including the Covenant of the League of Nations clauses. Consequently,
the US never became a member of the League.
The fact that the US did not approve the treaties made in Paris was
yet another tenet of the belief that the US may support revision. America’s
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rejection of the postwar settlement was interpreted by Horváth as
America’s refusal to become a party to the peace whose correction the US
considered necessary.60 This Hungarian belief was an illusion and was
anything but well-founded. As is well-known, a Republican turn in
American politics resulted in the Senate decision concerning the peace
treaties. This political change ultimately also drove the whole Wilsonian
project overboard.
“The importance of the American connection” in treaty revision
was founded on yet another popular misconception which Horváth kept
emphasizing in his works, namely, that the separate peace the US made
with Hungary (signed on August 29, 1921) did not mention the boundaries
of the Treaty of Trianon because the US did not approve the frontiers of
Hungary. Not mentioning the frontiers of Hungary in the US-Hungarian
separate peace, Horváth said, created an important precedent inasmuch as
it made the readjustment of the Hungarian frontiers possible in the future
in which, as is implied by Horváth, the US may undertake an important
role. 61 This belief was another tenet of the revisionist expectations toward
the US. Nevertheless, this notion lacked validity. Horváth’s interpretation
that the separate peace represented the amicable relations between the two
countries and opened the way for the revision of the Treaty of Trianon was
nothing short of delusional.
In the separate peace with Hungary the US insisted on keeping the
economic privileges and rights under the Treaty of Trianon. So, in
connection with them the Treaty of Trianon was specifically mentioned.
At the same time the US explicitly renounced all the responsibilities
contained therein regarding the Hungarian treaty (mainly responsibilities
accruing from Article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant holding out
the prospect of frontier adjustment). Consequently, even the slightest
reference to diplomatic, military and political commitments regarding the
Treaty of Trianon in general, and the frontiers of Hungary in particular
was left out of the text.62 The tone of the negotiations clearly demonstrated
that Hungary was in a “take-it-or-leave-it”63 position. The specific stipula-
tions of the treaty, setting the framework for the relations of Hungary and
the United States, reflect the uneven nature of the relationship between the
two countries, with the US dictating the conditions.64
In conclusion, during the interwar years Hungarians sought
answers for the tragedy of Trianon, and the desire for its revision provided
a common ground for the whole nation. Horváth’s works offered answers
to the question, ‘why Trianon happened.’ His stated aim was to refute
myths, legends and lies right in connection with Hungarian history during
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and after the war.65 At the same time he created new myths and mis-
conceptions. America’s role in negotiating the secret peace with the
Monarchy, the US policy of non-dismemberment, the Fourteen Points and
Point Ten, Wilson’s righteous peace based on them, the idea that Wilson
had fallen victim to the propaganda of the future successor states, Ameri-
can peace plans in Paris, America’s refusal to sign the Paris peace treaties
and the US-Hungarian separate peace all served to establish an otherwise
unfounded belief relating to the role the United States may play in treaty
revision. There is reason to believe that the creation of such myths by
Horváth was intentional. His treatment of historical sources seems to
support that. The question may arise whether Horváth’s often selective
treatment of historical facts can be explained by the lack of information.
As the ‘official’ historian of the period he had access to important primary
sources relating to the history of the war and the peace, in Hungary and
abroad alike. The contemporary accounts by David Hunter Miller, Charles
Seymour, Colonel Edward M. House, Ray Stannard Baker, Harold A.
Temperley, James T. Shotwell, Harold Nicholson, etc. were, indeed, all
available to him. The bibliographies of his works clearly testify to this.
Although not indicated in his references, Horváth had to have access to
James Brown Scott’s The Official War Aims and Peace Proposals,
December 1916 to November 1918 as well.66 This publication of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace provides clear and specific
information about US policies during the war and in Paris. For Horváth
who was a close associate of key mainstream politicians, such as Albert
Apponyi and Pál Teleki, who were both closely related to the Carnegie
Endowment, access to the book would not have been difficult. Even
though he had the major primary sources available, Horváth’s history
writing did lack objectivity: he often adapted historical facts to pre-
conceived theory, reinterpreted and rearranged them. Clearly, he was a
historian with an agenda. He thus put “official” history writing to the
services of Hungarian revisionist policies. Horváth’s fairly biased accounts
were the works of a man whose generation directly suffered the experience
of defeat and the trauma caused by Trianon. Under this psychological and
emotional burden, objectivity was apparently too much to expect from
him.
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In Search of a Usable Past:
The Legacy of the Ottoman Occupation in
Interwar Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy
Zsolt Nagy
On September 2, 1936 Budapest celebrated the 250th anniversary of the
Battle of Buda. The celebration was to commemorate the victory of the
Holy League over its Ottoman counterpart whereby the European Chris-
tian mercenary army under the leadership of Charles V, the Duke of
Lorraine captured the Castle of Buda and ended its 145 years of Ottoman
occupation. Contemporary newspapers reported that at 9:00 a.m. Hun-
garian and foreign dignitaries and invited international guests — among
them descendants of those who fought at the siege in 1686 — gathered at
the Coronation Church of Our Lady (simultaneous events took place at the
city’s main Protestant and Jewish places of worship). The male audience
was seated inside the church’s nave and, because of lack of space, the
female audience was seated just inside the main entrance. The mass
conducted by Jusztinián Serédi, the Prince Primate of Hungary, included
the choral and orchestral performance of Matteo Simonelli’s Missa Buda
Expugnata (a piece written in 1686) and Zoltán Kodály’s Te Deum (a
piece composed for this specific occasion).1 After the service, the elegant
crowd of secular and religious leaders, led by Regent Miklós Horthy,
strolled from the Square of Holy Trinity to the Viennese Gate Square.
They were to officially unveil the female statuette of a winged protective
spirit /angel with the Apostolic Cross, signifying the triumph and virtue of
Christianity (Figure 1, see p. 50). However, before they could reach the
Viennese Gate Square there was a halt in the procession. Horthy stopped to
lay a wreath on the memorial of Abdurrahman Abdi Arnavut Pasha, the
last Ottoman vizier of Buda who fell while fighting against the troops of
the Holy League (Figure 2, see p. 51).2 Was this anything but a gesture of
respect toward a fallen enemy? Or perhaps does the very fact that in the
midst of the jubilee that was to celebrate Christian Europe’s victory over
its Ottoman foe, Hungary’s leader paused to pay his respects to the vizier
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tell us something about the complexity of the legacy of Ottoman occu-
pation? In this short paper — which by no means could or is even designed
to address the subject matter as a whole — I will argue that interwar Hun-
garian cultural diplomacy’s representation of the country’s Ottoman past
was not without challenges, nor was it one-dimensional. Why? On the one
hand Hungarians, just as many of their neighbors, aimed to emphasize
their central role in the struggle against the “Ottoman menace” in service
of Western Civilization.3 On the other hand, there was the mythical idea
and influence of Turanism, which promoted the idea of a Hungarian-
Turkish brotherhood. Finally, the practitioners of cultural diplomacy were
also keenly aware of the very real geopolitical significance of Turkey, and
Hungarian diplomacy aimed to thwart the establishment of regional
cooperation between Turkey and Hungary’s neighbours — most impor-
tantly Yugoslavia and Romania. To sum it up, in the interwar Hungarian
imagination the Ottoman Empire/Turkey was simultaneously viewed as a
historical enemy, brotherly nation, and potential ally.
Let me start with a brief explanation of the raison d'être of inter-
war Hungarian cultural diplomacy. The Treaty of Trianon — whereby
Hungary lost 71.5% of its territory and 63.6% of its population — pro-
foundly altered the way Hungarian leadership viewed the significance of
culture and cultural projects. As the First World War and the accom-
panying propaganda offensive was raging on, the image of Hungary
abroad was becoming a frustrating subject. For example, Count Albert
Apponyi pointed out rather bitterly the role that Lord Northcliffe’s media
empire and the Reuters’ monopoly played in Hungary’s negative image
abroad. However, he also emphasized that one should not be surprised that
the country had such a negative image, for the Hungarians themselves had
failed to provide information about the nation’s achievements, just as they
had failed to combat the negative depiction of the country in the foreign
press and public opinion.4 After 1920 the country’s foreign image was
seen as an issue with very grave consequences. Count Kuno Klebelsberg,
Minister of Education and Culture, argued that the negative image of the
country was responsible for the severity of the Trianon Treaty and the
country’s international isolation. Klebelsberg, and the majority of the
country’s political elite, believed that the restoration of the country’s
geographic integrity and international status — because of the lack of
other factors, such as military and economic power — required the
reconstruction of Hungary’s image abroad.5 The Ministry of Culture and
the newly established diplomatic corps of the Foreign Ministry aspired to
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deploy the country’s cultural capital — real and imagined — as their
primary instrument in influencing Western public opinion.
The planners of the campaign believed that the country’s alleged
“cultural superiority” [kultúrfölény] and assumed Western roots were mat-
ters that needed propagation abroad, for they saw these qualities as some-
thing that could justify Hungarian designs for revision of the postwar
political and geographical reality. The goals of Hungarian cultural diplo-
macy were to maintain and expand the country’s role as the primus inter
pares, that is, “first among equals” in the field of cultural achievements
among the nations of the region, and to portray its alleged superiority in
the West, Klebelsberg argued. 6 Of course, Hungarians were not alone in
their efforts. As Andrea Orzoff’s recent study illustrates, the entire practice
of interwar East Central European cultural diplomacy was built upon the
discussion of Europe and Europeanness, as each state “cited its adherence
to European cultural norms as proof of its moral worthiness,” its historical
achievements, and its role in defending and creating Western civilization.7
Their “stories,” as historian Holly Case refers to them, were “stories of
always having belonged to, protected and defended, preserved, and rep-
resented European culture and values.”8 The legacy of Hungary’s Ottoman
past was indeed one of these “stories” and intended to show the Hungarian
nation’s contribution to European and universal culture.
In order to appreciate the complexity of Hungarian-Ottoman/ Tur-
kish relations a brief overview of the two nations’ entangled history might
be useful. According to Pál Fodor, in 1389, when the Ottomans first
crossed into Hungarian territory, the Hungarians did not realize that they
were facing a new kind of enemy. However, after the Battle of Nicopolis
(1396) when the Christian army under the leadership of King Sigismund of
Hungary was defeated, in the Hungarian imagination the Ottomans were
transformed into the “wild, pagan, godless” main enemy of king, country,
and faith.9 Under the rule of Matthias Corvinus (Mátyás Hunyadi) and
later the Jagiellonians, as Hungary continued to face the Ottoman danger,
the Turks became the eternal enemy of Hungary. The struggle against the
“enemy of the faith” elevated the Kingdom of Hungary to “the shield and
bastion of Christendom which, through great loss of its own blood [was]
constantly guarding Europe.”10 Historian Domokos Kosáry argued that
during King Matthias’ reign a significant departure in Hungarian self-
identity and national construction occurred: “Hungary continued to paint
itself as a defender of universal Christianity, but the universal notion of
Christianity was by now colored by national pride.”11
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The defeat at the Battle of Mohács (1526) and the subsequent fall
of Buda (1541) not only led to the partition of the medieval Hungarian
Kingdom, but also ended the prestige that the country hitherto enjoyed on
the international stage. Self-assurance and national pride, argues historian
Ignác Romsics, gave way to “despair and hopelessness,” and in the ser-
mons of Protestant pastors the Turks were seen as “the scourge of the
living God and the wrath He unleashed” upon Hungarians for their sins.12
Others believed that Hungary was predestined to find its way between the
Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire and called for unity.13 Finding
their way also meant relinquishing their status as the shield of Christen-
dom and building relationships with the Ottomans. After the Battle of
Mohács, Hungary faced three choices: maintain its independence, ally
itself with the Habsburgs against the Ottomans, or ally itself with the
Ottomans against the Habsburgs. King John Zápolya (János Szapolyai), on
the Hungarian throne simultaneously with Ferdinand of Habsburg, chose
the latter option and Hungary became an Ottoman vassal state in 1528.14
The Ottoman orientation and, consequently, the anti-Habsburg orientation
was especially pronounced in the politics of the Principality of Transyl-
vania. Under the leadership of Gábor Bethlen, István Báthori, and István
Bocskai the goal of the Transylvanian princes was to maneuver the princi-
pality between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs in ways that would allow
for the reunification of the Hungarian kingdom.15 Imre Thököly went so
far in opposing the Habsburg rule that some even referred to Hungary as
the “enemy of Christendom” — a label that, according to Béla Köpeczi’s
study on the subject, failed to gain currency in European public opinion.16
The 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz brought the end of more than a
century and a half of Ottoman subjugation of Hungary. While small
pockets of Hungarian territories — such as the Banat of Temesvár (today’s
Timişoara in Romania) — remained in Ottoman hands until 1718, conflict
between the Ottomans and the Hungarians ended. With this the image of
the Turks as the main enemy of Hungary was diminished. In many ways it
was replaced by the Habsburgs, thus the Austrians became the main
obstacles to the Hungarian aspirations that sought to resurrect the medieval
prestige and power of the Hungarian nation (even though the nation as
understood in the 19th century was yet to be). The Ottoman Empire
actually became a safe haven for anti-Habsburg leaders in the aftermath of
the Rákóczi Uprising (1703-1711). The small city of Tekirdağ — known
by Hungarians as Rodostó — on the shores of the Sea of Marmara
provided sanctuary to some of the leaders of the failed rebellion, including
Ferenc Rákóczi himself. After the failed revolution of 1848, the Ottoman
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city of Kütahya gave refuge to Lajos Kossuth. By the mid-19th century the
image of the Turks, as the eternal enemy, was transformed into an image
that celebrated Turkish-Hungarian kinship and friendship.
During the second half of the 19th century Turkish-Hungarian
relations continued to improve, because of the common fear of pan-
Slavism and an aversion toward the Russian Empire. In the fall of 1855,
during the Crimean War, two former Hungarian revolutionary officers —
György Kmety and Richárd Guyon — directed the successful Ottoman
defense of Kars against the Russian forces.17 During the 1877-78 Russo-
Turkish war there were anti-Russian demonstrations in Budapest and
elsewhere in Hungary. Gatherings, events, and publications celebrated the
shared history and heritage of the Hungarians and Turks — with emphasis
on reconciliation and friendship. For example, the 1877 publication of the
song Török-Magyar Bucsuzó [Turkish-Hungarian parting or goodbye]
commemorated the visit of a Turkish delegation. Both Hungarians and
Turks proclaimed their respective admiration of one another and their
common dislike of the Russians [muszka].18 Another publication, Rokon-
dalok [Songs of Kinship], tells the story of a commemorative occasion in
April 1877 when Hungary’s famed actress Lujza Blaha (billed as Mrs.
Lujza Soldos) performed a welcoming song while recalling the “bitter
fights” of the past, made it clear that nowadays the two nations shall
embrace one another and see only brothers.19 Symbolic gestures at the
highest level furthered reconciliation efforts.  In 1877 a Hungarian delega-
tion visited Constantinople and presented Abdul Kerim Pasha with an
ornamental sword.20 The visiting Ottoman delegation reciprocated with a
gesture of its own by returning some of the items that belonged to the
Bibliotheca Corviniana and were taken after the sacking of Buda.21 Histo-
rians and the political elite rediscovered the house of Rákóczi in Tekirdağ /
Rodostó and transformed it into one of the most poignant and revered sites
of Hungarian history outside of the country’s borders.22 By the turn of the
century plays and operas celebrated Rodostó and the Ottoman-Hungarian
shared past.23
Yet, despite the celebratory notes, the ambivalence to the view of
Hungary’s Ottoman past was already visible by the mid to late 1800s and
continued to divide the ways Hungarians reconstructed and remembered
their history. In many ways this was a historiographical development that
was rooted in the kuruc versus labanc dichotomy. While it is a rather
complex issue, for now suffice it to say that the kuruc mentality was
mainly represented by its anti-Habsburg stand and was most popular
within the Protestant and gentry strata, while the labanc character with its
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more pro-Habsburg position and a generally-speaking anti-Turkish stance
was rather representative among the country’s Catholic nobility. On the
one hand the works of historian Sándor Takáts’ romanticized account of
the 16th and 17th century, argues Pál Fodor, openly celebrated the chivalry
and courage of both Hungarians and Turks.24 In his account — which can
be seen as an extreme version of kuruc history — the Habsburgs were
responsible for the country’s suffering, while the Turkish-Hungarian past
was idealized.25 The short-lived Hungarian Scientific Institute of Con-
stantinople [Magyar Tudományos Intézet] was to be the crowning achieve-
ment of the cultural cooperation that was rooted in a mutual and entangled
historical past. Klebelsberg, the then head of the Hungarian Historical
Society [Magyar Történelmi Társulat], argued in 1917 for the necessity of
a government-organized and funded scholarship system that would enable
young students to further their education abroad and consequently provide
for the future intellectual reserves of the country.26 This institute was the
first realization of his dreams and as director between January of 1917 and
September of 1918 he organized a number of lectures and other events to
foster cooperation among Hungarian, German, Austrian, and Turkish
scholars.27
Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to say that no historian had
greater influence on interwar Hungarian historiography — and con-
sequently on the image of Hungary’s Ottoman past in cultural diplomacy
— than Gyula Szekfű. Klebelsberg understood the significance of finding
usable episodes in the country’s history. In his letter to Szekfű he pointed
out his wish that Hungarian historians would examine and write the history
of “Turkish peril.”28 Bálint Hóman’s and Gyula Szekfű’s multi-volume
work, Magyar történet [Hungarian History] in part answered the call. In
their works the Ottoman foe was once again vilified. As Steven Béla
Vardy notes, Szekfű “blamed the Turks not only for the economic plight
and personal harassment of the population, not only for the country’s
depopulation and for the general dislocation of Hungary’s historical evolu-
tion, but also for the destruction of the Hungarian soil, for the pollution of
the Hungarian waters, and for the putrefaction of the Hungarian air.”29
Szekfű indeed did not mince words; he proclaimed that Hungary’s struggle
against the Turks was simply “unprecedented in the history of mankind.”30
The Hungarians — argued Szekfű — unlike the Romanians, Serbs, and
Bulgarians, did not shrink from their Christian duties. Consequently, con-
tinues the author, the Hungarians’ fight for the “cause of Europe” was
characterized by an unyielding attitude, constant preparedness, strong
discipline, and deadly self-sacrifice — just as Rome’s struggle against the
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barbaric hordes.31 To be sure, in his narrative of the Ottoman occupation
of Hungary, one can clearly identify the story of victimization coupled
with the notions of Hungarian exceptionalism — two of the pillars of
interwar Hungarian self-identity. Cultural diplomacy’s task was to propa-
gate these and other perceived qualities abroad.
International recognition of Hungary’s historical deeds was vital to
legitimatizing revisionist claims, and as such representation and dissemi-
nation of the legacy of the country’s Ottoman past was an essential compo-
nent of cultural diplomacy. Interestingly enough it was not necessarily the
Hungarian victories, but rather their defeats and suffering that validated
Hungarian claims of Europeanness. All publications and lectures were
designed to convince educated foreign elites of Hungary’s credentials as a
European country, moreover one whose contributions were crucial to the
development of Western civilization. The basic idea was to represent
Hungary as the architect and guardian of, and the future key to European
culture in the Carpathian Basin. Apponyi — one of the Hungarian dele-
gates at Trianon — summed up this idea in this way:
The Hungarian nation had and has a lofty world-historic mis-
sion, determined by the achievement and tendencies of a
thousand years, in the fulfillment of which it has been ob-
structed and weakened by the catastrophe of Trianon. The mis-
sion was, and still is the defence and the peaceful extension of
the higher standards of Western life, by political and military, as
well as by cultural efforts, according to the requirements of the
age.32
Julius (Gyula) Kornis — state secretary of culture and member of the
Parliament — made a similar argument on the pages of the Hungarian
Quarterly, a government sponsored English language journal. According
to his understanding it was Hungary’s “historical mission” to be the
“defender of the West,” “the bulwark against tides of Orientals,” and “to
fight the Saracens for three centuries under the sign of the Cross.”33 Kornis
and others, such as János Pelényi (Hungarian ambassador to the United
States), offered the words of historians to illustrate their point about
Hungary’s status as the “shield of Christendom.” For example, in his
speech at Columbia University, Pelényi quoted French historian Jules
Michelet: “Europe can never repay Hungary for the service she rendered
when she protected Europe against the Turks and Mongols. While Hun-
gary erected dams against the barbarian invasions, arts could live and
prosper in the West.” In the same speech he also made reference to British
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historian Thomas Babington Macaulay, who supposedly said that “had it
not been for Hungary’s valiant defense of the cross against the Crescent it
might well be that the Koran [Quran] and not the Bible would be taught in
Oxford.”34
Hungary’s role in safeguarding and promoting Western Christi-
anity was and remained a dominant argument in proving the country’s
European character.35 The Hungarian Foreign Ministry ensured that all of
Hungary’s diplomats could act as historians abroad. Among the topics that
they were trained to discuss was Hungary’s role as the true “scutum fidei”
(Shield of Trinity or Shield of Faith). According to this view Hungary’s
role as the Eastern bastion of Western Christianity against the Mongols
and Turks exemplified the Europeanness of the country.36 A memorandum
entitled “Guidelines for contact with Americans” (“Irányelvek az ameri-
kaikkal való érinkezésre”) deemed the subject of “Hungary’s historical
role as the protector of Western culture and Christianity” an “effective”
topic. The instruction cautioned would-be diplomats to make audiences
aware that “the reason Western European culture could develop in peace”
was the “five centuries long” sacrifice of the Hungarian nation.37 Paul
Hanebrink’s recent article illustrated that the Hungarian understanding of
the country’s status as a shield of Europe continued into the twentieth
century, for religious and secular leaders and intellectuals promoted the
“ideological link” between Hungary’s struggle against the Ottomans in the
past and the Communist menace of the present.38
The country’s Ottoman legacy was also employed as an explana-
tion for the issue of demographics and ethnic composition of pre-Trianon
Hungary. Prime ministers Pál Teleki and István Bethlen both made argu-
ments to audiences in Great Britain and the United States in which they
argued that a consequence of the “inconceivable hardship and misery” was
that Hungary became “depopulated and devastated.”39 However, Hun-
gary’s victimization story was not yet over, for both Teleki and Bethlen
argued that with the end of Ottoman occupation came not liberty, but yet
another conquest, this time in the hands of the Habsburgs who resettled the
depopulated parts of Hungary with foreigners. This “racial expropriation
of Hungary by the Austrian Empire” — argued Teleki — forever changed
the ethnic makeup of Hungary and led to the “modern claims of nation-
alities.”40 In this narrative of double-victimization one can find an inter-
esting historiographical adjustment. By the 1920s in certain circles —
especially those connected with the foreign representation of Hungary’s
past — the kuruc-labanc dichotomy diminished and gave way to a histori-
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cal image in which the country was a martyr-like, underappreciated, and
misunderstood nation.41
Of course, Hungarians were not the only ones claiming their
Europeanness on the bases of historical deeds in service of the continent.
Austrians, Poles, Romanians, Ukrainians, Serbs, and Croats — diplomats,
historians, and artists — all argued for their role in safeguarding and
saving the achievements of western civilization. The Croatian narrative
went even further and proclaimed a “triple victimization,” in which Hun-
garians joined the Ottomans and the Habsburgs as oppressors.42 Romani-
ans used their opportunity to illustrate their heroic deeds in the face of the
Ottoman menace and in their representation there was nobody more
faithful to Christianity (albeit Orthodoxy) than the Wallachian prince,
Constantin Brâncoveanu. The prince was memorialized in the Romanian
section of the Nationality Rooms at the University of Pittsburgh’s Cathe-
dral of Learning. As the inscription in the room’s spectacular mosaic
states: “Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu and his family laid down their
lives so that faith in God and nation may live forever in Romanian hearts.”
His sacrifice became the symbol of Romania’s devotion to Christianity and
of Romania’s loyalty to Europe.43 Yet, perhaps no nation had more
credibility as the shield of Christendom against the Ottomans as Poland
and its king, Jan Sobieski. Even foreign newspapers celebrated this
historical figure as the savior of Christendom.44 Hungarians often felt
frustrated by the West’s perceived ignorance of Hungarian deeds and
Hungarian heroes. On one occasion the Hungarian consul general in
Washington D.C., György Ghika, addressed the lack of recognition of
Hungary’s hero János Hunyadi on the pages of The New York Times
arguing that historical inaccuracies were obfuscating Hungary’s
“centuries-long struggle.”45 Yet, perhaps the most bitter examination of the
foreign image and understanding of Hungarianness came from literary
historian Sándor Eckhardt. He argued that the negative image of
Hungarians abroad originated in the contemporary West’s reaction to the
Magyars’ sacking and pillaging in ninth and tenth century Europe. He
acrimoniously proclaimed that the West only appreciated Hungarian deeds
when it was in desperate need, otherwise what he saw as Hungarian
bravery and courage tended to be only referred to in negatives, as
characteristics of a barbarian horde that was and remained a “corps
étranger a l’Europe.”46 While Eckhardt was certainly not alone in his
grievances, the general tone of the representation of the country’s
historical and cultural deeds abroad remained respectful, one might say
politely informative, for Hungarians — just as their neighboring counter-
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parts — understood that they were not alone in their campaign to win
western acceptance and support.
Even though the overriding consensus among the political elite
pointed toward a European, that is Western leaning policy, there was a
significant portion of intellectuals and politicians who thought that Hun-
gary’s past and future rested in the East. This understanding was character-
istic of the Turanist movement.47 According to its followers, Hungarians
belonged to the Orient, as they shared the common Ural-Altaic origins
with Turkish, Bulgar, Finnish, Estonian, and Mongolian people. Some
even included Koreans and Japanese in this grouping and dreamed of a
pan-Turanian conglomeration that would counter-balance Western hege-
mony. Others saw it as a way to find equilibrium vis-à-vis pan-German
and pan-Slav ideologies. Turanist Society originated in the last third of the
nineteenth century as a real scientific — linguistic — project which sought
to prove or disprove the Hungarian language’s Finno-Ugric origin. Interest
in the movement was further amplified by political and economic
motivations, as the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy sought to carve
out its own area of influence. The Turanist Society [Turáni Társaság],
established in 1910, aimed to bring together the various interests in order
to promote further research. Hungarian orientalist and linguist, Ármin
Vámbéry’s 1914 book, A magyarság bölcsőjénél: A magyar-török rokon-
ság kezdete és fejlődése [At the Cradle of the Hungarians: The beginning
and development of Hungarian-Turkish kinship] provided new theories
about the origins of the Hungarian language and ethno-genesis of the
Hungarian people as a whole.48 Membership in the society was a sur-
prisingly diverse mixture of politicians and intellectuals from Mihály
Károlyi through István Tisza to Pál Teleki.49 In his 1914 speech to the
general assembly of the Turanist Society, Pál Teleki argued for the need of
continued scientific and economic cooperation that would bring together
all Turan nations, but these expansions — exhorted Teleki — must be in
harmony with the foreign policy parameters put forward by the joint
Foreign Ministry of the Dual Empire.50 In 1925 the vice-president of the
society, Alajos Paikert, explained that the goal of the group was to foster a
cultural, economic, and political cooperation between the related nations.
In his speech to the assembly he emphasized that while the society
believes and adheres to the ideas of the League of Nations, in its current
form — without Germany, the United States, Russia, and the Republic of
Turkey — it does not believe in its effectiveness. Instead, proposed
Paikert, Hungary should build stronger relationships with the likes of
Turkey (who successfully overturned the Treaty of Sèvres), Japan (one of
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the strongest naval powers), China (a nation with great potential), Finland
and Estonia.51 In many ways, I would argue, the Turanist Society was
representative of the same circumstance that characterized Hungarian
foreign policy as a whole, it was seeking to break out from isolation and
create new connections. Some of their efforts materialized by creating
Finnish and Estonian cultural institutes and Hungarian cultural institutions
and representations in places like Tokyo and Tartu.
There was a schism in the ideology and in 1920 a splinter group,
the Hungarian Turanist Union [Magyarországi Turáni Szövetség], began to
advocate an anti-Western orientation and became closely connected with
right-wing and racist groups with “pipedreams” about the decline of
Western Civilization and the subsequent ascendancy of the Orient. In this
new empire, which was to be the realization of Genghis Khan’s dream,
Hungary  once again was to be a border fortress, this time in the service of
the Orient against the Occident.52 It was in this spirit that a group of
Turanists gathered at the shrine of Gül Baba on September 2, 1936 to
commemorate the liberation of Buda in their own way. In their inter-
pretation the battle was not between the two Turan brothers — Hungarians
and Turks — but between East and West. If the two great people would
have worked together, continued the argument, than there would not have
been “narrow-minded” Paris Treaties and instead there would be two
powerful empires: the Hungarians and the Ottomans standing as barriers
against injustice, anarchy, and the red flood [of Bolshevism].53
There were certain aspects of Turanism that the Hungarian
political leadership accepted, such as the Hungarian-Turkish friendship,
but for the most part the Christian Nationalist political elite refused to
deviate from its Western orientation. Klebelsberg, for example, readily
acknowledged that Hungary’s roots were in Asia. He also went as far as to
agree that some of the racial characteristics remained intact. However,
argued Klebelsberg, for millennia Hungarians had been living in the heart
of Europe. He did not question the notion that Europe showed its
“ungrateful” side to Hungary at the Trianon treaty, which to him was
clearly “unjust and brutal,” yet he disagreed with those propagating a
break with the West. Breaking relations with the West would be the
rejection of a traditional European outlook that was exemplified by St.
Stephen, King Matthias, and István Széchenyi and would have amounted
to the rejection of the very essence of Hungarianness, argued Klebelsberg.
To refuse modern reforms in the center of Europe, concluded the minister,
would be “absurd,” and the nation would vanish.54 It is safe to say that
Turanism, especially the radical ideologies presented by the Hungarian
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Turanist Union, had little impact on the country’s diplomatic and cultural
diplomatic efforts.
Nevertheless, the main reason why Hungarians were careful about
their representation of the country’s Ottoman past was geopolitics.  During
the mid-nineteenth century Hungarian-Ottoman relations were improving
significantly, not at least because of a common dislike of Russia. During
the First World War, as allies, the improvement of relations continued and
in 1923 Hungary and Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship. During the
1926 commemoration of the 500 years anniversary of the Battle of Mohács
— which greatly weakened the Hungarian Kingdom — Horthy declared
that the “one time foe became a friend” and the “two nations bound by
common kinship” overcame their differences and replaced them with
friendship and sympathy.”55 The Hungarian ambassador’s (László Tahy)
report from Ankara testifies to the jealousy-mixed admiration the Hun-
garian political elite felt about a country that was able to revoke the Treaty
of Sevres, and gain international recognition for the new Republic of
Turkey through the Treaty of Lausanne.56
Different foreign policy aspirations however placed strain on
Turkish-Hungarian relations. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s Turkey sought to
have friendly relations with all of its neighbors and aimed to avoid
entanglements with Great Power politics. Atatürk’s principle “Peace at
Home, Peace Abroad” was based on Turkey’s strategically important geo-
political location — which was advantageous and disadvantageous at the
same time — and the need to keep an independent / neutral stance in
international relations (this is why Turkey actually had treaties of friend-
ship and pacts of non-aggression signed with the Soviet Union, Germany
and Great Britain at the same time).57 On the other hand, Hungary refused
a relationship with the Soviet Union, a country whose support was im-
mensely important to Turkey’s leaders. Even more significantly, as Hun-
gary sought to break out from its international isolation and aimed to
secure the necessary foreign support for its revisionist goals, the Bethlen
government turned toward Mussolini’s Italy. It was a move that was not
welcomed by the Turkish government.
Contemporary documents indicate that Turkey’s political elite was
deeply concerned about growing Italian political influence on the Balkans
and as such was apprehensive about the closeness of Hungarian-Italian
relations.58 Hungarians sought to alleviate the growing tension by
explaining the usefulness of Hungary’s Italian orientation to various
Turkish leaders. For example Prime Minister Bethlen, during his visit to
Turkey told his Turkish counterpart, İsmet İnönü, about the practical side
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of Italian support, such as its support to the plebiscite in Sopron, its
support for a League of Nations’ loan, and general Italian support for
Hungary on the international stage.59 In the same visit Bethlen met with
Atatürk who surprised him with the idea of a Balkan Pact. Bethlen argued
against the idea and painted the threatening picture of a pan-Slav union
(led by the Soviet Union) and positioned Hungarian revisionist aims as
way to counter such aspirations.60
This cautious approach to relations with Turkey continued under
Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös.  The new Prime Minister, accompanied by
his Foreign Minister Kálmán Kánya, visited Ankara in October 1933. The
two met with Prime Minister İsmet Pasha and Foreign Minister Tevfik
Rüştü and discussed the European political situation in their two-day
meeting. Among the issues discussed was the Four-Power Pact between
Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy that had been signed in June
1933. The Turkish hosts viewed the pact with a level of apprehension for
fears of the growing hegemony of Great Power politics vis-à-vis the
League, while the Hungarian leadership believed that such a coalition
would be beneficial as far as possible revisions of Trianon were concerned.
Balkan politics was another key theme of the meeting, for a proposed
Turkish-Romanian rapprochement was certainly against Hungarian
wishes. Hungary’s anti-Soviet stance — just as discussed during Bethlen’s
visit — once again proved to be a problematic issue, because Turkey was
looking to build and strengthen its relationship with the Soviet Union.61
Despite all its efforts, Hungarian leadership was unable to
influence Turkish foreign policy. Turkey mended its relationship with
Greece and, to the dismay of the architects of Hungarian foreign policy,
signed treaties of non-aggression, friendship, and cooperation with
Romania and Yugoslavia, culminating in the signing of the Balkan Pact in
February 1934.62 The Hungarian political elite looked at the Balkan Pact as
the definite sign of a break in the “traditional” Turkish-Hungarian
friendship. The very existence of the Balkan Pact and the subsequent
language of Turkish support of the status quo (and consequently the
support of anti-revisionism) made Hungarian politicians uneasy about
Turkey.63 Nevertheless the political leadership also realized that Hungary
could not afford to alienate its former ally and, for the remainder of the
interwar period, sought to maintain cordial relations with Turkey.
This cautious approach clearly manifested itself in the 1936
commemorative celebration of the 1686 liberation of Buda. From the
beginning the Hungarian Foreign Ministry advised that any and all
celebrations must pay due attention to the Turkish sensibilities and thus
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retained the right to check programs and speeches related to the events.64
Their restraints were justified, for the Turkish embassy sent word that its
government was growing more and more dissatisfied with tendencies to
place Hungary’s Ottoman past in the darkest light.65 I am using and have
been using the phrase “Ottoman past” not simply to differentiate between
the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, but because this dis-
tinction — albeit not always adhered to — was seen as a very important
one to both Hungarians and Turks of the time. The Foreign Ministry, for
example, asked Endre Liber (vice-mayor of Budapest) in his radio address
celebrating the anniversary, to please refrain from using the words
“Turkish” and use instead “Ottoman,” avoid “captivity” and use “occupa-
tion,” and instead of “heathens” employ the word “Islam” when addressing
the historical issue.66
The episode involving József Damkón’s and Gyula Walde’s statue
of Pope Innocent XI — the main architect behind the 1684 creation of the
Holy League — provides a telling example of the sensibilities surrounding
this celebration (Figure 3, see p. 52). On the one hand the papal statue
suggested a clear connection between the Hungarian past and the universal
themes of Christendom. The bronze statue erected by the “grateful nation”
was commemorating the pope — “the saviour of Hungary.” The founda-
tion was honouring the great figures of the struggle against the Ottomans:
Pope Innocent XI, Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, Jan Sobieski, and
Marcantonio Giustinian, the 107th doge of Venice. It is safe to say that at
no other time was Hungary so significant to its Western neighbours than
during its Ottoman occupation and no other major or minor Hungarian
battle was part of the Western historical memory to the degree than the
liberation of Buda was. The Hungarians understood this and when the
Turkish ambassador to Hungary complained about the anti-Turkish
rhetoric, the answer was a polite rejection of any charges and an argument
that stated that this was a celebration to signify and represent Hungary’s
historical traditions that — according to the Hungarian reply — were
steeped in the Western and Christian orientation. The ambassador’s
questions about the planned statue of Pope Innocent XI were not so easily
retorted. He argued that the fallen flag with the crescent at the foot of the
statue suggested disrespect and offered an analogy to his Hungarian host
about what his reaction would be to a statue celebrating the Ottoman
victory at Mohács with trampled Hungarian colors. Here, paying due
attention to Turkish sensibilities, a compromise was seemingly reached
whereby the dedication of the statue was not part of the official program,
but rather it was delayed a month.67
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The official ceremony did not only memorialize the recapturing of
Buda, but also offered parallels to the contemporary situation of the
country. Archduke József (Ágost) in his speech at the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences argued that just as Hungarians were able to break the Turkish
yoke so will Hungarians overcome the dark times of Trianon and the day
of commemoration should celebrate the future resurrection of Hungary.68
The Lord Mayor of Budapest, Jenő Sipőcz, in his radio speech emphasized
that with the victory at Buda Western civilization got back its eastern
bastion and just as before, once again — according to its historical
mission, continued the Lord Mayor — Budapest and Hungary served as
dam against new barbarism threatening Europe.69 Bálint Hóman, Minister
of Culture, offered similar symbolism and message in his speech focusing
on the example of the past as a model for “today’s struggle” for
“Hungarian resurrection.”70
What role did Hungary’s Ottoman past play in the country’s
cultural diplomacy? Interwar Hungary was a small and largely powerless
country with a proud past, and future dreams of grandeur. At one time
Hungary was significant to Europe as a whole. For example, when Thomas
More penned his famed spiritual work, A Dialogue of Comfort against
Tribulation, he placed his narrative in 16th century Hungary. More
explained that if Hungary was lost — “which up till now has always been
a very sure stronghold of Christendom” — it would open up an Ottoman
conquest of the rest of Christendom.71 Of course, More’s Dialogue is not
about Hungary, but the fact that he chose to set his story in Hungary, I
think, is representative of the universally recognized value of Hungary’s
struggle — as universal as far back as 16th century Europe’s fear of the
Ottoman was concerned. The decision to spotlight Hungary’s Ottoman
past in interwar cultural diplomacy was certainly not without logic. After
all, with perhaps the exception of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-1849,
there was very little in the country’s otherwise long history that mattered
to the rest of the world. Hungarians sought to suggest — albeit indirectly
— that the West owed them for their suffering and deeds. Intellectuals,
artists, and diplomats worked together to gently remind their foreign
audiences of the victimhood, one could say martyrdom, of Hungary as the
bastion of western culture and civilization. While Christendom was
definitely a universal concept in the 16th century when More was awaiting
for his execution, the problem for the architects of cultural diplomacy was
that in the 1920s and 1930s — amidst Great Power politics concerned with
nationalism, Communism, Fascism, Nazism and so on — the concept lost
its universal significance. Hungarian musicians were able to compose
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music, painters and sculptors depicted heroic deeds, and scholars wrote
historical studies all showcasing Hungarian deeds in service of
Christendom, but cultural diplomacy only works if there is interest on the
side of the target audience. To the Western European and American
public, the main targets of Hungarian cultural diplomacy, the value of past
deeds mattered very little. One does not necessarily have to subscribe to
the realist school of international relations to see that during the interwar
years military and economic considerations decided where the Great
Powers’ interest lied.
While highlighting the country’s Ottoman past might not have
successfully influenced the international situation, it did have an impact on
the ways Hungarians understood their Ottoman past and viewed them-
selves vis-à-vis the rest of the continent. The story of Hungarian heroism
continues to be disseminated even nowadays. Six-graders still struggle to
read Géza Gárdonyi’s 1899 romantic novel Egri csillagok. Known in the
English-speaking world as Eclipse of the Crescent Moon, it tells the story
of the 1552 siege of Eger and paints an epic picture of the small Hungarian
garrison’s victory against overwhelming Ottoman forces. To be sure, Hun-
garians continue to see their heroic struggle against the Ottoman foe as
their badge of honor and validation of their European credentials, but the
Turks are no longer the enemy. On the contrary, most Hungarians have
favorable views of the Turks. The focus on the shared past is celebrated in
exhibitions and gatherings.72 In Szigetvár, the site of Hungary’s first epic
poem Szigeti veszedelem (The Peril of Sziget), there is now a memorial
park commemorating both Miklós Zrínyi and Suleiman the Magnificent.
Talking about Suleiman, I cannot help but mention that currently on Hun-
garian television one of the most successful programs is the Turkish soap
opera Muhteşem Yüzyıl (titled Szulejmán in Hungarian, Magnificent
Century in English).73 The issue of Hungary’s Ottoman past continues to
resurface even in Hungarian political discourse. Its latest manifestation is
the Jobbik program — Hungary’s ultra-right party — which calls for
closer ties with Turkey (and the East in general) and even seeks to create a
commemorative day to celebrate common ancestry of the Turanian
people.74
In this light Miklós Horthy’s gesture toward a fallen enemy might
be no more than a gesture of respect for a valiant foe. However, the story
of interwar Hungarian cultural diplomacy’s search for a useable past could
also tell us that no nation has total ownership of its own history. History
was and remains a political tool, but there has to be an understanding that
one nation’s history is always intimately linked with the history of others.
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Presenting it in a biased and ahistorical way will not bring benefits — it
actually diminishes the possibility of constructing and developing a true
understanding of a nation’s history.
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A Step too Far? The Impact of German Military
Passage to Romania through Hungary on the
Anglo-Hungarian Relationship, April 1940
András Becker
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the German-
Hungarian relationship in the 1930s and early 40s and the role Hitler and
Mussolini played in the territorial aggrandisement of Hungary between
1938 and 1941. The historiography is overwhelmingly consensual on a
number of points: firstly, as the direct result of the Second Vienna Award
Hungary allowed the free passage (droit de passage) of the Wehrmacht to
Romania.1 Historians have been aware that the Wehrmacht had already
requested the use of Hungarian territory in its contingency plan to occupy
Romania much earlier than September 1940, in the spring of 1940 in fact,
but because the German military passage did not occur at that time the
problem in historical research seemed unimportant.2 Instead, Hungarian
historians have argued that the passage of German military trough Hun-
garian territory after the Second Vienna Award, and Hungary’s adherence
to the Tripartite Pact in November 1940 and allowing the Wehrmacht to
use Hungarian territory in the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941 cumu-
latively caused a deterioration in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship and in
the British opinion of Hungary.3 This argument has a number of inherent
flaws. Hungarian historiography has been primarily interested in the con-
clusions and outcomes of British policy towards Hungary, but the analysis
of the complex interplay of influences, dynamics and the criteria of the
British decision-making process, which provide a more nuanced picture of
British perceptions and policy towards Hungary, have so far been largely
neglected.
The problem of the prospect of a spring 1940 German military
passage through Hungary has so far been the scarcely understood affair of
the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. New and persuasive evidence, emerg-
ing from British archives, suggest that a decision to grant this free passage
was reached in Budapest much earlier than has been previously suggested,
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in April 1940. This fundamentally changes our understanding of
German-Hungarian relations by providing a new perspective on the ways
Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki (1939-41) perceived Hungarian revi-
sionism, neutrality and independence regarding the relationship with Ber-
lin. Firstly, it suggests that Teleki’s agreement to a German passage was
not the result of gratitude for the Second Vienna Award, nor was it the
sign of Hungarian subservience occurring as the consequence of the
disappearance of Allied counterbalance to German hegemony in the conti-
nent after the fall of France, a notion steadfastly maintained by Hungarian
historiography. The newly found evidence makes it necessary for us to
rethink this argument and to disentangle the true motives behind the early
Hungarian accord.
In this study, these misconceptions are contested, and it is argued
that the Hungarian decision to grant a way-leave passage to Germany in
April 1940 fundamentally changed British perceptions towards Hungary,
and in particular the way London looked at the trustworthiness of the Hun-
garian elite, and its willingness and ability to confront Germany. This
made a dramatic impact on British attitudes towards Hungary’s future role,
geographical shape and social and political structure in post-war Central
Europe. This episode is effectively the long lost puzzle piece of the
evolution of British opinion about Hungary: it finally explains the reasons
behind the sharp deterioration of British official opinion during the course
of the summer of 1940; a phenomenon which so far has been understood
only superficially, and which have been explained with the generalisation
that Hungary followed an increasingly pro-German policy.
With regards to the Hungarian perspective, the question inevitably
arises why Budapest consented to a German request in April. So far, the
Allied defeat in France in June 1940 went some way towards explaining
Hungary’s growing subservience. Historians have also argued that after
Dunkirk Teleki’s implicit faith in the ultimate British victory had been
fundamentally shaken, and apprehension about losing the possibility to
enlist German assistance for further territorial gains brought the realization
that closer cooperation with Hitler would be vital.4 The evidence brought
forward here suggests that by the spring of 1940, due to the lack of open
and immediate British support for Hungary’s territorial claims, Teleki had
been keen to bring the question of Transylvania to a head, in disregard of
British disapproval. Balázs Ablonczy and Tibor Frank has pointed to the
primacy of frontier revision in Teleki’s foreign political aims,5 but the
unquenchable thirst for revision does not seem to explain the decision to
value German support more than the British.
Anglo-Hungarian Relationship, April 1940 55
The answer ultimately lies in the dramatic shift on the inter-
national stage. The Hitler-Mussolini meetings at the Brenner Pass in
March 1940 have been viewed as a crucial step in the materialization of an
active German-Italian military alliance in the war, but historians have not
recognised its implications for the future of Hungary. British sources
indicate that at Brenner a secret deal was struck, and in return for greater
influence in the Balkans Mussolini had given up its special relationship
with Hungary.6 These documents indicate that losing nominal Italian pro-
tection, Hungary was faced with the dilemma of resistance or collaboration
in the face of German armed pressure. Here, we are arguing primarily that
the arrangements of the Brenner meetings could potentially explain that
out of fear of physical German occupation Teleki decided to provide a
carte blanche to Berlin to pass through Hungarian territory.
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the impact of the
Hungarian decision to grant transit rights for the Wehrmacht in April 1940
on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship and British Central European and
Balkan strategy until diplomatic relations were broken off between
London and Budapest in April 1941. It is also interesting to disentangle
how the question of the droit de passage affected British opinion of
Hungary’s recent territorial gains and how it shaped British post-war
planning in Central Europe. At the same time our analysis aims to dis-
entangle who and on what principles made policy on Hungary in White-
hall, and demonstrates the ways the various individual perceptions and
political and strategic priorities in the region shaped British official policy
towards Hungary.
Several studies have produced sketchy analyses on this problem,
but until now no reliable evidence has been brought forward to suggest
that Hungary granted military passage to Germany earlier than September
1940.7 András Bán recognised that the question posed an impossible
dilemma for Teleki, who so far successfully maintained a balance between
Germany and the Allies, but neglected its impact on the Anglo-Hungarian
relationship.8 György Réti has also paid some attention to the problem, and
stressed that the lack of Italian encouragement to resist a German request
put Hungary in a difficult situation, but Réti’s scope of analysis was
limited to German, Italian and Hungarian sources.9 Elizabeth Wiskemann
claimed that the German demand for a passage through Hungary served as
a cover for the invasion of Denmark and Norway, to direct attention away
from Scandinavia. Wiskemann unfortunately did not disclose her source of
information, but her argument was probably valid, as the Hungarian
decision occurred simultaneously with the Scandinavian campaign.10
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Until now, German, Italian, and Hungarian sources have
provided the largest set of evidence, but all of these are very vague on the
subject, particularly regarding the timing of the Hungarian decision. The
question presented a delicate and highly confidential issue for all parties;
therefore the problem is absent from official sources. The published
diplomatic documents of the German Foreign Ministry and the German-
Hungarian diplomatic correspondence do not mention that Berlin asked for
a military passage from Budapest in the spring of 1940.11 Italian sources
are also very obscure on the question. Talamo, the Italian minister in
Budapest, reported on several occasions in April that Berlin possibly
requested a military passage through Hungarian territory, but remained
silent on whether the Hungarians actually granted the passage.12 The I
Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, the published diplomatic sources of
Italian foreign policy reveals nothing exact about a ‘droit’ in the spring of
1940 either. The surviving Hungarian sources are similarly silent. Neither
the Diplomáciai iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához (DIMK), nor the
diplomatic correspondence between Berlin, Rome and Budapest mention
anything specific about a German request and a Hungarian reply. The
minutes of the Hungarian Cabinet meetings offer no further evidence
either.13 A memorandum handed by Lipót Baranyai, the anglophile
president of the Hungarian National Bank and a close ally of Teleki,
directly to Ciano on the 8 April is one of the rare documents clearly
indicating that the Germans contacted Budapest about a military passage.
In a questionnaire Baranyai enquired about whether Italy was willing to
defend Hungary against German aggression.14 Mussolini’s answer to the
Hungarian inquiry, after consultation with Berlin, was abrupt and laconic:
I am Hitler’s ally, and wish to remain so.15
Mussolini’s evasive response prompted Budapest to look for alter-
natives elsewhere. A similarly worded memorandum and questionnaire
was prepared for the Foreign Office by Teleki, which inquired about the
British attitude towards the prospects of allowing a German military pas-
sage. The memorandum pointed out that the British response would signi-
ficantly determine the Hungarian decision, but Foreign Minister István
Csáky wrote on the bottom of the page that the memorandum was never
sent to London.16 A personal letter, written by Teleki on the 17 April to
Hitler, also mentions the matter: Teleki assured the Germans that in return
for supporting Hungary’s bid for Transylvania, the passage of the
Wehrmacht to Romania would be allowed.17 It can thus be suggested that
the reason for holding the memorandum back was either the fact that
British opinion was not considered important anymore, or that Budapest
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made the decision to allow the military movements of the Wehrmacht
before the 17 April, or perhaps both.
So far only a fraction of the diplomatic reports of Owen O’Malley
(British Minister in Hungary, 1939-41) have been analysed by historians.
His reports convincingly prove that Hungary eventually granted a passage
in early April, but the exact date of the decision and the actual form of the
German request still remains very uncertain.
British priorities in Central and South East Europe until April 1940
In order to understand the impact of Hungary’s yielding to any German
transit request on the Anglo-Hungarian relationship we first need to ask a
number of questions. Firstly, it is useful to dwell upon problems such as
the British official attitude towards the role of small and neutral powers in
Europe, and the implications of the violation of their territory for British
strategy in time of war and peace. Also, sketching the interplay of Britain’s
political, military and economic priorities in Central Europe and the
Balkans, and outlining the criteria which determined the British perspec-
tive of the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, with particular attention to the
development of the German-Hungarian cooperation and the impact of
Hungary’s territorial claims on British policy prior to March 1940 will
enable us to have a clearer understanding of the effects of the problem on
British perceptions and policy.
The 1907 Hague Convention addressed the conduct of warfare and
the rights and duties of neutral powers. It forbade belligerents to move
troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the
territory of neutral powers; at the same time it prohibited neutrals from
allowing such actions.18 Many of these carefully laid down rules were
violated during the Great War. For instance, the German invasion of
Belgium in 1914, essentially an attempt to enforce a military passage to
France, was the violation of neutral territory. The inviolability of European
neutrals occupied a decisive role in the British strategy of the balance of
power, because it provided buffer zones for great power rivalry. In 1839,
Britain guaranteed Belgian neutrality, which eventually caused London to
declare war on Germany in 1914.19 After the Great War neither the League
of Nations nor other supranational bodies regulated the rights and duties of
neutrals in war, thus the Hague Convention remained in place to regulate
their role.
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It is clear that the Belgian example cannot be used to illustrate
British attitudes towards the role of neutrals and small powers in the
interwar period, particularly in Central Europe.20 Although Britain re-
turned to the balance of power, Whitehall was traditionally less concerned
with this part of the world. This period does not provide a suitable
precedent through which the paradigm of British attitude towards a droit
de passage through neutral territory in Central Europe could be examined.
The only notable exception is the question of a Red Army transit through
Poland and Romania, which would have been the fundamental element of
a collective security system against Nazi Germany from the mid-1930s.21
This example is useful in providing a rare glimpse of the British stance on
the issue of great power military passage through the territories of small
Central European states, but because the Soviet Union appeared as a
friendly power in this equation and that the scheme was to be organised in
peace-time, considering it provides inaccurate evidence for the British
attitude towards such a problem in war. Besides, Poland and Romania
would have played an integral part in the collective security system; hence
they cannot be referred to as neutrals.
Underpinned by deep antipathy towards Communism, Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax pro-
ceeded with great reluctance in negotiating the encirclement of Germany
with Soviet participation. Consequently, and as a result of extreme Polish
reluctance, London rejected supporting the passage of the Red Army
through Romania and Poland in 1938 in defence of Czechoslovakia.22
Shrouded in the dense fog of appeasement, the principles of British
strategy were unclear at the time, but the lukewarm enthusiasm to commit
to collective security tells much about the inherent reluctance to conduct
active power policy in a traditionally and practically second-tier region.
From the British perspective, the sweeping territorial changes of
Czechoslovakia in 1938 were acceptable, because they were negotiated at
the green table. Moreover, it perfectly befitted Chamberlain’s notion that
he would be able to cooperate with Berlin in resolving outstanding Central
European issues, which he believed would bring long sought stability to
international relations and to the region alike. For these reasons, the First
Vienna Award, the German-Italian arbitration of the Hungarian-Czecho-
slovak territorial dispute in November 1938, was de facto accepted by
London.23
In contrast, when in March 1939, simultaneously with German
aggression against Bohemia and Moravia, Hungary occupied Ruthenia,
Czechoslovakia’s easternmost province, British perceptions towards
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Hungary underwent a considerable change. From this kind of Hungarian
behaviour, which appeared to be a covert German-Hungarian military
cooperation, policy-makers in Whitehall were convinced that the ‘Hun-
garian jackal’ had taken the bait, and in return for further chunks of
territory in Transylvania would actively assist the ‘German lion’, its
master, in carving up the region. After the destruction of Czechoslovakia,
the German aggression against the Romanian oil fields had become the
permanent subject of British anxieties and the Foreign Office expected that
the Wehrmacht would most likely use Hungary as the most obvious transit
route. Whether Hungary would offer resistance to German aggression, or
grant military passage to avoid occupation, was a constant subject of
Foreign Office discussions.24 The predictions of the British Embassy in
Budapest that at best Hungary would only offer token resistance to such
German designs had significantly determined the way the Foreign Office
looked at the future of Hungarian foreign policy and the nature of the
German-Hungarian relationship.25 Consequently, Whitehall’s conception
of German-Hungarian military cooperation against Bucharest became
central to its perception of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute and
became the underlying reason for discouraging Hungary’s persistent
claims in Transylvania.26
The Kassa-Velejte railway incident in September 1939 is an
illustrative example, which vividly demonstrated the way Budapest
perceived German-Hungarian cooperation against Romania. The German
request to use the Hungarian section of this railway for the duration of the
German-Polish war has received great prominence in the Hungarian
historiography, although its implications for the future course of the
German-Hungarian relationship and the British reaction have not been
adequately stressed.
Teleki refused to grant passage for German military convoys
against Poland on moral grounds, citing the century old friendship between
Hungary and its northern neighbour. Historians have repeatedly overstated
this aspect and used it to underpin the image of Hungary as a country
steadfastly defiant to German pressure.27 In this respect, András Bán also
argued that the Hungarian noncompliance had a distinctive positive
reaction in London.28 Bán quoted Ralf Walford Selby’s Foreign Office
memorandum about Hungary, which emphasized that the Kassa example
clarified that Britain could count on Hungarian resistance against
Germany. The problem with this is that Selby was the lone voice in the
Foreign Office stressing that suspicions towards Hungary were unfounded.
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Moreover, he was a junior clerk, and his proposals were mostly side-
lined by senior officials at an early stage.29
In reality, the Hungarian refusal triggered mixed feelings in the
Foreign Office. Csáky’s promise that the railroad tunnels near Kassa
would be blown up if the Wehrmacht would have attempted enforcing the
passage turned out to be lies, which repulsed British policy-makers.30 C. A.
Macartney and Gyula Juhász pointed out that officials in Whitehall
believed that Hungary asked for a free hand in Transylvania for allowing
the passage and only after the German rejection they make the decision to
refuse allowing a military passage.31 However, it would be a mistake to
think that for these reasons British perceptions in relations to Hungary
were always and consistently negative. Both junior and senior officials in
Whitehall still displayed great trust in Horthy’s and Teleki’s ability to
mount stiff resistance to German demands incompatible with Hungarian
independence, such as a military passage.32
Historians have not pointed out that at the same time as refusing to
open the Kassa railway Csáky declared that a similar request for a passage
towards Romania would be granted without hesitation in return for
supporting Hungarian claims for Transylvania.33 The question had not
been raised by Berlin at that time, but Csáky’s statement amply demon-
strates the Hungarian stance in the matter.
During the ‘Phoney War’ Britain found itself caught between
Nazi-Soviet cooperation and its own military weakness in its Central
European strategy. Military options had to be reconsidered; opening a
Balkan front and defending Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia against
German aggression was ruled out and the strategic emphasis shifted to the
defence of vital imperial lifelines in the Mediterranean.34 This however did
not mean that London would not do its utmost to limit German expansion
in the region. The consequence, as we would see from the response to the
Hungarian agreement to the prospect of a German military passage in
April 1940, was a confusing vacillation between decisions taken in the
short-term military interest, and decisions dictated by the interest in long-
term political goals in the wider regions of East Central and South East
Europe.
Hungary grants military passage to Germany
The first confirmation that Hungary might be willing to grant passage was
reported to London by O’Malley in early March 1940. Taking advantage
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of the opportunity of the 20th anniversary of Horthy’s election as
Regent, O’Malley requested a private audience to probe him on German-
Hungarian relations. The meeting offered some deeply revealing insights
into the recent dramatic development of Hungarian foreign policy. Horthy
avoided O’Malley’s direct questions about the possibility of Hungarian
acquiescence to a German military passage. He remained very ambiguous
and talked around the subject at great length. He extensively dwelt upon
the disaster impending in Europe and the difficulties with which Hungary
was confronted. Notably however, he referred to ‘the sombre nature’ of the
decision he would have to take if Germany, determined to make a dash for
the Romanian oilfields, offered him the choice between regaining
Transylvania and armed German intervention. Regardless of O’Malley’s
persistence in demanding the declaration of a clear policy, Horthy only
noted that Hungary’s attitude depended on Mussolini’s willingness to
stand by Hungary. The meeting left O’Malley profoundly uneasy.
Regardless of being sympathetic towards moderate frontier revision, he
was evidently unable to comprehend why Horthy would place regaining
Transylvania before Hungarian independence. Judging from Horthy’s
circumspect attitude O’Malley was convinced that the question of military
passage had recently been brought up by Berlin again, and Hungarian
policy-makers were now intensely debating their options.35
Ultimately Horthy’s lack of political and diplomatic skill accounts
for his surprising frankness. Previously, Teleki was careful not to reveal
his card to the British. Horthy’s comment on the ‘sombre nature’ of the
decision about Transylvania seems to be a slip of the tongue, that later
caused considerable headaches to Teleki. In an attempt to repair Hungary’s
reputation in Britain Teleki took matters in his own hands. When
O’Malley requested clarification from Foreign Minister Csáky, keen to
prevent the meeting, Teleki stormed out of an ongoing Cabinet meeting to
confer with O’Malley personally.36 During their interview, the British
minister pressed the case of the importance of Hungarian resistance to any
German requests for transit, but sounded very vague in his argument
against such Hungarian actions. Since the outbreak of the war, quite
strikingly, O’Malley did not receive detailed instructions about the official
British attitude towards the question of Hungarian armed resistance;
therefore in his reasoning he could only stress Britain’s obvious strategic
interest that blocking further German expansion in the region was vital
both for Britain and Hungary.
Teleki appeared to be fully aware of the importance of Hungarian
resistance for London, and as a result, by vaguely referring to the
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possibility of a firm Hungarian protest, he attempted to take the wind
out of O’Malley’s complaints and to reassure British anxieties: “[…] it
seems to me that if we are to be robbed of our independence we can either
voluntarily submit ourselves […], or we can make it plain that we have
been overridden by brute force, in which case we can at least preserve the
hope of recovering our liberty later on.” 37 Highly skilful in his tactics, he
obviously aimed to probe O’Malley as to whether a mere diplomatic
protest would suffice to retain British sympathy. Historians have often
stressed that Teleki held great and genuine affection towards Britain and
tried his utmost to win British support both for Hungarian independence
and territorial aspirations. However, a deeper examination of the Anglo-
Hungarian relationship, and the problem of the German military passage in
particular, provide ample evidence that Teleki’s political course and
diplomatic moves were largely dictated by the determination that Hungary
could not abandon revisionism, and his conduct in this context had little
regard for British opinion.
Regardless of the obscurity of Horthy’s and Teleki’s words, the
evidence suggests that Teleki tried to maintain a balance between the
Allies and Germany with the unquestionable aim of preserving Hungarian
independence and neutrality as far as possible. In the process, until late
March, Teleki was able to resist German requests for a way-leave
passage.38
Since the final destruction of Czechoslovakia in March 1939,
German military passage through Hungary, or German-Hungarian military
aggression against Romania had been expected in Whitehall. Hence, the
response to O’Malley’s reports, which merely reiterated the possibility of
German military movements, was minimal. The probable Hungarian
acquiescence nevertheless stirred up some crude emotions, which vividly
demonstrated the mind-set of key policy-makers. For instance, Alexander
Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the
effective head of the Foreign Office, referred to Horthy’s comments with
sharp disapproval: “Disgusting!”39 At the same time, the British were keen
to forge the mutual cooperation of South East Europe against Germany. A
clear sign of this increased British interest was the calling of the heads of
British missions in the region to a conference in London. Before leaving
for the conference, O’Malley requested to see Teleki once again to find out
more about the recent meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at the
Brenner Pass. Teleki was anxious to convey that neither the Axis nor
Hungarian policy had changed as a result of the Brenner talks. The
interview did not bring tangible results, but O’Malley described Teleki as
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being unusually reticent, and was convinced that the Hungarian premier
had something to hide.40 O’Malley soon left for London, at a crucial
turning point for Hungary and the Anglo-Hungarian relationship. While he
was away, Teleki finally bowed to persistent German pressure and granted
military passage to the Wehrmacht.41 It is not beyond the bounds of
possibility that the fact that O’Malley was away provided a pressure-free
opportunity for Teleki to acquiesce to German demands; nevertheless,
O’Malley was only informed about the Hungarian decision upon his
return. 42
The meetings of British representatives in London dedicated very
limited attention to Hungary. The focus of the conference was to discuss
Britain’s vital strategic interests in the region. Debate centred on the
Turkish attitude towards the war, and the possibilities of providing help to
Romania, which at the time faced intense political and economic pressure
from Germany and the Soviet Union. Because of its important strategic
position in the vicinity of the Straits, special attention was also placed on
bringing Bulgaria closer to the Allies. These questions overshadowed the
problems surrounding Hungary, which clearly demonstrated its relative
strategic insignificance. However, during the time of the conference,
reports were received about the recent meetings between Hitler and
Mussolini at the Brenner Pass and its possible implications for Central and
South East Europe. These news once again set British strategic planning in
motion.
Historians have underlined the Brenner conference as the decisive
event in the completion of a German-Italian military alliance, an iconic
encounter of the two dictators, where Hitler finally persuaded Mussolini to
join the war on the side of Germany.43 This view of Brenner has persisted
in the writings of Hungarian historians, who have not recognized its far-
reaching implications for Central and South East Europe, and Hungary in
particular.44 Sources about the Brenner meetings are limited, and the
surviving accounts are deliberately ambiguous: German, Italian and Hun-
garian documents do not mention that the question of Hungary was ever
brought up.45 By comparison, British official sources strongly suggest that
at the Brenner Pass Central and South East Europe had been carved up into
a German and Italian sphere of influence, and in exchange for greater
dominance in Greece and the Mediterranean, Mussolini had given up the
protection of Hungary. Due to losing the protection of Italy, Budapest was
left with limited room to manoeuvre against Germany, which, this study
argues, became the primary reason for providing a carte blanche to the
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Wehrmacht to pass through Hungarian territory if Berlin deemed it
necessary at a future date.
London received the news through unspecified and highly con-
fidential diplomatic sources that Hitler at the Brenner Pass bluntly broke
the news of the imminent invasion of Romania to Mussolini, who realised
that Hungary would serve as a transit route in the process.46 More detailed
information started to flow from mid-April. Then the French reported that
members of the Italian Embassy in London openly declared that as a result
of the Brenner Conference Italian policy was forced to make a dramatic
turn in respect to Hungary. They admitted that Italy would now be unable
to do anything in Hungary against German wishes, and the Duce was
helpless to protect that country if Germany wanted to enforce a military
transit.47
A little later, information from the highest Hungarian circles con-
firmed the connection between the Brenner meeting and Hungary’s deci-
sion to allow German military movements. Ian Campbell, the British
minister in Belgrade, conveyed Horthy’s words to the Foreign Office. In a
direct message to Campbell, Horthy readily explained in plain words that
due to the change in Hungary’s position after the Brenner meetings it had
been decided in Budapest to allow the entry and passage of German troops
to Romania.48 At the same time, diplomatic and intelligence sources
reported heavy German military concentrations along the frontiers of
Hungary which underpinned the supposition in Whitehall that the sub-
jugation of Romania (and Hungary) was planned. (The same sources
however all described the German disappointment about the on-going
operations in Norway, and how the sluggishness of the campaign was most
likely to upset the original intention to occupy Romania before the summer
campaign on the Western front).49
If the British had any doubts about the Hungarian attitude towards
the question of any German military passage, they soon disappeared after
O’Malley’s return to Budapest. Disturbed by the rumours of the increased
German pressure for a passage, O’Malley, evidently in possession of
clearer instructions this time, pressed Teleki at their meeting on 20 April to
declare Hungary’s response to these German requests. Annoyed at being
forced into a corner, Teleki firmly rejected giving an answer: “[In] this
question […] I tolerate no intervention. What Hungary does […] is Hun-
gary’s business and it would be inconsistent with our dignity to give way
to the pressure that now you put on us to declare ourselves.”50An affirma-
tive answer to a German request could be held responsible for the sudden
dramatic change in Teleki’s tone. At the same time, as Teleki later
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admitted, the scant British attention to Hungary also played a crucial
role in yielding to German demands. Henceforth, Teleki did not even try to
prevent Csáky from trampling over the previously carefully protected
relationship with London, and did not block him from meeting O’Malley.
Keen to avoid these persistent interrogations, Teleki now sent Csáky to
break the news to the British minister that Hungary would not in any way
resist any German request and the railway line running through Kassa
[Košice] and Ungvár [Uzhhorod] would be put at the disposal of the
German army if it wanted to use it to invade Romania. However, it would
be misleading to put Csáky unduly in the role of a staunch advocate of
German orientation. According to O’Malley’s account, the Hungarian
Foreign Minister looked deeply shaken when he gloomily explained the
reasons for the decision: “The other alternative would be forcible
resistance to the German army. This could at best only last for a few days.
[…] Put yourself in my place and ask yourself what would you do?”51
O’Malley, compared to his predecessor Geoffrey Knox, was
genuinely fond of Hungary. He evidently felt kinship with the problems of
small nations in Central Europe, and to a certain degree he even sympa-
thized with Hungarian revisionism.52 He regarded the efforts Teleki and
Horthy had made for maintaining Hungarian independence highly, but
now felt bitter and disillusioned by the turn in Hungary’s foreign policy. A
little later, O’Malley learned from a close friend of Horthy that the
Brenner Conference, the recent successes of the Germans in Norway and
more precisely the British inability to protect Norway from a German
invasion, had confirmed the Hungarians in their decision that a way-leave
passage should be provided to Germany.53 Hence, upon his return to
Budapest realizing the shift in Hungarian foreign policy, O’Malley
recommended the immediate and complete restriction of trading raw and
war materials with Hungary, which he argued, would eventually fall into
German hands.54
The reaction of the Foreign Office
O’Malley’s reports brought deep-seated prejudices against Hungary in
Whitehall to the surface. The Hungarian decision was viewed as a cohernt
element of a tendentiously pro-German Hungarian policy, which left no
doubt about Hungary’s future attitude. Even though Hungary was con-
sidered militarily invaluable in British grand strategy after the collapse of
Poland, a German military passage through Hungary touched on a nerve
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and shifted British perceptions about Hungary and the Hungarian
political elite in particular. The question of how London should react
triggered intense soul-searching in the Foreign Office. The debate centred
on the problem’s immediate implications over the defence of Romania,
war trade with Hungary and the future of the Anglo-Hungarian relation-
ship. The question divided senior officials. ’Rab’ Butler, the Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recommended that the situation
should be ruthlessly exploited to cause trouble to Germany. His suggestion
that inducing Hungary to armed resistance would be a gain for the British
war effort, no matter how modest, proves that foreign affairs were now
inextricably mingled with defense considerations.55 Robert Vansittart, the
former head of the Foreign Office, also known for his deep antipathy
towards Hungary, also criticized the lack of active British support to
neutrals. After being kicked upstairs to become Chief Diplomatic Advisor
(a role with no direct influence on policy-making) Vansittart had now
evidently taken the opportunity to blame Britain’s diminishing reputation
in the region both on the mismanagement of British foreign policy and
Hungarian revisionism.56
As the debate reached the senior levels the tone became more
pragmatic. Orme Sargent, the head of the Southern Department raised his
voice against jumping into half-baked adventures and immediately
sidetracked Butler’s proposition. Sargent, who harbored feelings of resent-
ment towards the Hungarian elite, mostly due to Magyarization in the late
19th century, did not seem surprised by the Hungarian decision and felt
confirmed in his long-standing suspicions about a German-Hungarian
conspiracy against Romania. His response on the other hand also reflected
his broader understanding of the strategic implications of Hungary’s ‘volte
face’. Sargent was convinced that egging the Hungarian government to
resist Germany was inadvisable, as the short-term advantage of a brief
Hungarian resistance was outweighed by the long-term political dis-
advantage of being once more accused of failing to help a neutral state.57
This statement corroborate Macartney’s argument, which emphasized that
an openly pro-British Hungarian foreign policy in early 1940 would have
been an embarrassment for London, as Britain lacked the means to provide
adequate help. Cadogan wholeheartedly agreed with Sargent, but made an
interesting remark, which puts his earlier appalling opinion about Horthy
into context. He now stressed that a country that was not keen to commit
suicide cannot be treated harshly at the peace conference. Comments such
as this contradict the picture often painted by historians about Cadogan,
whose attitude towards Central Europe and the Balkans have so far been
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judged largely in the light of his often derogatory diary entries.58 From
the outbreak of the war Cadogan was involved in post-war planning to a
great extent and the evidence suggests that he advocated the creation of a
peace settlement which would not have divided the region into victors and
vanquished.59
We know very little about the opinion of Foreign Secretary Lord
Halifax about Hungary in the spring of 1940.60 He seldom minuted
Foreign Office files, and the examination of his official memoranda on
Central Europe and the Balkans do not bringing us closer to his mindset
either. The accuracy of these official memoranda in projecting British
official policy had also been widely questioned by historians. David Dilks
has pointed out that memoranda initialed by Halifax were often compiled
either by Oliver Stanley, Halifax’s private secretary, or by senior officials
in the Foreign Office.61
Indeed, British Cabinet memoranda on the Balkans and Central
Europe in the spring of 1940 are very vague and exhibit a large amount of
indifference. They do not mention the problem of German military passage
at all, but dwell extensively on insignificant issues, such as strong anti-
German feelings in the region and exuded ungrounded optimism about the
temporality of the loss of British prestige.62 Completely disregarding the
implications of the Brenner meetings, these documents did not entirely
exclude the possibility of the Italian protection of Hungary against German
aggression. Considering the fate of Hungary to be an unusually high
priority in Italian policy they expected, or perhaps wished for, a German-
Italian quarrel over Hungary or other positions in the Balkans.63 Another
memorandum in late April similarly misjudged the Balkan status quo, and
Halifax proudly declared that the Balkan Bloc, consisting of Romania,
Yugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria, had been created and declared that
British prospects in these countries, with the backing of the Anglo-French-
Turkish alliance, were highly promising.64 Due to the unreliability of these
primary sources, in the analysis Halifax’s opinion, we have to rely on the
scarce number of minutes in Foreign Office files scribbled by Halifax
personally.65 The fact that he mostly only initialed the minutes written by
Sargent and Cadogan, as a sign of concurrence, or simply minuted ‘I
agree’, leave no doubt that on Hungarian matters the Foreign Secretary
largely relied on their viewpoints. These observations attach added
importance to Sargent’s and Cadogan’s opinion in analyzing the official
British opinion of Hungary, all the more so, as in most cases, besides
Halifax, they represented the Foreign Office’s viewpoint at Cabinet
meetings.
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Hungary’s persistent revisionist ambitions, and more crucially
the notion that for its pro-German policy Hungary would be rewarded with
territories at the expense of its neighbours, were now linked with the
German military passage and consequently became the permanent feature
in the British judgement of Hungary. Consequently, this did not only affect
perceptions about Hungary’s future attitude, but also questioned the
viability of Hungary’s earlier territorial acquisitions, the First Vienna
Award and the occupation of Ruthenia, which were now seen as proof of a
long-term German-Hungarian collaboration. Cadogan, Sargent and other
senior policy-makers were convinced that for allowing a military transit
through her territory Hungary would receive Eastern Slovakia as a re-
ward.66
Even though the British foreign policy-making elite now seemed
to have lost faith in Hungary, their reaction to a yet mostly unknown
Hungarian proposition, from a very different quarter, suggests that the lack
of trust was only felt towards the current Hungarian political elite.
Historiography usually suggests that Count Mihály Károlyi, the contro-
versial and left wing president of Hungary after the Great War (1918-19),
had only taken up a political role in the Hungarian anti-fascist emigration
in Britain from 1941.67 New evidence however indicates that he was active
as early as April 1940. Urievicz, an emissary of Károlyi, called on the
Foreign Office in late April and requested British approval for Károlyi’s
plan to offer Ruthenia to the Soviet Union in return for a Soviet guarantee
of Hungary’s independence. Minutes suggest that Orchard and Robert in
the Central Department approached Károlyi’s group positively, and were
keen to sound out Urievicz on the views of a Hungarian political group
which opposed both Hitler and the current Hungarian regime, but because
of the current Nazi-Soviet cooperation they were convinced that Moscow
would not support such a scheme, thus Károlyi’s emissary was not
received.68
“Our fate is being decided now between Namur and Sedan.”69 The
Anglo-Hungarian relationship in the first weeks of the Battle of
France
The decisive moment on the Western front came on 10 May, when
Germany launched a major offensive against the Allies. György Barcza in
London, and the Hungarian elite in Budapest, anxiously waited for the
outcome of the battle, praying for an Allied victory. The aim here is to
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determine whether the outbreak of hostilities on the Western front
brought about change in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship, and in what
direction the war pushed the crippled image of Hungary in London.
Immediately before the Battle of France O’Malley sounded out
Teleki on Hungary’s attitude towards the war and Germany, with the aim
to find out whether the Hungarian position had changed towards a German
military transit. The intense conversation highlighted the enormous
contrast between Hungarian and British perceptions about the limits of
acceptable cooperation between Budapest and Berlin. Frustrated over the
lack of information Teleki was providing, O’Malley firmly indicated that
opening Hungarian territory in return for frontier revision in Transylvania
may have grave consequences for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship and
could result in reducing British raw material export to Hungary. A
seemingly very enervated Teleki, frustrated about the British threats,
exclaimed that this would be the best way to push Hungary into Ger-
many’s arms.70
Teleki, guided by the vision of Hungary’s messianic mission in the
Carpathian basin, was convinced that the security of Hungary could only
be guaranteed by the restoration of Greater Hungary.71 O’Malley and key
British policy-makers refused to accept the idea that the purpose of frontier
revision was to build a geographically and militarily strong Hungary at the
expanse of other nations. They were baffled by Teleki’s policy, which
seemingly was even prepared to collaborate with Germany to achieve this
aim.72
The Teleki-O’Malley meeting on 11 May resonates with this
notion. Teleki, once again showed considerable annoyance towards
O’Malley and blamed British lack of support for allowing a German
passage, if they asked. Teleki was particularly adamant, declaring that the
current situation on the Western front was the result of the failure of
Britain and France to check Hitler when it was still possible, and to
address the territorial problems of Central Europe. He also indicated that
he would not accept territory from either Britain or Germany, and hinted
that Hungary now wished to take matters into its own hands.73 The
Hungarian anger and self-pity over Trianon, which earlier was rigorously
projected towards Britain in an attempt to gather sympathy, now in the
dilemma of collaboration or occupation, turned into intense irritation
towards Britain. The argument that Hungary would not defend Romania,
by refusing military passage to Germany, appeared during this meeting for
the first time, and concurrently served as a justification for action towards
London. The fact that the concept only appeared about a month after the
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actual Hungarian decision occured questions whether it was genuine.
Whether Teleki used this argument as a pretext cannot be decided
conclusively, nevertheless it failed to deceive O’Malley and the Foreign
Office, who considered this argument a fabrication.
Teleki, although irritated with British passivity, continued the
policy of reassurance towards London. He sent Béla Randvánszky to
London, with the message that Hungary would protest at a German
military passage, but the regime and Horthy would stay in place to prevent
the appointment of a Quisling government and any Gleichschaltung of the
country.74 The Hungarian born Lady Listowel, who had connections with
the highest Foreign Office circles, was also sent to London to convey
Teleki’s message of continued neutrality in the war. However, as a result
of Hungary’s compliance to a German passage, the Foreign Office
thereafter turned a deaf ear to these pledges and disregarded them as false
promises.75 These missions failed to influence British perceptions, as
Hungarian assurances were intentionally left vague to avoid angering
Berlin with any resemblence to a pro-British policy.76 Also, these ambi-
guous promises were unable to outweigh the official pro-German rhetho-
ric, the Axis friendly tone of the Hungarian press and the violent anti-
Western invectives of Csáky.77 These kind of diplomatic balancing acts
were acceptable for London during the Czech crises of 1938, but since the
outbreak of war it caused intense displeasure.78
The implications of the droit de passage on British Central and South
East European policy and its impact on the Anglo-Hungarian relation-
ship
The Hungarian decision carried profound implications for British Central
and South East European policy. For one, militarily, Whitehall found the
prospect of an effortless German military transit through Hungary
particularly alarming, because it brought the Wehrmacht dangerously close
to Britain’s vital strategic interests in Greece, Turkey and the Eastern
Mediterranean. Politically, Hungary’s acquiescence, and Britain’s inability
to check German expansion in Hungary, could have sent the signal to
Romania, Greece and Turkey that London could do nothing to prevent
them from falling under the German yoke, which would only be avoidable
if they followed the Hungarian example and yielded.  Also, it potentially
provided the German economy access to essential raw materials, such as
Romanian petroleum and agricultural products and non-ferrous metals
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from mines in Yugoslavia. The sharp contrast between the strong con-
demnation expressed behind closed doors in London, and the seemingly
indifferent official reaction points to the curious conflict and interplay of
short and long-term political, economic and military interests in the wider
region, which evidently worked on a far broader scale than the Anglo-
Hungarian relationship. British military strategy in the Balkans is beside
the point here. The aim is to demonstrate the impact of the Hungarian
decision on British policy towards Hungary and the wider Central and
South East European region.
In London, the swift German occupation of South East Europe
appeared to be inevitable as soon as hostilities broke out on the Western
front in May. Based on O’Malley’s alarming accounts and a fresh report
by the British military attaché in Budapest, the possibility of any
Hungarian resistance to a German passage was completely ruled out by
late April.79 One can immediately argue that the Hungarian decision had a
minimal impact on British strategy, due to the fact that after the collapse of
Poland, Hungary and Romania were already written off in military
planning, and that by late 1939 the British also ruled out any possibility of
opening a Balkan front. However, regardless of its military weaknesses,
the British were far from ignoring the political and military possibilities
the region had to offer in the war. The immediate primary concern was the
probable discouraging effect of Hungary’s decision on Romania’s
determination to resist German aggression. With the aim to increase the
prospects of armed Romanian resistance, London went out of its way to
assure Bucharest of British support. Moreover, to avoid disheartening the
Romanians it was decided that all efforts should be made to prevent the
news from reaching Bucharest.
The prospect of Hungarian yielding also had a significant impact
on Anglo-Hungarian trade. Earlier, Hugh Dalton, the Minister of
Economic Warfare, was convinced that by offering supplementary export
and import quotas, Hungary, which was in desperate need of raw materials
to modernise its industry and army, could be encouraged to resist German
aggression. Now, reflecting on the new situation, Dalton reversed his
viewpoint and proposed the complete suspension of all war material
exports and that further import quotas should be refused.80 By comparison,
the Ministry of Supply was apparently still very interested in maintaining
trade-relations unchanged, as it was keen to secure the import of
mechanical parts and ammunition from Hungarian arms manufacturers.
Thus, they recommended refraining from diplomatic protests or imposing
an economic embargo in order not to compromise trade with Hungary.81
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In the interwar period the Foreign Office was not in a position
to influence British trade policies, which was a rather intriguing charac-
teristic of the British foreign policy-making process, but on this occasion
the direct intervention of Halifax provided an exception. The Foreign
Office unanimously agreed to maintain a rigid set of criteria in trading
with Hungary in the future; contraband-control remained tightly enforced
and exceptions were not allowed.82 War material exports to Hungary in
excess of pre-war levels were also prohibited, but even though Halifax and
the senior officials of the Foreign Office were convinced that strength-
ening the Hungarian Army with war-trade would eventually strengthen the
Wehrmacht, which after the probable occupation of Hungary would disarm
the Hungarians, war material trade remained largely unrestricted.83 The
top-secret scheme of importing Bofors air-defence guns and ammunition,
manufactured in Hungary under Swedish licence, for the defence of
Britain and Portugal seemed to have a critical role in the decision to
maintain friendly diplomatic relations with Hungary and for keeping war-
trade unrestricted.84 Halifax was very interested in acquiring these guns
from Hungary and believed that putting political and economic restrictions
on the Anglo-Hungarian trade would cause resentment in Budapest, which
could endanger the Bofors scheme.85 In order to help the deal, Halifax and
the War Office both expressed their willingness to satisfy future Hungarian
requests for increased import quotas, if it would facilitate the
manufacturing of the Bofors guns.86
Whitehall’s disapproval of the constant flow of overtly anti-
Hungarian newspaper articles in the British press, which kept reiterating
the possibility of a German-Hungarian military alliance, also demonstrates
the utmost determination to avoid compromising friendly relations with
Budapest. For instance, in early May, the Evening Standard enthu-
siastically claimed that Hungary aimed to regain Transylvania with
German assistance, and would allow a German military passage through
its territory in return.87 Barcza, being completely unaware that Hungary
provided a military carte blanche to Germany, as standard procedure,
vehemently protested against the publication of the article, which, he
believed unduly put Hungary in a negative light.88 Even though Cadogan
grew more and more certain about a German-Hungarian military coopera-
tion against Romania, to maintain cordiality between London and Buda-
pest, he acceded to Barcza’s request and took steps to prevent any
recurrence.89
For all these reasons, O’Malley was instructed to maintain friendly
relations with Budapest, and was advised that instead of issuing an official
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diplomatic démarche, British reservations should only be raised in a
personal letter to Csáky, which nevertheless should highlight the
inconsistency of Hungary’s move with the concept of neutrality. 90
However, in the longrun, the matter proved to be a critical water-
shed in the Anglo-Hungarian relationship and made a dramatic impact on
British perceptions about Hungary and regional policy alike. Primarily, it
raised doubts about the earnestness and trustworthiness of the Hungarian
elite, which brought questions about Hungary’s post-war social and
political structure to the forefront. Furthermore, the earlier tacit consent to
Hungary’s recent territorial acquisitions now came under review in
London. It is becoming increasingly important to review the enduring
viewpoint of this era’s historiography that Hungary’s adherence to the
Tripartite Pact in November 1940 and the participation in the invasion of
Yugoslavia in 1941 were ultimately responsible for the deterioration of the
British view of Hungary. The evidence set out here strongly suggests that
allowing access to Hungarian territory had a more far-reaching impact on
British opinion.
The Foreign Office blamed Hungary’s increasing cooperation with
Germany on Horthy’s apparent reluctance to commit Hungary against its
powerful neighbour, which was believed to be the result of the Regent’s
inherent admiration of German militarism and his continued inability to
control the pro-German elements of the army’s high command. Also,
senior policy-makers viewed Horthy’s subservient attitude as the natural
continuation of the German-Austro-Hungarian military alliance in the
Great War, a notion, which in British perceptions determined Hungary’s
place on Germany’s side in a future conflict and became responsible for
seeing Hungary as unreliable. Since Trianon, senior officials often referred
to Hungary as one of the main culprit of the Great War, a country, which
deserved dismemberment at Trianon due to the impatient Magyarization of
its minorities in the dualist era. Hungary’s current behaviour consolidated
these deeply held perceptions.91
Teleki’s positive image in London also crumbled. The Central
Department, which oversaw Czechoslovak and Hungarian affairs, until
now expressed its appreciation for all the work Teleki had done for
Hungarian independence and neutrality. However, after this shift in
Hungarian foreign policy Roberts and Orchard uttered their deepest
disappointment and irritation over Teleki’s dubious conduct.
These developments had a profound impact on the dwindling
Anglo-Czechoslovak relationship, which since the outbreak of the war had
been deeply troubled over the issue of the status of the Czecho-Slovak
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émigrés in London. Edvard Beneš, the last Czechoslovak president and
now head of the Czech émigrés, demanded the repudiation of the Munich
Agreement and the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Committee
as a legal government-in-exile. Suspicious about his political machinations
and keen to avoid being drawn into political and territorial commitments,
the British until then exhibited extreme reluctance to recognise this émigré
group, but increasing German-Hungarian collaboration eventually broke
the deadlock. Upon receiving news of the Hungarian decision about the
passage of German troops through Hungary, Roberts and Orchard, guided
by the strategic priority to find allies on the continent, now recommended
that more support should be given to nations, such as the Czechs, which
were ready to make sacrifices for the Allied cause. 92
Hungary’s “unreliability” as a potential partner in the struggle
against Germany set British Central European policy in motion. Since the
Munich Agreement, in order to keep its options open, in official
communications London was careful to appear neither pro-Czech nor pro-
Hungarian. Until March 1940 the same caution was recognisable towards
the Hungarian-Czechoslovak territorial dispute, and its arbitrary settlement
in November 1938, the First Vienna Award.93 The new situation changed
the way London perceived Prague’s and Budapest’s future role and weight
in post-war Central Europe. Roberts, who previously exhibited strong
reservations about Beneš, now insisted on abandoning impartiality in the
Hungarian-Czechoslovak rivalry and recommended that soothing
Hungarian anxieties regarding the developing Anglo-Czechoslovak friend-
ship or the future Czechoslovak frontiers was now unnecessary as Hungary
had committed itself on the side of the enemy.94
British Central European priorities shift: the changing significance of
the German military passage through Hungary
Hungarian historiography did not recognise that until the ‘droit’ affair the
Czech émigré question in London had a Hungarian angle, and London was
reluctant to decide between Prague and Budapest.95 In early July however,
at the recommendation of Halifax, the Cabinet decided to recognise the
Czecho-Slovak National Committee as the provisional government of the
Czecho-Slovak peoples.96 The reasons for the decision were both strategic
and political. As a result of the defeat of France and Hungary’s openly pro-
German policy, Halifax stressed that the opinions of Paris and Budapest
could now be ignored.97 Despite the recognition, London still explicitly
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refused to commit to the future frontiers of the Czecho-Slovak state, but
compared to 1939, when similar reservations were expressed, the question
lost its Hungarian dimension. 98
We have noted the disagreement between O’Malley and the
Foreign Office about the direction of British policy should take over
Hungary. Now, the recognition of the Czech émigrés brought the differ-
ences to the surface, which eventually clarified the impact of the droit de
passage on British perceptions over the question of the future of
Hungary’s recent territorial gains. Earlier in February Sargent had noted
his dissatisfaction over O`Malley’s pro-Hungarian inclination and minuted
with discontent that “[…] the Hungarians have an eloquent advocate in the
person of His Majesty’s representative”.99 Later in July Sargent was
particularly annoyed over O’Malley’s recommendation that in order to
prevent Hungarian flirtations with Germany Hungary’s territorial claims in
Transylvania should be officially supported.100 Due to O’Malley’s pro-
Hungarian views on frontier revision, and perhaps to avoid his unneces-
sary protests, the Foreign Office deliberately failed to inform him that the
Czech émigrés would receive recognition. O’Malley, on receiving the
news felt let down and deprived of any opportunities to sooth Hungarian
anxieties or to influence Hungarian foreign policy.101 One of the most
significant results to emerge from this spat was that during the ensuing
discussion, the Foreign Office categorically asserted that the Hungarian
decision to grant military passage to Germany in April crucially influenced
the decision to recognise the Czecho-Slovak Committee as a provisional
government.102
Before the French defeat, while the British Expeditionary Force
was standing and fighting on the continent, the Hungarian attitude in the
matter of German military passage was of primary importance in British
Central and South East European policy. However, after the Allied
collapse the question seemed to be less pressing in terms of strategic
planning. For this reason, and also due to the fact that the passage did not
occur, British official criticism of Hungarian policy had somewhat
softened by the autumn of 1940. Thus, when German troops passed
through Hungary via Romania in October en masse the matter did not
disturb the Foreign Office to the same degree as it did earlier in April. (By
agreeing to the German-Italian arbitration of the Hungarian-Romanian
territorial dispute, the Second Vienna Award, Hungary consented to allow
the transfer of German troops to Romania).103 By the turn of the year, the
use of Hungarian territory lost most of its strategic implications, but as we
would see, regardless of the evidently softened disapproval of Hungary’s
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foreign policy, resentment towards the Hungarian elite had not changed
and for this the decision to allow a German passage remained responsible.
Hungarian historiography has shown considerable confusion about
British policy towards Hungary in late 1940 and early 1941. András Bán
and Ignác Romsics interpreted the prolonged debates within the Foreign
Office, a common mechanism of policy-making in London, as the sign of
intense fluctuation and inconsistency in official policy. Bán and Romsics
percieved the formulation of British opinion as a series of balanced and
meticulous debates, a series of consensus achieved by the painstaking and
equal participation of the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign
Office, which considered every possible scenario to reach a wise and
sensible decision. In effect, the process was largely the uncoordinated
interaction of governmental departments and influential officials.
Decisions, particularly on secondary issues such as Hungary, were often
made hastily, based on limited information by the department heads of the
Foriegn Office, without consulting higher authority. The Foreign Secretary
and the Cabinet only dealt with Hungarian questions when they gathered
primary importance in regional war strategy.
For these reasons, view-points of the military passage varied
significantly depending on the participants of discussions and how it
related to British grand strategy at the particular moment. For instance,
nobody has taken the trouble to juxtopose the correspondence of the two
departments responsible for the region, the Central and Southern, which
long had been quarelling about the direction of policy towards Hungary.
This debate became particularly prominent from late 1940. Such analysis
would have revealed that the issue of a German military passage does not
only serve as a barometer for the Anglo-Hungarian relationship but also as
a the showpiece of the dynamics of British grand strategy in the region,
and as a window to the workings of the British foreign policy-making
process.
Neither Bán nor Romsics realised that the Southern and Central
Departments were at odds over the policy Britain should follow towards
Hungary. A comparison of the Central Department’s policy in the
Hungarian-Czechoslovak relationship with that of the Southern, which
dealt with the Hungarian-Romanian dispute separately, indeed projects the
distinct impression of confusion in British policy. In January 1941 Britain
severed diplomatic relations with Bucharest claiming that Romania
became the base of the German army. For this reason, the Central
Department, although still critical about the the pro-German attitude of the
Hungarian elite, recommended a friendly policy towards Hungary, which
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in effect demonstrates the diminishing significance of Hungary’s earlier
stand on the military passage. Bán mistakenly interpreted the contrast
between Cadogan’s disapproval of the Second Vienna Award in
September 1940 and Makins’ positive tone towards Hungary in early 1941
in the Central Department as a positive shift in British opinion. During the
course of the first three months of 1941, Makins and Roberts, the senior
officials of the Central Department, articulated a surprisingly lenient and
friendly tone towards Hungary.104 They blocked the request of the
Treasury to freeze Hungarian financial assets in London - moreover their
tone occasionally suggested that they were toying with the idea of basing
British post-war Central European strategy on a strong and territorially
bigger Hungary.105
On the other hand, from 1941 Orme Sargent, the head of the
Southern Department, strongly pressed for a pro-Romanian policy in the
Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute over Transylvania. He constantly
used the Hungarian decisions made in April and October about a German
passage as the basis of his anti-Hungarian tone. He was startled that
London still maintained contacts with a country that allowed the easy
passage of Nazis towards the Mediterranean.106 Vansittart shared Sargent’s
view-point and also recommended that diplomatic relations with Hungary
should be immediately severed, as the Hungarian elite was completely on
the side of Nazi Germany and thus the country was under enemy
control.107 Roberts, who defended Hungary and explained that the country
was only a corridor for Germany, not like Romania, immediately sidelined
these arguments.108
It seems curious that Makins and Roberts, who arguably carried
less influence in decision-making at Cabinet level than Sargent, managed
to lead the formulation of policy towards Hungary in the early months of
1941. It is not our aim to enter into a prolonged analysis of the British
foreign policy-making process but to point out that until the attitude of
Hungary became a primary concern in the Yugoslav crisis in April 1941,
the Foreign Office, particularly its Central Department, was allowed to
direct the conduct of policy. When in April the German aggression in the
Balkans seemed imminent, the defence of Yugoslavia and Greece became
a primary British strategic interest, and thus Cadogan, Eden and the
Cabinet overruled the recommendations of the Central Department and
decided that attaining allies on the continent by supporting Yugoslavia was
more important than securing the friendship of Budapest. Hence
diplomatic relations with Budapest was broken off on 7 April for the
reason that Budapest allowed Hungarian territory to become a German
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base in the assault on Yugoslavia. In April 1941 the shift in the strategic
situation in the Balkans necessitated the adjustment of British priorities.
Consequently, the Anglo-Hungarian relationship became subordinated to
these.
Conclusion
Many historians have criticised Britain because it expected second-ranking
powers to make sacrifices on the altar of the Allied cause.109 The evidence
set out here suggest that these claims are unteanable in the case of
Hungary, which during 1940-41 was never asked to follow an openly pro-
British policy or to declare war on Germany. Both O’Malley and Barcza
stressed on numerous occassions to the Foreign Office that with a British
promise of the revision of the Trianon frontiers Hungary could have been
instantly turned against Germany. This card however was never played by
Whitehall. The evidence suggests that through diplomatic channels Buda-
pest was strongly urged to resist German political, and economic pressure,
and to deny the right of military passage, but direct threats or military and
other promises were never used to influence the direction of Hungarian
foreign policy.
This article has also re-examined some of the statements made by
British and Hungarian historians and by scrutinising a large number of
hitherto unused sources has concluded that Teleki did not decide to pursue
a closer cooperation with Germany as the consequence of the Allied defeat
in France, but he did so because Hungary had lost Italy’s support after the
Brenner Conference. This study has argued furthermore that providing
transit right for the Wehrmacht in April 1940 became a turning-point in the
British perceptions of Hungary, which consequently was viewed by senior
decision-makers as a country that had been drawn into the German orbit by
its own choice. One of the most significant findings to emerge from the
analysis of the question of the ’droit’ is that the new evidence presented
here now clearly explains the radical contrast between the positive British
opinion of Hungary in early 1940 and the condemnation of the Second
Vienna Award in August 1940. This, until now, has only been explained
by the vague and generalizing argument that Hungary followed an
increasingly pro-German policy.
This study does not trace the development of British policy after
1941, but it emphasizes that as a consequence of the ‘droit’ affair, trust in
the Hungarian political elite as a reliable partner had already been shaken
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by mid-1940 and in British official circles the justification of Hungary’s
territorial acquisitions were already being debated and questioned. This
attitude essentially prevailed until the Paris Peace Conference in 1947.
The analysis of the British reaction to the question of military
passage has also provided a window through which the labyrinth of the
British foreign policy-making process towards Central Europe and the
Balkans could be better understood. It demonstrated the contrast in the
workings of Whitehall between the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy
towards second-tier regions, such as Central Europe, and crises, when
imperial priorities were threatened, such as during Hitler’s Balkan cam-
paign of April 1941. The reaction to any German military transits through
Hungary changed accordingly.110
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Other themes:
Lockean “Gold” Versus Ancien Régime
“Mud” in Zsigmond Móricz’s Sárarany
Virginia L. Lewis
“… and again he swung the damned body, smashing it against the stone
wall, as though the latter were the ancient adversary he had to destroy with
this despicable object of carnage, this execrable, disintegrating pillar of
flesh.” Zsigmond Móricz’s first novel Sárarany (1910) reaches its brutal
climax in this moment toward the novel’s end, when the proud Hungarian
peasant protagonist, Dani Turi, takes out an anger accumulated over
centuries on Count László Karay, reducing the aristocrat to “little more
than a rag, a useless, formless heap.”1 The barbarity of this scene provokes
a crucial question: what accounts for the boundless frustration that thus
transforms a wealthy, successful peasant into a brutal, savage murderer? In
broader terms, how is the reader to interpret Móricz’s suggestion that an
intelligent, capable man such as Turi, the “gold” or arany of his title, is
compelled to wallow in the “mud” or sár of his milieu, and succumb to
complete ethical degradation?2 Does Móricz really mean, as the final
words of his text indicate, to lay the blame at God’s feet if nothing good
has become of this human gold?
Ki hát a bűnös, ha ebből az aranyból semmi sem lett?
– Ki?
Az Isten, aki nem csinált belőle semmit.3
So who is at fault if nothing has become of this gold?
“Who?”
God, who has made nothing of it.4
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The reader can certainly take Móricz at his word here. But the very fact
that the author invested the effort necessary to write a full-length novel
about Dani Turi’s predicament intimates he wished for his readers to look
more deeply, to take into account the social and economic forces laid bare
in Sárarany in their effort to fathom the mechanisms implicated in Dani’s
fall from grace and descent to homicidal madness. In this essay, I suggest
that Dani Turi’s attempt to extricate himself from the “mud” of the ancien
régime that holds him down, by realizing his golden potential via the
Lockean dream of profitable land ownership, is doomed as a venture in
light of what Móricz diagnoses as the feudal backwardness of turn-of-the-
century Hungarian society.5
When the novel opens, Dani has already proven himself an
unusually capable agricultural entrepreneur, whose profitable ventures are
the envy of the entire peasant community. Móricz begins his account of
Dani’s economic success by emphasizing his status as a village peasant
“[j]ust like the others,”6 who completes the usual military service,
followed by his marriage to a girl from his village; but his unique entre-
preneurial talents are quickly unveiled. His wife’s dowry having made a
landowner of him, Dani creates a scandal by planting, instead of the
traditional wheat grown by all his peers, rapeseed, and “when the harvest
arrived and the richly blessed earth yielded Dani Turi eight hundred forints
per acre of rape-field, boundless incredulity took hold of the people.” The
peasant’s unheard-of success is the talk of the village: “it would never
have entered their minds that this soil could produce anything other than
what it was accustomed to producing. They would gladly have vented their
anger on this earth, which up to now had failed to return all the nice money
they’d invested …”7 But this is just the beginning. In a move that can only
be deemed revolutionary, Dani scraps his rapeseed venture for the
production of cabbage, resulting in what strikes his fellows as earth-
shaking success: “An earthquake could not have aroused the astonishment
Dani Turi did when he earned the sum of three thousand forints from a plot
planted with cabbage which previously, when planted with wheat, had
brought in barely two hundred…. People fought over this Kiskara cabbage
at the markets.”8 After the success of this enterprise, Dani acquires more
land from his father-in-law, a wedding gift consisting of fallow fields
deemed useless by their owner, and rents it out to others who want to
follow his lead and grow cabbage, and thus, “without lifting a finger, he
got more from the land than he would have if he’d worked himself to
death.”9 Móricz’s protagonist exhibits all the traits of a commercial
agricultural producer, who assesses the market and plants what will
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command the best price, while factoring in techniques of modern farm
production: “the revitalizing of the old, used-up earth; fertilizer one could
buy at the store and scatter from sacks; deep plowing of the soil, viticulture
…”10 Dani Turi thus mounts a full frontal attack on the traditional agrarian
economy that was rooted in subsistence farming and relied for its
persistence on a class of rural subalterns who lacked the agency necessary
to embrace modernization.
Dani is in effect bucking the trend of a centuries’ long feudal
mentality in rural Hungary. Joseph Held sheds light on this mentality in his
book The Modernization of Agriculture: Rural Transformation in Hun-
gary, 1848-1975. Writing concerning the impact of the lifting of serfdom
in 1848, Held states: “The journals of the 1850’s and 1860’s, especially
those dealing with economics on a professional level, contained con-
tinuous complaints about the peasants’ continuing to work their lands the
same way as they had done in the age of the robot and the ninth of the
harvest (dézsma).”11 Further:
… the reporters of county newspapers realized that, although 1848
ended feudalism in Hungary, the past proved much too strong a
force in peasant life. … The feudal system in Hungary — as in the
other societies of East Central Europe — actually impeded the
development of rational thinking among the peasants, or, as
contemporaries were fond of saying, “it retarded the development of
work-ethics.”12
In the same section, Held affirms: “Since 1848 lifted the burden of feudal
obligations from athe [sic] peasants, eliminating the obstacles to diligence
and initiative, improvements could soon be expected. But it took three
decades before the existing system began to fall apart.”13 At the time of
Móricz’s writing, this process was still only haltingly underway, particu-
larly in eastern Hungary, as Held observes: “For the most part, moderni-
zation left the eastern part of the country relatively untouched during the
1870’s and 1880’s.”14 By portraying Dani Turi as the only man in his
village who embraces “the two motivating forces” which, as Held sug-
gests, “existed for furthering progress: namely ‘freedom and property,’”15
Móricz presents a timely and honest critique of the society in which he
grew up. Dani is admired by his fellow villagers, but he stands apart in his
passionate devotion to the Lockean dream.
As Held explains, it was the liberal reformers responsible for the
1848-1849 Revolution who promoted freedom and capitalism among the
peasantry. These reformers “lived under the illusion that the freeing of
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peasants from feudal burdens would bring about a sudden improvement in
agricultural practices. They hoped that production methods of primitive
self-sufficiency would be quickly transformed into a system based on
individual peasant smallholders of a capitalist kind.”16 Many of these
reformers’ ideas harked back to John Locke’s Second Treatise of
Government, first printed in 1690. The right to own property is asserted by
Locke, in addition to other passages, in §45 of the Treatise: “Thus Labour,
in the Beginning, gave a Right of Property, where-ever any one was
pleased to employ it, upon what was common ….”17 The notion of land-as-
commodity also finds early resonance in Locke: “’Tis Labour then which
puts the greatest part of Value upon Land, without which it would scarcely
be worth any thing ….”18 Man’s capacity to produce things of value to
others from land-as-property makes possible the exchange and accumula-
tion of wealth through the use of money:
50. But since Gold and Silver, being little useful to the Life of Man
in proportion to Food, Rayment, and Carriage, has its value only
from consent of Men, whereof Labour yet makes, in great part, the
measure, it is plain, that Men have agreed to disproportionate and
unequal Possession of the Earth, they having by a tacit and
voluntary consent, found out a way, how a man may fairly possess
more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in
exchange for the overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be hoarded
up without injury to any one, these metalls not spoileing or decaying
in the hands of the possessor.19
It is in the context of this private, commodity-based economy that Dani
Turi seeks to realize his ambitions as an agricultural entrepreneur. Though
writers on Locke often caution against deeming him an apologist of
unrestrained capitalism,20 his ethical outlook was, according to Charles
Taylor, “plainly an endorsement of the serious, productive, pacific im-
prover of any class and against the aristocratic, caste-conscious pursuit of
honour and glory through self-display and the warrior virtues.”21 Accord-
ing to Taylor, Locke’s arguments in the Second Treatise support the
conclusion that men are intended to work hard for their own improvement
as rational individuals. Held cites the Hungarian reformers he references in
The Modernization of Agriculture to similar effect: “‘there is a magic force
in the idea of private property, a force that frightens away indolence,
awakens all the slumbering powers of labor and sows the seeds of moral
ennoblement.’”22
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Improvement in the Lockean sense is certainly an apt term for
what Dani Turi seeks for himself and his family. Early on in the novel, he
dreams of his son becoming a student,23 and even a count.24 These noble
aspirations are extended to his wife, of whom he seeks to make “a real
lady”: “– Bizony még úri asszony lesz belőled!” he exclaims to her.25 He
plans to fulfill her every material desire: “‘There’s not as much silk in all
the shops of Szatmár as you’ll be able to get for your dresses!’”26 His
children, too, should inherit “a proper fortune.”27 But Dani’s goals are not
limited to his immediate family circle. In a manner that reflects once again
the goals of the Hungarian reformers cited by Held, Dani Turi seeks to
right historical wrongs committed against the peasants of Kiskara by the
Karay counts, whose treasonous actions had resulted in the forced
departure of the local peasants from the land handed down to them by their
Hungarian ancestors: “He wanted to gain land, to conquer it; not just for
himself, but for his entire land-hungry village.”28 The Nagyszeg, one of the
parcels of land he seeks, is thus destined for the village community as a
whole.29
Móricz makes it clear that Dani’s social status as a peasant frus-
trates him and suggests repeatedly that improving his social status is a key
concern for him. He is bothered on more than one occasion by his coarse,
rough peasant’s hands30 which must cause revulsion in any noble lady he
might touch31 (“His thick, coarse fingers lay there spread out, studded with
jagged nails, and were so strong and so accustomed to hard gripping that
they were incapable of holding anything gently. Held by such fingers, a
tender white woman’s body must melt like a sculpture made of butter”32);
and he seeks to emulate the refined expressions of affection characteristic
of the upper class.33 He imagines his son Béla as a little gentleman whose
hands must always be clean34 and betrays his inner desire to enjoy others’
respect.35 Dani’s striking physical resemblance to Count László36 under-
scores the notion that he indeed merits a higher social status, that somehow
his destiny includes access to the same privileges and respectability
enjoyed by his aristocratic look-a-like. Improving his lot and reaching his
ambitions means improving his standing in society, and Dani sees the
accumulation of money as the best way to accomplish this. That it lies
within the realm of possibility is hinted at by Móricz with the character of
the vén házalózsidó or old peddler Jew from the first chapter of the second
part of Sárarany, whose income from the sale of his modest wares has
ensured that his sons became gentlemen, his daughters-in-law “fine ladies”
(úri fiai és nagyúri menyei).37 The selling of goods by a Jew, however, is
fundamentally different from the development of land as a commodified
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resource by a peasant — the first did not constitute the threat to the
aristocracy’s hold on social and economic power that the second did. And
yet Dani has no other means at his disposal of improving his status than
generating profit as a landowner from land-as-commodity. The central
challenge he faces in realizing his ambitions is that suggested by a
Hegelian notion of agency: he can only function as an economic agent
given adequate status, and he cannot attain the necessary status without
succeeding as an economic agent.38 The plot of Gold in the Mud pivots on
this very paradox.
Money, acquired through skill, intelligence, and hard work, those
attributes that allowed individuals to prosper as members of the urban
middle classes, does not by itself suffice in allowing Hungarian peasant
Dani Turi to improve his social standing and access to agency in a
meaningful way, in spite of his extraordinary feats in the area of agri-
cultural commerce. Dani’s keen intelligence is recognized not just by his
peasant peers, but even by high-level administrators of the Karay estate:
“‘We have a certain peasant in Kiskara,’” the manorial administrator tells
Count László, “‘by the name of Dani Turi. If he had a bit of schooling, he
could cut a nice figure in any gentlemen’s society. He has more
intelligence than the entire village put together.’”39 Móricz devotes the
better part of a chapter to describing Dani’s fabled capacity to get things
done as a field worker, extolling not only his speed and thoroughness as a
wheat cutter, but also the superior quality of his tools.40 Yet he can never
increase his profits sufficiently to rise above his station without the
acquisition of more land. As the author puts it: “He’d been married for
barely four years when the boundaries of Kiskara grew too narrow for him.
These boundaries were limited by the monstrous estates of the Count.”41
Legally there is very little land for even the wealthiest of peasants to
acquire, due to the stranglehold of feudalism on land tenure as portrayed in
the novel. Of all the land belonging to Count Miska’s “monstrous estates,”
only two modest parcels are exempted from the entailment: “The first was
the Nagyszeg, which at the time of the leasing had been under water; this
section lay in a mighty enclave of the Tisza. The other was the Pallag, a
nice piece of pasture extending for two hundred acres.”42 As modest as
these two parcels are, they would in fact triple the size of Dani Turi’s
holdings,43 thus opening the door to a substantial accumulation of wealth
on his part if he could manage to acquire them.
Dani’s land hunger (földéhség) is referenced by scholars such as
Péter Nagy44 and was symptomatic of peasants across Europe, as
evidenced by narratives such as Emile Zola’s La terre (1887) concerning a
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peasant community in central France, or Liviu Rebreanu’s Ion (1920)
about an ambitious Romanian peasant, among numerous others. The hopes
pinned by many an immigrant to the United States around the turn of the
20th century on access to land in the territories beyond the Mississippi
River, as portrayed in narratives such as Ole Edvart Rølvaag’s Verdens
Grøde (Giants in the Earth, 1924-25), provide further evidence of the
importance of land in the minds of many rural inhabitants in the modern
era as a means of acquiring wealth, freedom, and improved social
standing.45 To gain a more complete understanding of what increased
access to land-as-property meant to the peasant-cum-entrepreneur at an
individual, human level, beyond outward expressions of status and posi-
tion, it is useful to consider the inward aspirations of Móricz’s protagonist.
Dani Turi’s own lust for land has a great deal to do with realizing the
“gold” within himself; he seeks land as a means of accomplishing
something, of acting in a meaningful way on the world around him. His
efforts to acquire the Pallag and the Nagyszeg parcels are frustrated for
many months, because Count Miska and his wife Count Helene are
standing in the way of this acquisition by their refusal to act on Dani’s
request. During these months, Dani’s frustration accumulates and the
reader gains insight into the peasant’s hopes in relation to the land he
seeks:
… what most oppressed him was that he couldn’t accomplish
anything great. He couldn’t make a break from life as he knew it. …
he yearned for another life, greater, busier, bolder …. How
deplorable are all these wasted days, he thought to himself over and
over, God, what I could accomplish with them! If only I had the
right opportunity!
…. If it weren’t for the hope that the day must yet come that
would lead him to a new burst of activity and make good this
endless period of stagnation and uselessness, he would surely
perish, consumed from within by maggots …46
Scholars on Móricz often refer to Dani as an example of the unused
energies of the peasants, citing his lust for action and power and
suggesting that society would be the ultimate beneficiary of any measures
taken to alleviate the frustrated ambitions of the Dani Turis of the world.47
But Dani’s crisis is also of an individual nature, one that can trace its roots
to a Lockean notion of natural rights. Móricz takes care to problematize
the ambitious, egomaniacal dimensions of his protagonist, often betraying
the threatening nature of his goals.48 This perspective contributes to the
critical side of the debate concerning the role of the “rational individual” in
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the modern nation-state, described as follows by Michael Kearney: “This
creature is a choice-making, self-gratifying, maximizing actor. The gene-
alogy of this type runs from Locke and the other social contract theorists
of the state through Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham to its most elaborate
and explicit conceptualization in the neoclassic economists.”49 The land-
owning, maximizing actor operating within the framework of capitalism
conduces to a whole host of problems studied by Martin Heidegger, Val
Plumwood, and Wendell Berry, to name just a few. Without venturing too
far into the treacherous terrain of seeking justification for the eminently
questionable motives guiding Dani Turi’s actions, and in the spirit of the
Lockean interpretation featured in this article, it is useful to assert that
Dani Turi seeks what philosopher Alan Gewirth terms “aspiration fulfil-
lment,” which he explains as follows: “To fulfill oneself by reference to
one’s aspirations involves that the self is viewed as a center of desiderative
force which strives to achieve intended outcomes. To fulfill oneself is to
achieve these outcomes and thereby to bring oneself, as thus centered in
one’s aspirations, to fruition ….”50 Gewirth’s definition can be construct-
ively compared with Locke’s understanding of the role of property in
enabling the individual to achieve tangible realization of his capacities, as
a means of interpreting Dani Turi’s ambitions with regard to the land he
seeks to acquire from Count Miska:
… property to Locke seems to symbolize rights in their concrete
form, or perhaps rather to provide the tangible subject of an indi-
vidual’s powers and attitudes. It is because they can be symbolized
as property, something a man can conceive of as distinguishable
from himself though a part of himself, that a man’s attributes, such
as his freedom, his equality, his power to execute the law of nature,
can become the subject of his consent, the subject of any negotiation
with his fellows. We cannot alienate any part of our personalities,
but we can alienate that with which we have chosen to mix our
personalities.51
This process of alienation in the legal sense relates to the “outcomes” that
result from Gewirth’s aspiration fulfillment to the extent that, by
producing valuable crops from his land, Dani can engage in the sort of
economic exchange with his community that will enhance his and his
family’s material welfare and, he hopes, also allow him to engage
purposefully with the power structures that determine the political and
social roles he, his wife, and children can play in society. In addition, Dani
aspires to facilitate the empowerment of his entire village by restoring land
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access withdrawn from the community as a result of the treasonous actions
of the Karay family centuries before.
The problem, of course, is that Dani cannot assert any claim on the
land he seeks without the assent of the Count.52 His ambition of increased
independence is dependent on the feudal structures that place severe limits
on his action radius. The “mud” of the ancien régime threatens to trap him.
Móricz asserts the highly problematic nature of this dilemma by insisting
that it is not so simple as an either/or proposition. There is not only the
question of whether Dani Turi can gain access to the land parcels he seeks,
there is also the question of how. These two questions play an equally
critical role in the novel. Concerning the first, Móricz lends drama to the
situation by showing how the nobles’ lack of interest in lending serious
attention to Dani Turi’s request causes painful delays that, beyond
resulting in doubt, stress, and misery for the peasant, also occur at
precisely that point in his life when he feels his physical powers and
energy dwindling. The reasons for these delays constitute a pointed
critique of the nobles’ failure to treat the peasants as human beings with
valid needs and hopes:
During the summer [Dani had] visited the town lawyer day in and
day out without succeeding in taking over the dead tenant’s land
lease. The Count had journeyed to Africa, and the Countess would
hear nothing concerning the governance of Kiskara. And Count
László, her brother-in-law, had made it clear that he was the
peasants’ enemy. So nothing at all had happened. … a decision
would not take place until the new year.53
The nobles are distant from their subjects both geographically and
mentally. The welfare of the community is of no concern to them. At the
collective level, they exhibit no interest in bringing about “improvement”
in the sense noted above — they live in a world apart from that of the
peasants, whose quality of life bears no connection with their own
concerns. At the individual level, the problem is even more apparent: Dani
Turi is the acknowledged head of the village, yet his eminently reasonable
petition is simply ignored. In an era when nation-building is a crucial
concern of modernity, such neglect on the part of those who hold the reins
of social and economic power is intolerable. Móricz thus offers a strong
indictment of the aristocracy for standing in the way of progress, and
strengthens it by indicating how the nobles’ neglect results in a waste of
productive energy, given that a peasant like Dani can withstand the
rigorous work required of a successful farmer for only a limited time. As
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the second part of Sárarany gets underway, the author makes a point of
emphasizing the waning of Dani’s powers: “Not with anger, but with
bitterness, with anguish he realized how much he’d aged.”54 This
statement comes in the context of Dani’s realization that he is no longer
the attractive sexual male he once was. The author’s repeated references to
Dani’s fatigue and lethargy55 parallel his decline as a desirable object of
sexual attention: “And now his playmates were the aged women with their
crusty loins, who complained when hugged that everything aches, their
sides, their backs, their bones? An unbearable bitterness, the great
bitterness of his life, gathered in Dani’s soul.”56 Móricz thus introduces a
crisis in his narrative, suggesting that if his peasant protagonist does not
soon reach his goal of assuming the Pallag and Nagyszeg land parcels, it
will be too late for him to accomplish his entrepreneurial goals and make a
meaningful contribution to progress in his community.
The pressure on Dani is intensified by the fact that the peasants
themselves exert a negative influence on him with regard to achieving his
aspirations. Sárarany is a valuable historical document in its portrait of the
peasantry in eastern Hungary and the barriers to progress posed by their
mentality and habits. Their reliance on tradition as a guide for their social
and economic actions,57 their apathy in the face of hardship and
suffering,58 and their high tolerance for disorderliness of both a physical
and moral nature59 all suggest a class of people unprepared for the kind of
freedom posited by Locke, with its requirement of responsibility and
mutual trust based on reason and virtue. The most revealing character in
this regard is Dani’s wife Erzsi, whose value system exhibits numerous
contrasts with that of her ambitious husband. Two obvious reasons for
these differences stand out: firstly her identity as a woman, and secondly
her Catholicism. Erzsi’s character merits an entire article devoted to what
she reveals in regard to the place and role of women in turn-of-the-century
rural Hungarian society. Without any intent of minimizing the importance
of Erzsi’s status as a wife, mother, and woman in her own right with
aspirations unique to these identities, the focus here concerns her religious
convictions and decision to pursue the path of martyrdom as opposed to
prosperity. While Dani serves as a virtual poster child for Weber’s notion
of the Protestant work ethic, Erzsi uses her Catholic faith as a vehicle for
projecting meaning onto, and thereby embracing, her suffering as the path
to moral salvation. Although Erzsi’s unblemished record of absolute
faithfulness to her husband is a source of great pride to Dani on the one
hand,60 her rejection of his capitalist ambitions on the other hand causes
him endless frustration.61 This rejection has a dual foundation. Erzsi’s
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dreams of domestic bliss are at odds with Dani’s ambitions and their
dependence on work beyond the confines of their home and engagement
with the community at large. At one point, she laments concerning her
husband: “He needed everything … and amidst all this he also needed her.
But she was only a small part of this everything! This embittered her
fiercely ….”62 She has no need of wealth for its own sake, on the contrary,
thrift has been a constant in her life and she struggles with the notion that
that ought to change:
The penny-pinching of Erzsi’s parents had rescued for their
descendants a small inheritance which, in the limited circumstances
of village life, could not be enlarged. When Dani turned out to be
such an incredibly talented money-maker, into whose lap forints
dropped by the thousands, the two of them gradually shed their true
nature. Dani demanded more and more impatiently the “good life,”
a home, a wife, a way of life fit for a lord …. Erzsi, for her part, felt
that her old, miserly lifestyle was no longer appropriate, and if her
husband had acted toward her as he should, she would have
completed the transition to a new way of living. But as things stood,
instead of adapting to a new approach to life, she had no idea what
would come next. She was losing the ground beneath her feet. It
was a constant source of aggravation to her that she hated her
husband’s money as much as she hated life itself …63
In time, Erzsi adopts suffering as the only way of life that will ensure her
the peace of mind she requires in order to be content,64 effectively closing
the door on any aspirations related to prosperity or capitalism-induced
wealth. This desire to achieve sinlessness finds its source in the second
aspect of the dual foundation mentioned above, namely the sinful
dimension of Dani’s quest for wealth and power, the fact that, in this
narrative, he enacts his quest via an economic exchange reliant on sex as
currency. Dani’s repeated sexual transgressions in the name of increasing
his wealth are unacceptable in view of the ethical code subscribed to by his
wife, with its demand for marital fidelity as a vital aspect of domestic
bliss. The issue of the sexual economy in Sárarany must be addressed in
relation to the question posed above concerning how Dani can get the
approval he needs from the Count to acquire the Pallag and Nagyszeg land
parcels. Whether he succeeds in this being the issue at stake for the
moment, it should be pointed out that, although Erzsi’s objections to
Dani’s ambitions contribute to the stumbling blocks he must overcome in
order to reach his goals, in the end her decision to pursue the path of
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Catholic martyrdom and tolerate her husband’s every transgression
removes her misgivings as an obstacle.
This leaves the obstacle posed by the comital family itself. Dani
forces their hand by having the schoolmaster write up a petition, which
reaches Countess Helene’s hands precisely when her boredom with her
“empty, senseless and aimless life” causes her to dwell in excitement on
the powerful impression made on her by Dani Turi, that “peasant Don
Juan,” during his initial encounter with her and Count László in his
attempt to gain their permission to purchase the land he desires.65 In the
end, her family lawyer concludes that the fields sought by the peasant
“were exempted from the estate property as a whole. So the Countess had
a contract drawn up whereby the one parcel, the ‘Pallag,’ would be
granted to Dani Turi in exchange for cash, while the other would go to the
village community conjointly ….”66 Once Dani has signed the two
documents and the Countess marks the contract regarding the Pallag as
paid in full, the transaction is effectively complete. Dani has reached the
object of his aims. This victory is, however, hollow and pointless, as an
examination of the how of the land transfer transaction will show.
The two social worlds portrayed in Sárarany, that of the peasants
and that of the aristocrats, differ radically from one another in ways that
render Dani’s aspiration of significantly improving his social status
doomed from the start. Arguably the most significant difference
distinguishing the two spheres in the novel is the sexual economy of the
local peasantry, which is so alien to Countess Helene that she requires a
detailed explanation from Bora Kis, one of Dani Turi’s admirers and the
object of a destructive rivalry between Dani and his wife’s cousin, Gyuri
Takács. The explanation begins when Countess Helene asks Bora whether
she has ever received a hug from Dani Turi, the paraszt donjuán:
The girl looked at her innocently. “I wouldn’t allow it.”
“Even so.”
“I’m a poor girl.”
“And?”
“I can’t be had for free …”
The Countess was astonished; she didn’t understand.
“Uncle Dani pays no one. On the contrary, people pay him,”
she added as though boasting. “The women and girls go to work on
his fields solely in order to get a kiss from him. ’Cause he doesn’t
give his kisses to just anyone.”
“So he hasn’t hugged you, because you can’t pay him?”
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The girl gave a peevish shrug of her shoulders. “I know how to
wield a hoe, too! I could pay too … Him … But he wouldn’t pay
me! Obviously you don’t know that when a poor girl like me is also
beautiful, she can only sleep with a man who pays well. I have to
make my fortune. …”67
Some scholarship on Sárarany suggests that Móricz’s adoption of the
themes of Naturalism in the novel, including the attention to sexual
excesses, represents a response to literary fashion.68 But his use of sexual
references and themes throughout the text plays a crucial functional role in
defining the sort of glass ceiling that bars the peasant Dani Turi from his
objective of rising above his class. There is a clear dichotomy separating
the role of sex in the peasant world, where it is closely connected to
material gain, from its role in the world of the nobles, where it revolves
solely around pleasure. Bora explains how Dani secures labor for his fields
by granting sexual favors to village women. Without this, he would not be
able to accomplish what he does in monetary terms with his land. Additi-
onal references to this economic state of affairs are strewn throughout the
novel, such as the following:
This year Dani planted cabbage along the Tisza, on the very fields
where, in the first year, the rapeseed had done so well. He had to
win over the women to this project – it was the only way to succeed
where no one else would in cultivating these far-flung fields
successfully. When it came to winning women over to harvest
cabbage, Dani didn’t even refrain from giving hugs to the Gypsy
women dwelling near the village.69
Four paragraphs further down in the text, the author states: “All the
women of the village were his vassals, his work slaves.”70 The Countess
neatly sums up this unique labor market, with her “vague impression that
an open trade was going on in the world, whereby girls and men freely
generated profit from their beauty.”71 In a society where capital is
painfully limited, as among land-starved peasants, physical attractiveness
becomes a form of currency used in a manner very similar to money
among the wealthier classes. But this currency market comes with a high
ethical price, as the hurtful relationship between Dani and Erzsi reveals.
Even Dani understands his wife’s misery as she complains to him about
the double standard affecting their love life:
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“In the five years of our marriage, have I as much as looked at
anyone else? What would you do with me if I kept a lover?”
Strangle you! the man thought to himself in his rage; but he
said nothing, only clenching his fists.
The woman sighed. “But you! What do you do to me? Why are
you never with me? You can’t stand us? And yet you’re with all the
women of the entire village! Shouldn’t I cry over that from morning
to night?”72
Erzsi expresses disgust over the “dirty money” Dani makes: “Money for
which I have to fight over you with others.”73 She experiences acute inner
torment over her unfaithful husband.74 Yet even she seems to understand at
some level the necessity of her husband’s marital infidelity, as evidenced
by her dogged rejection of the overtures of her cousin, Gyuri Takács, as he
tries to convince her that Dani merits her hatred and does not deserve her
the way he himself does:75 “‘Phooey,’” she exclaims to him, “‘you come
whining and crying to me, because my husband, who’s married and has a
family, is more appealing to the girls than an old bachelor.’”76 In spite of
everything, Erzsi feels a deep loving bond with Dani, in part because of his
very success in his endeavors. This is part of the rationale behind her
ability to adopt the role of the sacrificial lamb who allows her husband
everything, while denying herself everything — except for him, whom in
the end she cannot live without.77
For his part, Dani is able to live with himself as an unfaithful
husband as long as he does not cross the one line of actually desiring
another woman to the extent that he would do exactly what Bora expects,
namely “pay” for her affections with a gift. This dividing line between
acceptable infidelity and unacceptable infidelity is mentioned in the very
first chapter of the novel, an indication of its important role in the plot: “I
want to gather up the entire world and lay it at your feet,” Dani exclaims to
his wife. “To this day I haven’t given a single other woman the tiniest of
gifts. So what are you feeling sorry about? … What does it matter to you
how I go about my business, as long as I succeed!”78 Sexual favors as a
means to further his business endeavors – that is what is at stake for Dani,
who loves his wife just as deeply as she loves him,79 in spite of how his
material ambitions drive him to hurt her. This invisible line is crossed,
however, when Dani purchases a silk kerchief for Bora, who refuses any
and all overtures of affection on the part of the paraszt donjuán precisely
for the reasons she explains to the Countess. Tormented over the thought
that he is no longer the man he used to be, Dani is driven by desperation to
give “the tiniest of gifts” to the young girl in order to win her over.80 The
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momentousness of this act as transgression is made plain by the author,
who writes that Dani’s “soul trembled with emotion. A storm of desires
and sensations battled within him; he felt ashamed and was overcome with
humility; he sensed the unmanliness of his actions and sought to make
amends for it.”81 This, the first chapter of the second part of the novel,
ends with the observation: “Dani Turi was a completely different man
from the one who’d driven out to the fields that morning.”82 As readers
familiar with Sárarany will recall, Dani only intensifies this transgression
he so regrets, in the name of prevailing over rival Gyuri Takács, who
would like nothing better than to depose Dani as what the Countess
regards as “a proud cock,” ruling “over the many hens atop the dung heap
of life,”83 by winning the entirety of Gyuri’s landholdings in a card game
and handing them over to Bora Kis’s father. Yet in spite of the invisible
line dividing Dani’s use of sexual favors for strictly business purposes
from deliberate acts of infidelity, the dirty (piszkos) continuity connecting
the two is beyond doubt. The peasant reliance on sex-as-currency forms a
material part of the sár or mud that composes Dani’s peasant world, “the
raunchy world of the little village” as the Countess imagines it,
“surrounding her with the odor of the brutal and unrestrained mating of the
animals, the horses, the chickens, the pigeon coops, the unbathed peasant
women” and constituting “filth” (szemét).84
Dani Turi’s quest to improve his social status means rising above
the mud of his feudal existence. His determination to accumulate the
socially accepted currency of the capitalist world: money,85 is a gesture
toward emancipating himself from the sexual economy that undermines
his social acceptability. Dani’s first direct encounter with gentility gives
him a glimpse of the enormous gap separating peasant sexual relations
from noble ones, as he observes the display of affection that takes place
between the Count’s lawyer and the latter’s beautiful wife:
… he regarded the lady and the gentleman as they hugged each
other with gentle ease. The lady’s white arm rested with such
delicacy on her husband’s shoulder, as though a rose had fallen
there. And the man, with his plump face and red moustache,
breathed such a soft kiss onto her hand, as though he hadn’t touched
it. And when they’d kissed each other in this same gentle manner,
like the touching of butterflies’ wings, Dani saw clearly that
unattainable something that was missing from his women, his love
affairs …86
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This example of affectionate behavior in an upper-class married couple is
a far cry from the tumbles in the hay that typify Dani’s experience with
sexual relations, as shown by his encounter with one of the cutters working
for him during the wheat harvest: “Dani flung his arms around her, hugged
her wildly and brutally, then cast her onto the sheaf of grain. He shattered
her with his kisses, with horribly lustful kisses meant for the both of
them,” after which “the girl lay there in the grass.” Dani then leaves her
and heads for home: “He didn’t once turn around, didn’t even glance back
at the girl, who lay in her disheveled clothes there among the grain like a
crushed bit of life.”87 Amazingly, the peasant girl had craved this
opportunity to enjoy Dani’s affections to the point of stalking him as they
worked at harvesting the wheat! Immediately after this scene, as Dani is on
his way home, he imagines a very different scenario if the opportunity
were to present itself for him to hug Countess Helene: “How softly, how
gently, how very differently he would hug her than he was accustomed to
hugging other women. So impalpably that he would barely graze her skin;
so lightly that he would barely feel her weight.”88 Of course the only way
such a scene could possibly take place would entail either that the peasant
Dani Turi become the Countess’s lover, an utter impossibility given her
superior social standing, or that Dani himself enjoy genteel social standing,
his ultimate, though unrealistic aim. And even if such an impossibility
were to occur, it would have nothing to do with securing the Countess’s
labor for his fields, it would be strictly a question of pleasure similar to
that enjoyed by Helene together with her paramour, Count László. That
Dani even imagines such an unlikely scenario is necessary in part as a foil
for what really does transpire when the Countess’s gross need for titillation
prompts her to engage in the peasant sexual economy dominated by Dani
Turi,89 an eventuality she had imagined when first learning of his fabled
reputation among the peasants:
For the first time in her life, the Countess felt the wild, sensuous,
aimless drive well up within her that takes hold of one’s body and
jolts it, ripping one’s soul from its hinges. And at times she
shuddered at the thought of what would happen if she really fell into
the hands of this stallion of a peasant, whom these rutting mares
surrounded with their neighing and cavorting like a god risen to
earth.90
Returning to the crucial question as to the how of Dani’s securing
the Countess’s approval for his acquisition of the Pallag and Nagyszeg
fields, Dani is fully aware that the only currency with which he can
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legitimately gain access to this land to the full satisfaction of all parties
involved is money. If he is to enjoy tenure of the land with the legal rights
necessary to permit capitalist development and the building of wealth, he
must purchase it. Thanks to his diligence and business acumen, Dani
succeeds in amassing the money needed to reach his goal. Thus when he
learns that “immediate cash payment was expected” to finalize his
acquisition of the Pallag, he can react with the plan to “get the money to
complete the purchase this very day!”91 But by this point it is already
evident that his plan is doomed, given the Countess’s abysmal assessment
of Dani’s social worth. The first thing Dani hears upon entering the room
where Helene has invited him to sign the documents pertaining to the land
transfer is the insulting nickname that Gyuri Takács has circulated and that
Bora Kis revealed to the Countess early in the novel, concerning where he
is beautiful:92 “laughing, her teeth pressed together, lustfully, disdainfully,
she uttered the peasant Don Juan’s insulting nickname, and saw in her
mind the queer, shameless girl who’d likewise uttered the word, with an
unmistakable snicker and boorish charm.”93 Dani is far too intelligent not
to perceive the grave insult inflicted on him by her utterance, particularly
given Bora’s revelation when she breaks down and shares the nickname
with Countess Helene: “whoever says it out loud, Dani Turi would kill
without a thought.”94 This explains his cold, silent reaction as he stands
now before the Countess. He has just hit the glass ceiling that blocks his
ascent to higher social standing. Her “cold disdain” as he waits for her to
acknowledge his presence does not escape him, nor the fact that his “very
peasantness angered the Countess.”95 Dani’s aspirations are further
offended when he sees upon inspection of the documents he is to sign “that
the selling price had been reduced to half his original offer, and instead of
payment by installments, immediate cash payment was expected.”96 His
capacity to pay for the land, his ability to engage successfully with an
economy that relies on money as currency, is the object of serious doubt
on the part of those financial leaders who, like Count Miska, “did not
believe he could get any money out of” the peasants.97 Faith means
everything in an economy based on money, as the very word “credit”
confirms, derived as it is from the Latin word for “believe.” As long as
Dani’s would-be creditors assume he lacks the means to prove a good
financial risk, his effort to participate successfully in the capitalist econo-
my is doomed.
But the humiliation to which the Countess subjects him goes even
farther than this financial suspicion.98 Her fascination with the very sexual
economy from which Dani seeks to extricate himself through the use of
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money as payment provokes her into engaging with it herself: “It would
never have occurred to her that she, too, would be paying this peasant Don
Juan, who was accustomed to being paid by the women.”99 And this is
exactly what she does: “She took the pen, dipped it in the ink, and
hurriedly wrote at the bottom of the document, beneath Dániel Turi’s
miserable, laughable chicken scratches: ‘Entire sum received in full,’
followed by her name.” Dani then “suspected what the woman had in mind
for him, what she expected of him.”100 Dani is now confronted with the
opportunity to realize the vision of gentle, delicate, noble exchange of
affection he had imagined himself indulging in with Countess Helene. Yet
the sexual act that takes place is instead so brutal and violent that it can
only be characterized as an act of extreme vengeance. Móricz leaves the
worst possible details to his readers’ imagination, allowing the Countess
only to languish in the subsequent chapter, broken and bleeding helplessly,
passing in and out of consciousness, with no one to come to her aid.101
Thus we arrive at the scene referenced at the beginning of this
article, which opens with a silent confrontation between Count László and
the peasant who has just, for all intents and purposes and to indulge a
vulgar term, screwed his lover to death. The few words that finally escape
the Count’s mouth: “What are you doing here?” and the stern command:
“March!”102 do little more than pound the nail in the coffin of Dani Turi’s
social and economic aspirations. This is then the point where Dani reduces
Count László to little more than a bloody heap, which he thrashes violently
against a stone wall, the symbol for the historical processes that have led to
this moment of unquenchable rage and frustration on the part of a capable,
intelligent, passionate, ambitious agricultural entrepreneur. In spite of his
outstanding qualifications for realizing the Lockean dream of improved
social standing by means of land-as-property, his proven ability to engage
reason and hard work in the production of valuable commodities from his
land, Dani’s path to improvement and progress is barred by the mud of the
ancien régime, in which he is condemned to wallow due to the grip of the
aristocracy on the structures of power, and its refusal to share them with
those groups they have oppressed for centuries. Zsigmond Móricz’s first
published novel thus offers an important and revealing portrait of the
impact the oppressive social and economic forces of his age had in
delaying the arrival of effective self-realization and prosperity among
Hungary’s peasant classes.
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– Bhhh, amiért osztoni kell – rajtad!” (Móricz, 13).
74 Móricz, 36, 59-60.
75 Móricz, 36-37, 195-198.
76 Móricz/Lewis, 270; original wording: “Fí, sírni jössz a kötőm mellé,
panaszkodni, hogy az uram, ember létére kedvesebb a jányoknál, mint egy ilyen
vén legény” (Móricz, 195).
77 Móricz, 135.
78 Móricz/Lewis, 18; original wording: “Az egész világot ide akarom
hordani a kötődbe; még a mai napig egy bokor kendőt se adtam más
asszonyszemélynek rajtad kívül. Mit sajnálsz? … Mi közöd hozzá, hogy csinálom
a magam seftyét, csak sikerüljön” (Móricz, 14).
79 Móricz, 61.
80 Móricz, 138.
81 Móricz/Lewis, 196; original wording: “… a lelkében egész fölindulás
reszketett. Nagy akarások és fölgerjedt érzések háborogtak benne; restellte magát
s a szívét szorította valami megalázottság; érezte férfiatlánság s jóvá akarta tenni”
(Móricz, 139-140).
82 Móricz/Lewis, 197; original wording: “… hogy ez a Turi Dani egészen
más ember, mint az, aki reggel kihajtott a mezőre” (Móricz, 140).
83 Móricz/Lewis, 112; original wording: “… aki mint büszke kakas
uralkodik az életnek e trágyás, soktyúkú szemétdombján” (Móricz, 79).
84 Móricz/Lewis, 112; original wording: “Beleszédítették a hallgató
asszonyt a kis falu bűzös világába. A lányon át szétsugárzott körülötte az állatok, a
lovak, a tyúkok, a galambducok, a fürdetlen parasztasszonyok nyers és
tartózkodás nélküli párzásainak szaga …” (Móricz, 79).
85 Móricz, 128.
86 Móricz/Lewis, 65; original wording: “… elnézte az asszonyt, meg az
urát, amint puhán, könnyedén átöltelték egymást. Olyan könnyű mozdulattal
pihent az asszony fehér keze az ura vállán, mintha egy fehér rózsa esett volna oda.
S olyan lágyan lehelt rá a vöröses bajszú, húsos arcú férfi egy kis csókot arra a
kézre, mintha nem is érintette volna. És mikor épp ilyen könnyedén, lepkeszárny
módra csókolták meg egymást, Dani tisztán megérezte, mi az az elérhetetlen
valami, ami hiányzik az ő asszonyaiból, az ő szeretkezéseiből …” (Móricz, 46).
87 Móricz/Lewis, 151-152; original wording: “És Dani átkapta félkarral,
vad kegyetlenül átölelte, levágta a kéve búzára. Csókkal, mindkettőjüknek
irtózatosan kéjes csókkal törte agyon.” “A lány ott hevert a földön.” “Vissza sem
nézett, oda sem pillantott a lányra, aki ott feküdt rendetlen ruhával a kévén, mint
egy szétmállott élet” (Móricz, 107-108).
88 Móricz/Lewis, 153; original wording: “Be lágyan, be puhán, be
máskép tudná, mint ahogy asszonyt szokott ölelni. Olyan érezhetetlenül, alig
birizgelné a színét, olyan könnyen, alig emelintené meg a súlyát” (Móricz, 108).
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89 Móricz, 215.
90 Móricz/Lewis, 112; original wording: “Érezte, hogy életében most
először forrt föl benne az a vad, érzéki, oktalan és céltalan buja gerjedelem, amely
elfogja és megrázza az emberi testet és sarkaiból kiveti a lelket. És néha szinte
megrémült már attól, mi lesz, ha csakugyan hatalma alá kerül a paraszt
díszménnek, akikhez mint valami földön járó istenhez búgnak és nyihognak és
táncolnak ezek a buja sárló kancá” (Móricz, 79).
91 Móricz/Lewis, 301; original wording: “a részletek helyett rögtöni
fizetésről szólt az írás.” “Kap ő pénzt arra a birtokra még ma!” (Móricz, 218).
92 Móricz, 89, 134.
93 Móricz/Lewis, 297; original wording: “És nevetve, összeszorított
foggal, buján, cudarul mondta ki a paraszt Don Juan gúnynevét és látja azt a
különös becstelen lányt, aki maga is meredt nyihogással s durva bájjal mondta ki”
(Móricz, 215).
94 Móricz/Lewis, 124; original wording: “aki élő ember azt kimondja, azt
megölné Turi Dani” (Móricz, 88).
95 Móricz/Lewis, 300; original wording: “Hideg lett a pillantása s
gúnyisan nézett az emberre …” (Móricz, 216); “A grófnőt bosszantotta a paraszt
parasztsága” (p. 217).
96 Móricz/Lewis, 301; original wording: “Azon hökkent meg, hogy a
vételár felényire volt szabva, mint amit ő ajánlott, viszont a részletek helyett
rögtöni fizetésről szólt az írás” (Móricz, 218).
97 Móricz/Lewis, 35; original wording: “nem bízott benne, hogy ezektől
pénzt kap” (Móricz, 25).
98 In the following I take issue with Péter Nagy’s statement in “How
Modern Was Zsigmond Móricz” (p. 31) concerning Dani Turi: “Out to conquer
the world, he thinks of seducing the countess and succeeds, only to be humiliated
by the count whom he then kills.” Count László’s humiliation of Dani is nothing
when compared with that to which he is subjected by Helene. The connection
between Bora’s statement that Dani Turi would kill anyone who calls him by his
insulting nickname and the Countess’s arousal-inducing use of this same
nickname within earshot of him provides certain indication that the chain of
events including Dani’s murder of the Count, as well as of the man who made up
the nickname in the first place, Gyuri Takács, begins when he first hears Helene’s
deeply insulting use of it.
99 Móricz/Lewis, 296; original wording: “Sohasem gondolta volna, hogy
ő is megfizesse a paraszt Don Juant, akit meg szoktak fizetni az asszonyok”
(Móricz, 214).
100 Móricz/Lewis, 302; original wording: “Fölvette a tollat, tintába
mártotta és sietve odaírta a szerződés végére, a Turi Dániel gyatra, nevetséges
betűi alá, hogy: ‘Az egész összeget átvettem.’ És a nevét.” “… megértette, mit
szánt neki, mit várt tőle a nőstény” (Móricz, 218).
101 Móricz, 220-222.
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102 Móricz/Lewis, 311; original wording: “– Mit akarsz itt?” (Móricz,
224), “– Mars!” (p. 225).
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Éva Heyman, the Hungarian Anne Frank:
Writing Against Persecution and Trauma
Agatha Schwartz
2015 marks an important anniversary: 70 years since the end of World
War II and its darkest chapter, the Holocaust. Numerous memoirs and
other testimonies about the Holocaust have been published to date and
continue to be published. However, as Louise Vasvári has pointed out,
there is a “relative lack of Holocaust texts published in Central and Eastern
Europe proper, including scholarship.” Vasvári sees one major reason for
this in the fact that “in postwar communist countries, anti-Semitism
continues today.”1 Vasvári considers women’s Holocaust writing a cate-
gory in itself; and yet another category are adolescents some of whom
survived the Holocaust and published their diaries or memoirs either
immediately after World War II or much later.2 Anne Frank and Éva
Heyman belong to those adolescents whose diaries did survive but who
themselves were victims of the Holocaust.3 Their names became known
posthumously for their testimonies that were published by a surviving
parent — in Anne’s case her father, in Éva’s case her mother. The name of
Anne Frank is familiar to most people; her diary has become a signature
piece of Holocaust literature and translated into numerous languages. It is
not only a testimony about life for persecuted Jews under the Nazi regime
but also a symbol of a bright adolescent girl’s refusal to succumb to
despair and darkness. Fewer readers will be familiar with the diary of
another teenage Holocaust victim who, like Anne Frank, began her diary
on her thirteenth birthday and who also wrote about her observations,
feelings and thoughts before being brutally pushed into a cattle wagon and
transported to Auschwitz where she would be murdered a few months
later. The Hungarian Éva Heyman has rightly been called the “Anne Frank
from Northern Transylvania.”4 Yet unlike Anne Frank, whose diary en-
compasses the period between the summer of 1942 and 1944, Éva Heyman
barely had a few months to fill the pages of her little notebook.
To date, Éva Heyman’s diary has been published under different
titles in several languages; first in 1948 in the Hungarian original under her
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mother's, Ágnes Zsolt’s name as Éva lányom (My daughter Éva) and re-
published under the same title only recently, in 2011. The form of the
published diary is that of an embedded narrative, introduced by Ágnes
Zsolt’s preface and followed by two letters addressed to the mother after
the war, one by Mariska, the family’s former cook, the other one by Juszti,
the former nanny. These frame narratives explain the context in which Éva
wrote her diary and also provide information about her, her family’s and
her diary’s destiny following the deportation. The English translation bears
the title The Diary of Éva Heyman, published initially in 1974 and based
on the 1964 Hebrew translation Yomanah shel Evah Hayman. In Romani-
an, the title is Jurnalul lui Éva Heyman (1991), with the subtitle “Am trăit
atît de puţin” (I have lived so little), which is a quote from the diary. The
German version relied on one of the important episodes described in the
diary by opting for the title Das rote Fahrrad (The red bicycle, 2012).
Finally, in French it was rendered, using the same quote as the Romanian
translation’s subtitle, as J’ai vécu si peu: Journal du ghetto d’Oradea (I
have lived so little: Diary from the Nagyvárad ghetto, 2013).
Éva’s diary, written in Nagyvárad/Oradea/Großwardein5 encom-
passes the period from February 13 (her thirteenth birthday) to May 30,
1944, thus about three and a half months. The last part of the diary was
written in the Nagyvárad ghetto where Éva and her family were forced to
move shortly before they were deported. According to the preface written
by Ágnes Zsolt, it was the family’s loyal former cook Mariska Szabó who
had kept Éva’s diary handed to her by Éva herself the night before the
family’s deportation. Mariska kept it only to give it to Éva’s mother who,
along with her husband Béla Zsolt, survived the war. Unlike Anne Frank,
who had to live in hiding for two years and could thus experience the
immediate effects of the war and the persecution of the Jewish people
mostly indirectly before their hiding place would be betrayed, Éva
Heyman reports on the day-to day changes that affect her, her family’s and
their friends’ lives at a dramatic pace. Thus she describes several trau-
matizing events, most notably her best friend Márta’s sudden deportation,
back in 1941, in the middle of an afternoon tea party. This event marks
Éva profoundly to the point that she mentions it twice already in her first
diary entry. I will argue that writing becomes a coping strategy and a form
of healing for Éva for the brief yet extremely daunting period that her
diary encompasses, her way of dealing with the trauma and with the
constant danger and fear around her. I agree with Cornelius Hell that
“dealing with what is happening to her and the people around her becomes
the motor of a fast-track path to adulthood which only allows for occasi-
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onal remnants of a child’s fantasy world.”6 Thus Éva, despite her young
age, seems to be the one who handles the increasingly difficult situation,
the ever-increasing narrowing down of her and her family’s living space
and the moving to the ghetto the best. Along with her unabated desire to
live, writing the diary gives her the much needed support and hope. It
offers the reader insights into an adolescent girl’s “feelings, desires and
experiences.”7 But most importantly, the diary gives the reader a sense of
how this adolescent girl managed to create for herself the narrative tools to
analyze what is happening around her and to take a critical stance not only
toward the perpetrators who destroy her, her family’s and other Jewish
people’s lives, but also toward members of her family.
The authenticity debate
It is important to address the authenticity debate surrounding this diary.
The authenticity of Éva Heyman’s diary has been contested to the point
that Gergely Kunt proposes to read it as a text that was not only edited (a
point on which most critics agree), but even authored by Éva’s mother.
According to Kunt, Ágnes Zsolt, unable not only to save her only child but
even to offer her a proper funeral, “wrote this book as part of the
mourning-process” by taking a “child’s point of view in the narrative.”8
One major problem is that the original of the diary is missing.9 It is not
unlikely that Ágnes, who had a literary inclination, or even her writer
husband Béla Zsolt himself may have altered or even omitted parts in the
published version of Éva’s diary.10 It remains an open question to what
degree Éva’s mother may have “censored” her daughter’s notes and thus
given the reader only a shorter version of the original text. But, these
possible editorial interventions notwithstanding, Judah Marton, author of
the introduction to the English translation, has no doubts regarding the
diary’s authenticity. He bases this judgment, on the one hand, on the fact
that “in 1940 Jewish children in Europe were mature beyond their years”;
on the other hand, he met and spoke to some surviving members of the
Rácz (Ágnes Zsolt’s) family in Israel as well as to a former classmate of
Éva’s: “all of them said that Éva was an extraordinarily intelligent girl. All
agreed that the image of Éva that emerges from the diary precisely reflects
the Éva they had known and that they had no reason to question the
authenticity of any part of the diary.”11 This image of Éva is further
confirmed by her stepfather, Béla Zsolt who in his Holocaust memoir
Kilenc koffer (Nine Suitcases) describes her as a “child, with her small
fairy apple face, her eager curiosity, her ambition, her vanity, her starry
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eyes full of energy.”12 More recently, following the publication of the
German translation, Cornelius Hell also argued in support of the diary’s
authenticity: “the micro-scenes written from the perspective of an adoles-
cent girl exude an authenticity making it improbable that the mother would
have tried to overcome her feelings of guilt by producing a fake. More-
over, it is unlikely that the critical representation of the mother would have
come from the mother herself.”13 Based on these strong points in support
of the authenticity of Éva Heyman’s diary, in the following I will approach
it as a text authored first and foremost by Éva herself.
However, I would like to add a general comment regarding the so-
called veracity of any diary, autobiography or any other form of life
writing.14 As Roger Woods argues quoting Dagmar Günther, life writing
has to be analyzed beyond the simple binary of fact and fiction and seen,
rather, within the larger frame of “biographical constructions of mean-
ing.”15 I will therefore read Éva Heyman’s diary along the same lines as
neither fact nor fiction but as a testimony about an extreme existential
situation that was the Holocaust and for the effects that this extreme
situation left on the factual and fictional Éva Heyman.
Éva Heyman’s family
Éva Heyman was born in Oradea/Nagyvárad on February 13 (a Friday, as
per the first page of the diary), 1931. Her mother, Ágnes (Ági) Rácz, was
the only child of a prominent Jewish-Hungarian family. Ágnes’s father,
Dr. Rezső Rácz, was a reputable pharmacist (the Rácz pharmacy was on
Várad’s main street), whose father Dr. Sándor Rosenberg was the first
neolog rabbi of Nagyvárad between 1868-1876.16 While a student of
pharmacy, Rezső Rosenberg changed the family name to Rácz. He was
connected to progressive Hungarian intellectual circles and writers in
Nagyvárad. Ágnes herself was also very educated and studied pharma-
cology in Kolozsvár. Ágnes’s mother, née Kaufmann, was the daughter of
a prosperous Arad family who owned vineyards. Éva’s father, Béla Hey-
man, an architect, came from the well-known Heyman-Weiszlovits family.
Ági and Béla Heyman divorced in 1935 (when Éva was only 4 years old),
leaving their only child in the care of her maternal grandparents and the
family’s Austrian governess, Juszti (whom Éva often mentions in her diary
with great affection). Ágnes later married the well-known and prolific
Hungarian writer and left-wing journalist Béla Zsolt, took on her new
husband’s name and followed him to Budapest. It is important to mention
that Béla Zsolt is the author of “one of the very first — and most important
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— memoirs of the Holocaust ever written,”17 Nine Suitcases (2004; Kilenc
koffer).18 In fact, Éva Heyman’s and Béla Zsolt’s respective narratives can
be read as complementary accounts of the Hungarian Holocaust, told from
two different perspectives,19 but each offering another angle of the same
episode: the deportation of the Nagyvárad Jews. Whereas Béla Zsolt’s
memoir mainly encompasses his and his wife’s as well as his wife’s
family’s (including Éva’s) days in the Nagyvárad ghetto,20 Éva’s diary
tells mostly about her and her family’s pre-ghetto life and its rapid dis-
integration following the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944.
In this paper, I will make only occasional references to Béla Zsolt’s text so
as to offer additional information about some important moments from
Éva’s diary.
While Béla and Ágnes Zsolt were smuggled out of the ghetto with
false papers and with the help of friends, Éva, her father and her grand-
parents were deported to Auschwitz and murdered there. According to
Ágnes Zsolt’s preface, and based on information she had obtained from
survivors, it was Mengele himself who, on October 17, 1944, pushed Éva
(who had by then contracted scabies and had feet covered in wounds) onto
the truck that carried his victims to the gas chamber. Éva was not to live to
celebrate her fourteenth birthday. Her mother and stepfather left Hungary
on Rezső Kasztner’s train and survived.21 Béla Zsolt died in 1949 fol-
lowing an illness and Ágnes Zsolt committed suicide in 1951 by slashing
her wrists in front of a picture of her daughter.22 However, before her death
she made sure that her daughter’s diary that had survived the horrors of the
Holocaust, saw the light of the day in 1948. Éva’s diary can thus be
considered, along with her stepfather’s memoir, one of the earliest
published accounts of the Hungarian Holocaust.
The diary
Éva’s journal23 contains 38 entries in total, written over a period of three
and a half months. The entries up to March 19, when she mentions the
German occupation of Hungary, are usually several pages long. The
entries between March 19 and the family’s moving to the Nagyvárad
ghetto on May 5 become shorter, which may partly be explained by the air
raids that at times made it difficult for Éva to write. The entries written in
the ghetto are initially quite long, but become shorter between May 17 and
30, the day before the deportation. The first entry, written on Éva’s
thirteenth birthday, introduces all the important people around her: her
mother, her stepfather, her father, her maternal grandparents, her paternal
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grandmother, as well as the nanny Juszti and the cook Mariska. From the
first page, Éva’s main preoccupations become apparent: her mother’s
prolonged absences because of Uncle Béla (as she calls her stepfather) and
his imprisonment in Budapest. The fact that she only refers to her mother
as Ági, never as mom, in itself reflects her problematic relationship with
her mother, one that is full of doubt regarding her mother’s love and
commitment toward her, a feeling that in later entries becomes mixed with
jealousy. The reader is introduced to the world of a young upper-middle
class girl full of hope for the future and her ambition to become a photo
journalist. Yet despite the surface of a certain normalcy that she conveys
from a teenager’s perspective (e.g. describing an abundance of birthday
presents, among them a little golden chain that she puts around her neck
with the key to her diary, her studying French, doing lots of sports and
having plans for the future), it is clear that abnormal things have been
happening. Already her desire to be an Aryan and to marry an Aryan
Englishman speaks to the persecution of the Jewish people as does her
mentioning of Uncle Béla’s earlier internment in the Ukraine. It also
becomes evident that Éva had had her diary for a while, but that she did
not write in it either because she was still too young or because some
events were too difficult for her to write about, as it will transpire later.
She treats her diary like her best friend, promising it to write more about
certain difficult topics and personifying it to the degree of concluding her
first entry with the words: “You’re probably tired, too, dear diary.”24
Writing about and against trauma
The most difficult things that become almost unsayable for Éva can be
considered as traumatizing events.25 Tim Cole sees two such events in the
diary: one is the deportation of Éva’s friend Márta to “Poland,” in Éva’s
words, the other a certain vitéz Szepesváry’s repeated attempts to con-
fiscate her grandfather’s pharmacy.26 Unlike Cole, I would not regard the
latter as traumatizing; although Éva does keep mentioning it — which
reflects her deep annoyance, her feeling of injustice and a certain fear and
loss of security — it does not lead to such a deep, obsessive and painful
“acting out” as does Márta’s deportation.
In its original meaning, as Cathy Caruth reminds us, trauma
signified “wound,” i.e. a bodily injury. With the development of medical
and psychiatric literature in the 19th century, and particularly following
Freud, trauma begins to signify a wound inflicted on a person’s mind, one
that becomes latent and acts itself out through the unconscious, in night-
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mares or repetitive actions.27 Indeed, repetition is one of the most prevalent
signs of trauma, although not the only one. Dominick LaCapra calls this
compulsive going back to and re-enacting of the repressed traumatizing
event in the Freudian sense “acting out.” It can result in repetition of
traumatic scenes and situations that often appear in dreams. In order to
heal trauma, the compulsive “acting out” ideally has to yield to “working
through.” In “working through” there is an attempt to gain critical distance
to an event and to distinguish between past, present and future,28 some-
thing trauma victims often lose.29 For Éva, writing her diary becomes, at
least temporarily, such an act of healing, of “working through” as it gives
her a sense of agency, something her community is gradually being
stripped of, and it allows her to keep a sense of the present and her hope in
the future. However, there are also moments of what can be called “acting
out.”30
As per the above definition, Márta’s sudden disappearance
definitely constitutes a traumatizing event for Éva. She manages to write
about it in detail in her second diary entry from February 14. This episode
continues to haunt her, which is confirmed in her mother’s foreword:
“Ever since her friend, Márta Münzer, was taken away in 1941 [...], Éva
had changed in a rather peculiar manner [...] the grief she felt at Márta’s
destiny left deep, indelible traces upon her.”31 The way in which Éva
describes this episode from three years back reflects the intertwining of the
child’s and the adults’ perspective that she re-formulates in her own words,
something we can see throughout the entire diary. She refers to Márta as a
friend who was two years her senior and whom she admired for her talent
as a dancer. She even compares her with Josephine Baker. In the middle of
a happy afternoon, following a bicycle ride (on Éva’s new red bicycle that
will become an important player in a later episode) and the savouring of a
delicious afternoon snack at Éva’s place (chocolate and strawberries with
whipped cream), Márta suddenly has to leave as the police had come to
their house to pick up her parents. The child’s naive explanation from her
point of view that it must be because of Márta’s speeding on her bicycle
quickly dissipates as Éva overhears a conversation between Ági and
Grandma, a conversation that brutally brings in the reality of the adult
world: “the government was preparing to do something terrible, and Jews
who weren’t born in Hungary would be taken to Poland where a horrible
fate was in store for them.”32 As it turns out, it was only Márta’s father
who had not been born in Hungary, but both she and her mother followed
him on his last journey. What Éva did not know at the time but would
Agatha Schwartz124
gradually find out, was that Márta’s family’s fate was shared by many
other Jews living in Hungary. Jacob Boas notes:
The so-called alien Jews, of which there were some thirty to
thirty-five thousand, were told that they would be sent to “Poland,”
where they would live in the homes of Jews who had fled east. They
were taken instead to newly-occupied Ukraine, to a place called
Kamenets-Podolsk. But there were no homes waiting — only
machine guns — and some twenty-three thousand (including local
Jews) were shot: the first five-figure massacre in the Nazi’s Final
Solution program.33
However, Éva admits that she wouldn’t have done what Márta did,
i.e. follow her father. She will mention later (entry from April 19) that she
would go “to any place in the world,” even if that meant not seeing her
family, only not to be “taken to Poland like Márta was.”34 And in her entry
from April 20, she admits that, if given the same choice as Márta, “I would
stay even without Papa and without Ági and without anybody at all,
because I want to stay alive!”35 Thus the trauma Márta’s deportation has
caused her seems to be abating somewhat, due to the “working through”
writing brings for Éva; her desire to live and her hope for a future prevails.
However, in one of the last entries, from May 14, written already
in the ghetto, Éva’s way of dealing with this trauma changes in that she no
longer thinks about Márta as she did particularly since the German
occupation. Instead, she begins to have dreams, nightmares about her lost
friend. Thus she falls back into the “acting out” of the initial trauma as it
seems to become cemented in her unconscious:
For instance, yesterday I dreamt that I was Márta and I stood in a
big field, bigger than any I had ever seen, and then I realized that
that field was Poland. There wasn’t a sign of a human being any-
where, or of a bird, or of any other creature, and it was still, like that
time we were waiting to be taken to the Ghetto. In my dream I was
very frightened by the silence and I started running. Suddenly, that
cross-eyed gendarme, who returned the cigarettes to Ági, grabbed
me from behind by the neck, and put his pistol against my nape. The
pistol felt very cold. I wanted to scream, but not a sound came out
of my throat. I woke up and woke up Marica and told her what an
awful dream I had had. Suddenly it occurred to me that that is the
way poor Márta must have felt at the moment the Germans shot her
to death! Marica asked me not to tell her about any more dreams
like that; she had not told me what the adults were discussing one
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night when they thought the children were asleep. I was really
asleep, but Marica had been awake.36
The return of the “acting out” of the trauma that had begun to heal
can be explained by further traumatization that the increasing pace of
persecution, the stripping away of her family’s, their friends’ and her own
(as few as they may be) possessions and basic human rights entails.
Following the Germans’ arrival in Nagyvárad on March 25, Éva notes the
day-to-day worsening of the Jews’ situation: “Every day they keep issuing
new laws against the Jews.”37 She writes about, among other things,
having to wear the yellow star, send away their “Aryan” personnel
(Mariska and Juszti), their belongings being taken away — including her
camera — as well as the panic that befalls her family, in particular her
mother and grandmother, and the wall that becomes erected between Jews
and “Aryans” who won’t even greet the Jews on the street anymore. But
she also notes the decency of some rare “Aryans,” mostly from the lower
classes, such as Mariska who keeps coming back to their house secretly,
feels ashamed about what is happening and continues to help the Rácz
family.
The event that has the deepest impact on Éva in this period of re-
traumatization leading up to their moving to the ghetto, is the loss of her
red bicycle. This bicycle was not only the sole remaining connection to her
lost friend Márta (with whom they rode their red bicycles on their last
afternoon together), but a friend whom she named Friday (after Robinson
Crusoe). Éva liked riding around on Friday, thus it was both a symbol of
freedom, adventure and loyalty for her. And this symbol will be taken
away on April 7 when the police confiscate her bicycle. Éva is so outraged
at this blatant injustice of being stripped of her lawful property that she
throws herself on the ground, holding the back wheel of her bicycle and
shouting: “Shame on you for taking away a bicycle from a girl! That’s
robbery!”38 Éva thus positions herself in opposition not only to the
authorities but to the adult world in general in displaying agency and
courage to rebel against injustice, which the adults of her family seem to
lack. Her rebellious act provokes a twofold reaction: while one of the
policemen shouts all sorts of nasty anti-Semitic insults back at her, much
to Éva’s shock who had never been told such things to the face before, the
other policeman speaks up in her defence: “You should be ashamed of
yourself, colleague, he said, is your heart made of stone? How can you
speak that way to such a beautiful girl? Then he stroked my hair and
promised to take good care of my bicycle. He gave me a receipt and told
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me not to cry, because when the war was over I would get my bicycle
back.”39
The loss of her bicycle carries the elements of re-traumatization
for Éva. It will be soon followed by other “terrible things” that Éva refers
to only fleetingly making her at times lose her motivation for writing.
Nevertheless, her notes continue and her diary becomes the main support
she can rely on. Thus the “writing through” of her by now permanent
traumatization remains her main tool to cope with the situation and it helps
her, despite moments of despair, keep her desire to live and her faith in the
future.
The desire to live and failed attempts to save Éva’s life
What runs through the diary like a leitmotif is Éva’s continued affirmation
of her desire to live, against all trauma, loss and persecution. Éva repeat-
edly mentions this strong desire to live, particularly in the days following
the German occupation. On March 25, day of the German troops’ arrival in
Várad, she writes that she wants to see the end of the war and that she will
hide.40 On March 26, she cries out: “But I don’t want them to kill me! I
want to be a newspaper photographer, and when I’m twenty-four41 I’ll
marry an Aryan Englishman, or maybe even Pista Vadas.”42 Pista Vadas is
a Jewish boy who is her first love and a few years her senior. The fact that
Éva comes to the point of considering marrying a Jewish man may be
interpreted as an acceptance of her Jewishness and of the collective fate of
her people. The most heartrending entry is from March 28, when Éva
writes: “I always cry when I read about someone dying.43 I don’t want to
die, because I’ve hardly lived!”44 And on March 29, a rather unusual cry to
God as Éva doesn’t otherwise mention God: “God, sweet God, don’t let us
die [...]. I so much want to live!”45
What makes Éva’s story particularly tragic is that there were
several possibilities for her to be saved. Although as mentioned above, the
factual information provided in any diary cannot be taken at face value,
most details of this part of Éva’s story are also rendered and corroborated
by Béla Zsolt in Nine Suitcases. One option was that Juszti take Éva to a
farm owned by the Poroszlay family. While Mrs. Poroszlay was very
much in favour of this solution, and Éva writes that she would have been
happy to live in a stable and keep the sheep, “just so the Germans should
not kill me with a gun as they killed Márta,”46 Mr. Poroszlay, an anti-
Semite, rejects this proposal. The second possibility to save her was taking
her to Budapest, along with Ági and Uncle Béla, with false papers that a
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cousin of Ági’s brings along. However, Grandma’s psychological condi-
tion is so bad by that point that the cousin returns to Budapest leaving
everybody, including Éva, to their fate in Várad. The third and last
possibility to save Éva was the family seamstress’s, Mrs. Jakobi’s offer
(entry from April 19) to take Éva with her. Here Éva describes Grandma’s
reaction in detail as follows: “But Grandma said that she wouldn’t allow it,
because Mrs. Jakobi was an evil woman and she would sell me to men and
then I would also be an evil woman.”47 Ági apologizes to Mrs. Jakobi
explaining that her mother’s mental state is very bad, on which Éva
comments: “It looks like Ági is ashamed that Grandma is out of her mind,
even though nobody can be blamed for it except that damned Hitler.”48
Through such comments, Éva describes the toll the persecution of the Jews
took not only on people’s physical but also mental and emotional well-
being. Ultimately, however, she becomes the sacrificial lamb for the sake
of keeping the family together, come what may. The diary offers no lament
on Éva’s part regarding this tragic development; but it could well be that
her mother may have edited some parts out. Béla Zsolt gives a much more
critical view about these failed attempts to save Éva’s life, and he blames it
very much on his mother-in-law and her obsessive insistence that the child
may be harmed, sold, or ending up on the street if she let her go with the
people who offered to help. Zsolt describes his mother-in-law’s rejection
of letting Éva go, even against Ági’s heated argument with her, as a
blackmailing strategy: “if the child had gone, the old people would have
taken cyanide.”49 Faced with this situation, Ági is unable to choose bet-
ween her daughter and her parents’ well-being. Zsolt concludes with a
bitter comment: “My mother-in-law had won: the child stayed.”50
Life in the ghetto and deportation
Éva refers to what follows soon after “as if it really is a dream,” which one
can interpret as a manifestation of trauma, and she admits that she has
“never been so afraid.”51 The family is forced to leave their home and
move to the Nagyvárad ghetto on May 5. The policemen who come for
them take away all jewellery, including Éva’s little golden chain on which
the key to her diary hangs. She replaces the golden chain with a velvet
ribbon, politely asking the policeman: “Mr. Inspector, may I take a velvet
ribbon along to the Ghetto?”52 She thus demonstrates a certain presence of
mind and acceptance of the situation, much unlike the adults around her.
Éva describes in great detail their moving to the ghetto and their new
quarters at the Rabbinical Residence that used to belong to her late uncle.
Agatha Schwartz128
From there, Éva reports on their new living conditions that worsen with
every day: the terrible crowdedness (over ten people per room) and further
and further harassment “by the gendarmes who took everything away from
us”53 including their provisions. Éva’s optimism is faltering at this point:
“Every time I think: This is the end, things couldn’t possibly be worse, and
then I find out that it’s always possible for everything to get worse, and
even much much worse.”54 The beating and torture of people at the Dreher
brewery to give away alleged hiding places of whatever valuables they
may have left is one of such episodes.55 Éva briefly reports what she hears
the adults say, especially regarding what women are exposed to, and this
time around, words fail her: “Things that I am incapable of putting into
words, even though you know, dear diary, that I haven’t kept any secrets
from you till now.”56 Here the usually verbose Éva is faced with the limits
of language when it comes to expressing liminal experiences in the world
of an adolescent girl.
This narrowing down of what language can (or is supposed to)
convey goes parallel to the spatial narrowing down of Éva’s universe,
similar to how Elie Wiesel, another Jewish adolescent from Transylvania
who was only a few years older than Éva at the time of his deportation,
later described his experience of the Holocaust: “The universe began
shrinking, [...] [F]irst we were supposed to leave our towns and con-
centrate in the larger cities. Then the towns shrank to the ghetto, and the
ghetto to a house, the house to a room, the room to a cattle car...”57 When
the Nagyvárad ghetto is divided into sectors to be deported one after the
other, Éva writes a short note into her diary on May 29: “And so, dear
diary, now the end of everything has really come.”58 But she refuses to
give in to despair, and her last entry, from May 30, ends with the words:
[D]ear diary, I don’t want to die, I want to live even if it means
that I’ll be the only person here allowed to stay. I would wait for the
end of the war in some cellar, or on the roof,59 or in some secret
cranny. I would even let the cross-eyed gendarme the one who took
our flour away from us, kiss me, just as long as they didn’t kill me,
only that they should let me live.
Now I see that friendly gendarme has let Mariska come in. I
can’t write anymore, dear diary, the tears run from my eyes, I’m
hurrying over to Mariska...60
Here Éva Heyman’s diary ends. The following day, Éva, her father
and her grandparents were herded into a crowded cattle wagon that carried
them away to Auschwitz. When Anne Frank and her family arrived in
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Auschwitz on September 6, Éva was still alive. When Mengele sent Éva to
the gas chamber on October 17, 1944 Anne was still alive in Auschwitz
from where she and her sister would be deported at the end of October to
Bergen-Belsen. Both Éva and Anne died while Germany and its allies
were already losing the war. Their diaries live on as testimonies and as a
warning for the present and the future, particularly as we commemorate 70
years of the Holocaust in a climate of rising anti-Semitism in many
countries, including Hungary.
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Hungarian Scouting in Exile:
Frame Narratives and the Creation of a
Diasporic Community
Katherine Magyarody
Mihály Vörösmarty’s 1836 poem “Szózat,” translated as “The Appeal,” is
described in the 1969 Cserkészkönyv I [Hungarian Boy Scout Manual] as
Hungary’s second national anthem.  It begins:
Hazádnak rendületlenül, [To your homeland, above all,
Légy híve, ó magyar, Be faithful, oh Hungarian,
Bölcsőd az s majdan sírod is It was your cradle and will be your grave
Mely ápol s eltakar. Which nurtures and will bury you.
A nagy világon e kivűl In the large world beyond,
Nincsen számodra hely; There is no room for you;
Áldjon vagy verjen sors keze: Whether fate’s hand blesses or beats you,
Itt élned, halnod kell. Here you must live and die.]1
The Hungarian Boy Scout Manual was published in Garfield, New Jersey,
far away from the land in which Vörösmarty insists it is a Hungarian’s
duty to stay. If the concept of cultural belonging is so rooted to the soil,
how can one maintain a Hungarian identity abroad? If not the soil, then
what replaces it as the constitutive aspect of Hungarian identity as inter-
preted by the Scouting movement in the Hungarian Diaspora?  In this
paper, I assess two shifts in the way the Külföldi Magyar Cserkész-
szövetség [Hungarian Scouting Association in Exteris {i.e. Exile} or
KMCSSZ in this paper] preserves and promotes a diasporic cultural iden-
tity through the repetition and recreation of narratives of historical and
mythical moments in kerettörténetek [frame narratives] used in its cur-
riculums and through annual Akadályversenyek [Hungarian Scouting com-
petitions] and vezetőképző táborok [leadership training camps] in the Sík
Sándor Scout Park in upstate New York between 1998 and 2011. I also
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suggest that there has been a shift in the way these frame narratives were
presented after the Second World War and in the post-communist era.
Having been raised within Toronto’s Hungarian community as a Scout, I
had access to Scouting materials in private collections as well as to
individuals willing to share their experiences with me for the purposes of
this project.
Besides secondary scholarly sources on Baden-Powell’s move-
ment, I will be using and comparing three main types of information: first,
official documents such as Scout handbooks, textbooks and annual histo-
rical publications used in preparation for and at youth leadership camps
which reveal what the KMCSSZ wants to accomplish; second, camp
schedules and storyboards used by leaders in planning and enacting frame
narratives in order to show how the Association’s objectives are translated
into action, and third, interviews conducted by myself, documentaries and
archival material such as letters and camp diaries which I have collected or
have access to at the Toronto troop’s location, which demonstrates to what
extent and to what effect the objectives of the Association are fulfilled.
After laying out the theoretical background for my project, I begin
with an introduction of the development of Baden-Powell’s Scouting
movement in Hungary and the way its focus turned towards ethnography
and culture. Next, I illustrate the way the narrated beginnings of the
KMCSSZ invokes myths of a nomadic Hungarian past in order to justify
the participants’ diasporic identity and how these myths have been funda-
mentally incorporated into the Scouting curriculum.2 Subsequently, I ana-
lyse the official use of the frame narrative/kerettörténet, during the annual
Akadályverseny in which the children’s Scouting skills and cultural
knowledge are tested during the re-enactment of a literary work, a histori-
cal event or a myth.3 Within the context of an overall fun event, leaders
attempt to impress upon the Scouts the weight of history by making it
“real.”4 Although the Akadályverseny seemed to promote a historic-
nationalistic perspective in the past, I also consider the ways frame
narratives/kerettörténetek can be used to challenge these perspectives and
the way building self-consciousness about frame narratives/kerettörténetek
is built into the structure of the patrol leadership training camps. Lastly, I
briefly look at the KMCSSZ’s renegotiation of Hungarian identity
throughout the duration of the organization’s history and the reflection of
this change in the narratives it uses, signalling a break from the more
essentialist mind set with which it had started and its turn to a more flexi-
ble conception of Hungarian identity that reaches across the borders of the
homeland.
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Why Scouting? Why Narrative?
Scouting offers an important combination of experiences necessary for the
formation of a diasporic community. James Clifford, the prominent cultu-
ral theorist and historian, suggests that after three generations, immigrants
to the USA metamorphose into “ethnic Americans,” (and we can replace
American with Canadian, Argentine, German, and any other nationality
Hungarian Scouts possess) unless they “resist erasure through the nor-
malizing processes of forgetting, assimilating, and distancing.”5 Diasporic
theorist Martin Sökefeld suggests that assimilation-prone immigrants
might maintain their identity through engaging “in collective action” and
taking part in “associations that create and sustain discourses of com-
munity.”6 Scholars conducting field-work on disporic communities gener-
ally concur that the maintenance of a community’s culture in subsequent
generations faces challenges. In Toronto, education researcher Roma
Chumak-Horbatsch found that children in Ukrainian schools felt resentful
about their cultural isolation, while language teacher Hong Xiao found that
weekend language schools were ineffective at culture maintenance because
of the limited hours of instruction they offer. However, another language
researcher Martin Guardado argued that voluntary, intergenerational
cultural activities such as scouting were beneficial to culture maintenance
in a diasporic community.
A voluntary heritage language scout troop program in Vancouver,
Guardado noted, provided children with an engaging activity that also
emphasized their “Spanish language and literacy practices” and “cultural
ideologies and practices.”7 In this diasporic Scouting situation, Spanish
became a way to resist a hegemonic Anglophone identity and also to foster
a community by connecting “newcomers and old-timers” and building
bonds between Spanish speaking children and their parents.8 In relation to
a specifically Hungarian context, Endre Szentkirályi’s study of language
proficiency and cultural contexts for language use in Cleveland, Ohio, and
Katalin Pintz’s study of Hungarian heritage maintenance in New
Brunswick, New Jersey, both specifically identify Hungarian Scouting as
an important venue for community building.9 Although these three studies
spend valuable time assessing the nexus between friendship and language
use in the community, they do not focus on what activities are used to
socialize children into cultural values, or how those cultural values are
defined.10 One of the most flexible and pervasive vehicles for communi-
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cating ideas of “Hungarianness” within the KMCSSZ is the frame narra-
tive or kerettörténet.
The narratives constitute an important aspect for understanding
Hungarian and diasporic identity formation. In his essay on literary con-
texts, the noted author Milan Kundera invokes Kafka’s words to assert that
“a small nation … has great respect for its writers because they provide it
with pride ‘in the face of the hostile surrounding world’; for a small nation,
literature is ‘less a matter of literary history’ than ‘a matter of the people’
… ‘nothing less than a life-or-death decree.’”11 Thus, literature and literary
practices comprise an essential factor in the creation of a culture. In addi-
tion to literature, the narrative framing of historical events and the shaping
of folk customs is integral to perceptions of what culture is and how an
individual identifies as part of a national/ethnic/cultural group. Canadian
philosopher Will Kymlicka maintains that when a group of individuals
leave their home for a country where they are “free to try to maintain
whatever part of their ethnic heritage or identity they wish,” the main-
tenance of that heritage depends upon a retained consciousness of a litera-
ture, a history and the traditions of their culture of origin.12 In his search
for diasporic identity, diasporic and literary theorist Radhakrishnan warns
against simplified concepts of “authenticity” in which ambiguities and
political controversies are suppressed.13 Narratives within a diasporic con-
text become contentious because of the particular types of cultural know-
ledge that are passed on. Radhakrishnan also distinguishes between pos-
sessing information and experiential knowledge, a boundary which may be
blurred in the attempt to create a cultural consciousness.14 A narrative
might be known, but cultural authenticity relies on possessing that narra-
tive through experience.
Frame narratives have been recognized within the Scouting Move-
ment as pedagogically significant since Baden-Powell’s original Scouting
for Boys in 1908.  The original frame narrative of Baden-Powell’s text was
also, in a sense, diasporic. Rudyard Kipling’s Kim is about an Irish boy
born in India who spies within the global network of Britons who consti-
tute the British Empire. The Scouting founder Baden-Powell saw that by
taking on characters and acting out situations, children would be more
invested in learning survival skills.15 The point of a frame narrative is to
create a story wherein the child’s experiences congeal into a series of
related events. When the story is based on historical events, by enacting
those events, the history becomes part of the child’s “real” life.16 Within
the KMCSSZ, collective reading and acting out of literature and history
blurs the boundary between the possession of information about a culture
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and experiential knowledge in the attempt to create an “authentic” cultural
consciousness.17 Both the way the KMCSSZ creates experiential know-
ledge of narratives and has changed the narratives it tells is an important
indicator of how it creates and maintains a diasporic community. Before
delving into the frame narratives within a diasporic context, however, it is
necessary to understand the history of narrative orientation in Hungarian
Scouting before 1948 and its relationship to the KMCSSZ.
Scouting in Hungary: How Hungarian Culture became the Focus
The Scouting movement has historically oscillated between the poles of
nationalism and internationalism. The Scouting movement was established
by Lord Robert Baden-Powell in England in 1907-1908 for the purpose of
fostering the future of the British Empire. Despite Scouting’s imperial and
specifically British origins, the movement spread rapidly across Europe,
causing Baden-Powell to turn from endorsing a specifically British identity
to accepting a benign national pride in general.18 In Hungary, then part of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Magyar Cserkészet had come about as a
movement by 1910 — and became an official organization in 1912.19 The
Hungarian Boy Scouts’ strong performance at the third World Scouting
Jamboree lead to the country’s selection to host the fourth Jamboree at
Gödöllő in 1933.20 This event was strongly promoted by the Hungarian
government as an opportunity for country to rebuild its national pride
which had been bruised after the First World War.21 Although Scouts
followed the original British Kipling narratives in their weekly activities,
the Jamboree’s mascot derived from Hungarian mythology. The white
stag, or csodaszarvas, which led the legendary twins Hunor and Magor
towards a new homeland, was now presented as a symbol for Scouting.  In
Baden-Powell’s farewell speech, he imbued the national emblem of the
white stag with international Scouting virtues:
The Hungarian hunters of old pursued the miraculous Stag, not
because they expected to kill it, but because it led them on in the joy
of the chase to new trails and fresh adventures, and so to capture
happiness. You may look on that White Stag as the pure spirit of
Scouting, springing forward and upward, ever leading you onward
and upward .22
The connection Baden-Powell had made stuck in the minds of the young
Hungarian Scouts. The stag returned as the symbol of the Hungarian
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Scouting movement in exile and was officially accepted as the move-
ment’s emblem when it came about in West German displaced persons
camps in 1945. However, there were other significant ideological changes
to be made before the Hungarian Scouting Association in Exteris was
officially established.
The success of the Gödöllő Jamboree made Hungarian Scouts
possible symbols of the nation’s future, similar to Baden-Powell’s initial
intentions for Scouting in Britain. However, the question remained as to
what this nation’s future should be. Hungary’s head-of-state, Regent
Miklós Horthy, recognized the potential that Scouting held for the country
and favoured turning the Scouts into a paramilitary youth organization.23
Against Horthy’s wishes, in 1940, the Chief Scout of Hungary Pál Teleki,
who happened to be the country’s Prime Minister, publicly pronounced the
Association’s neutral status. Furthermore, Teleki strove to keep Scouting
separate from the already existing government-sponsored paramilitary
Levente youth group, which had been set up in 1921.24 In 1939 an act of
the Hungarian Parliament declared Levente service for boys between
twelve and twenty-one to be mandatory. The following year the Levente
adopted many aspects of the Scouting curriculum, thereby increasing the
pressure on Hungary’s Scouting Association to become part of the Levente
movement.25 The Association itself was split between those attracted to
Scouting for its spirituality-based character education and those who were
enticed by its military training potential.26 In September of 1940 Teleki
invited the leaders of the Scouting Association to his lodge on Ábrahám-
hegy [Mount Abraham], where they rewrote the Scouting curriculum.27
Based partially on Teleki’s background as a geographer and ethnographer
— and an increased public interest in the 1930s in falucserkészet [village
scouting] — the curriculum was refocused from such para-military exer-
cises as games of surveillance to activities emphasizing religious and cul-
tural traditions.28 Regőlés, that is, “Hungarian folklore, traditions, folk
music, song, and dance,” became the main focus of the Hungarian
Scouting’s programme.29 While political science scholar László Kürti
objects to the concept of “regőscserkészet,” or folkloric scouts, as national-
istic essentialism, in the wider political and social context the focus on the
diverse regional folk arts rather than military training indicates Hungarian
Scouting’s resistance to the increasingly constrictive political situation .30
A Hungarian scouting motto “Emberebb ember, magyarabb
magyar” [More humane humans, more Hungarian Hungarians] calls for
balance between the maintenance of a particular cultural identity and the
development of broadly humanist principles. The extent to which broad
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humanist principles could be maintained in an increasingly tense political
situation came under contention during the December 1940 Conference of
the Hungarian Boy Scout Association when the suggestion was raised to
strike the Fourth Hungarian Scout Law, namely that “A Scout regards
every other Scout as his brother.”31 In a country interested in gaining back
territory lost after the First World War, such a policy of transnational
friendship threatened the effectiveness of the national martial endeavour.
Teleki, in his position as Chief Scout of Hungary, defended the law and
kept it in place. Nevertheless many changes to Hungarian Scouting that
took place under his watch, first as Minister of Culture and Education and
then as Prime Minister, can be seen as violations of the basic fraternal
principles of Scouting. Historian Paul Lendvai calls Teleki “a convinced,
but ‘moderate’ anti-Semite” who helped to introduce discriminatory laws
that stand in sharp contrast to his work at the Gödöllő Jamboree and the
non-militaristic nature of regölés.32 Despite the large number of Jewish
Scouts and scouts of part-Jewish parentage in Hungary’s Scouting move-
ment, and the protest of Jewish Scout masters, in 1940 Teleki allowed
boys of Jewish extraction to be excluded.33 It might be noted that what
transpired in this respect under Teleki’s watch in 1939-1940 was signif-
icantly less harmful than what occurred four years later after the German
occupation of Hungary. What happened in 1944 came as the consequence
of Hungary’s involvement in the Second World War, an involvement that
Teleki had resisted. In the spring of 1941, however, with Hitler’s decision
to invade Yugoslavia and his request to send German troops there through
Hungary precipitated a crisis in the Hungarian regime’s leadership. Teleki,
finding that he was no longer able to maintain his country’s neutrality in
the war, committed suicide. With his death Hungarian Scouting lost a
dedicated and influential friend.34
After Hungary’s involvement in the war, on the ground level at
least, changes in scouting policies were slow to be introduced. Scouting
historian Ferenc Gergely noted that while in some troops the anti-Semitic
measures were implemented, the leaders of other troops quietly refused to
comply with the new regulations.35 Information from one of my informants
also supports the idea that after the spring of 1941 for a while there were
little noticeable changes to Scouting practices. For the children, the curri-
culum remained much the same. The cub Scouts still followed the Jungle
Book, and the older boys followed their curriculum based off of the story
of the white stag, or continued with regőlés. My elderly informant, who
had been involved in scouting since the early thirties, noted that it was
only when he became a scout leader that he recognized the pressures upon
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the organization. As an Assistant Scoutmaster, he and his peers became
responsible for examining and training Levente youth leaders. Even so, he
explained, the Scouts avoided the overt militarism of the Levente: “At that
time, the Scouting training was accepted by the Levente as the same as
their own — but we still used our own methods. We tried to teach them,
not the soldier stuff, but how to be more human.”36 Eventually, as the Red
Army began advancing into Hungary in the late summer of 1944, civilian
activities became unsustainable and Scout leaders were drafted into the
Hungary’s wartime army. Many of them were captured and both they and
captured Levente members were sent to POW camps in the Soviet Union
— from where they returned only years later or never returned at all.
Scouting in the Displaced Persons Camps and the Wide World
At the end of the Second World War prospects for the revival of Scouting
in Hungary were bleak. Still, the first reaction of Scout leaders and their
troops to the conclusion of hostilities was to get out and clear rubble from
the streets, aid the war’s civilian victims, distribute food to the starving,
and help with the harvest in the countryside.37 Although the country did
not become a communist dominated nation until 1948, a resurgent Com-
munist Party, aided and abetted by an Allied Control Commission under
the direction of its chairman, former Soviet Commissar of Defence Mar-
shal Klimenty Voroshilov, established a rival youth organization, the út-
törők [the Pioneers] in the fall of 1945.38 In the two years following, the
Pioneers received increasing political and financial support. By early 1948
the Communists had gained complete control of Hungary’s government
and in May of that year they ordered the absorption of what remained of
the Scouting movement into the Pioneers. In September a decree declared
the latter the “only democratic youth movement” and ordered the
formation of units of the Pioneers in all of Hungary’s elementary
schools.39 This decree brought a formal end to Scouting in the country;
however, Hungarian Scouting by then had reappeared in the displaced
persons camps of the Western Sectors of Germany. Its headquarters had
already been established in 1947 in Pfarrkirchen in Bavaria. Former Scout
leaders saw in the re-introduction of scouting activities a means of dis-
tracting the children, both male and female, from the difficulties of every-
day life in the refugee camps.40 As one of my informants explained, when
they were camping, the fact that eight girls had one blanket between them
and slept on pine needles in a tent borrowed from American soldiers, was a
novelty rather than a hardship to be endured.41
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Baden-Powell’s Hungarian nomadic mythology reappeared in this
context of displacement. In 1947, a select group of young men convened to
consolidate the leadership of the fledgling movement.42 This “törzs,” or
tribe, named themselves the Hontalan Sasok or Homeless Eagles.43 The
narration of the Eagles’ formation within Hungarian Scouting materials
evokes the mythological moment of Hungary’s birth in reverse. In myth,
the princes of seven Hungarian nomadic tribes swore fealty to Prince
Árpád when they entered a land that seemed very promising.44 They
convened, gathered their blood into a cup and drank a blood covenant, thus
creating the Hungarian nation and divesting themselves of their tribal par-
ticularisms.45 In an inverse enactment of this event, the leaders of the
Hungarian Scouts in Exteris swore fealty to each other under the leader-
ship of Gábor Bodnár and created their own “tribe,” united in their goals
despite the diverse destinations to which they would travel.46 In 1947 the
Eagle tribe declared its mission to the cultural lives of Hungarian youth
growing up overseas through Scouting.47 Thus, the Hungarian refugee
identity began to resemble an ancient Hungarian nomadic mythology that
predated Hungary, justifying their ability to remain Hungarian without
remaining in their native land.
The connection between the fledgling KMCSSZ and the Hun-
garian Diaspora grew stronger when Bodnár immigrated to the United
States in 1951. After settling in New Jersey, he set up a network of chosen
leaders in Europe, the Americas and Australia, and retained various leader-
ship positions in the organization until his death in 1996.48 One of his
primary goals was to provide whatever literature necessary to imbue the
lives of Hungarian youth growing up overseas with Hungarian culture
through Scouting, pronouncing to future Scoutmasters that “we will give
the necessary and appropriate books into the hands of every Hungarian
youth.”49 In this attempt to give every youth the chance at attaining
cultural literacy, the focus of the KMCSSZ differed greatly from Scouting
in pre-communist Hungary, which was an elitist movement. Bodnár
published multiple Scouting guide books, leadership protocols and histo-
ries, rewriting the Scouting curriculum set forth at Ábrahámhegy for a
diasporic context.50
Tellingly, the Hungarian Boy Scout manuals of 1969, 1970 and
1972 are infused with pre-settlement Hungarian mythology. The first story
in the manual is that of the white stag, whose promise of a better place
prompts its pursuers to follow it far from home.51 Although the original
legend talks about the conquest of a homeland, in the KMCSSZ retelling,
the story focuses on skills needed during the journey rather than on
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reaching the destination. A quotation from János Arany’s nineteenth
century epic poem Rege a csodaszarvasról [Tale of the miraculous stag]
prefaces each camping skill, which is also explained in terms of essential
nomadic know-how. For example, in the Cserkészkönyv I for the youngest
age group, the section on archery begins with a stanza on Hunor and
Magor’s flashing arrows, followed by an explanation that “in our
ancestors’ time, they did not know guns. Their preferred weapon as the
bow and arrow; this is what they used in their battles, with this they hunted
and caught fish.”52 Thus, in its week to week activities, Scouting became a
way to re-live an older version of Hungarianness.
Frame Narratives at the 2011 Scout Competition: More Hungarian
Hungarians?
While in his Scout manuals Bodnár knit together scouting knowledge with
history and literature, he did not overtly suggest the re-enactment of any
historical events. Rather, subsequent generations of Scout leaders have
elaborated upon the importance of enacting stories to teach skills. The
concept of the frame narrative is formalized and taught in the camp for
Assistant Scoutmasters, whose responsibilities include the planning of
narrative-driven competitions. The 2006 Segédtiszt Emlékeztető [Assistant
Scoutmaster’s Guidebook], a compilation of essential documents distri-
buted to all Assistant Scoutmasters, explains that the frame narrative is “an
IMPORTANT teaching tool” because it allows Hungarian culture to be
passed on at the same time as teaching or testing other Scouting skills.53
The frame narrative accomplishes this by providing a better atmosphere,
making “dry,” academic or boring material easier to teach and enacting
history so it better sticks in the child’s mind.54 In theory, the frame
narrative can be a “historical event, folklore, geography, etc,” but it is
important that it remain within the bounds of believability.55 Thus frame
narratives increase the effectiveness of the Scouting competitions and even
the vezetőképző táborok [leadership training camps]. The point of a frame
narrative, the Assistant Scoutmaster’s Guidebook continues, is to create a
story wherein the child’s experiences congeal into a series of related
events. When the story is based on historical events, by enacting those
events, the history becomes part of the child’s “real” life.56 From Benkő’s
material it seems that the frame narrative is a mode by which to enact the
“more Hungarian Hungarian” part of the Hungarian Scouting motto.
The frame narrative is thought to be of utmost importance to the
Akadályverseny [Scouting competition], because the knowledge learned or
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tested leaves a greater impression on the Scout in a memorable environ-
ment.57 Each year, a text is selected and distributed to the troops. The
children read and study the text concurrently with practicing scouting
skills. When they arrive at the Sík Sándor Cserkészpark, they are expected
to take on characters from the texts and go on a hike where they encounter
scenes derived from the context of the frame narrative in which they must
solve scouting problems.58 The Scouts leave the relative safety of the camp
for the unknown, where they are confronted with difficult challenges until
they reach the climax of the trail and a test of their bravery through their
encounter with the “enemy” whose identity shifts according to time period.
Before 2000, the frame narratives were Hungarian literary texts: the
fantastical János Vitéz [translated as John the Valiant], Egri csillagok
[translated as Eclipse of the Cresent Moon], and A rab ember fiai [Sons of
the Slave]. After 2000, the frame narratives became historical: the life and
deeds of Saint Stephen, the golden age of Transylvania, and the 1848-49
War for Independence. As in previous years these historical contexts were
adapted to narratives of adventure meant to highlight the excitement and
attractiveness of being Hungarian. It is important to note the contrasting
tones of narrative between the authors of the general text and the inter-
pretation of a particular frame narrative by the leaders actually enacting
historical characters engaging with the children. In 2008, for example, the
frame narrative was the 1848-49 War for Independence, a frame narrative
that lends itself to representations of the highest flung patriotism. Instead
of a patriotic interpretation on the event, the Scout leaders enacting the
Austrian adversaries in one of the camps called themselves Gunther Von
Trapp and General Schwarzenegger, prompting laughter from the children
around them. The parody of Austrian identity derived from Hollywood
stereotypes points to the thin line between the pathos and bathos of
patriotism even within an allegedly patriotic framework. The sentimental
victimization of Hungarians written into the storyline by older leaders
easily becomes a parodic game between younger leaders and children.
The younger leaders’ awareness of the constructed quality of the
stories the Scouting community tells itself to maintain a central, diasporic
identity opens up the possibility for creating new narratives. By 2010,
those born around the demise of the Soviet Union grew into positions of
planning the Akadályverseny, rather than participating in them. Around
this time, a change is visible in the ways the frame narrative texts are
interpreted for a new generation of Scouts. For example, the 2011 theme
was “Híres Magyar Feltalálók és Tudósok” or “Famous Hungarian Inven-
tors and Scientists” and the textbook contained a rather dry list of
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biographies of people like Eötvös Loránd, Bíró László József, Telkes
Mária and Teller Ede.59 Throughout the year this text was translated into
various science experiments conducted during weekly meetings.60 At the
same time Scout leaders expressed concern about the lack of narrative
coherence in the material given to them. The inventors and scientists
featured lived across three centuries and several continents. How could
this chronological and geographical spread be adapted into an exciting,
cohesive narrative suitable to a forest setting? How could the objectivity of
science and pervasive nature of technology fit with a tradition of stories
based on romantic adventure?
As a solution, the writers and organizers of the Akadályverseny/
Scout competition chose to play with the chronologies and geographical
limits of historically-defined nationality. On May 1, troop leaders received
a forwarded email from “Rubik Ernő” to the director of the Eötvös Loránd
Tudományegyetem announcing that his newly isolated element
“pannoannominium” — the element that will power a time machine made
possible by solving a Rubiks cube — has been stolen. Worse still, the
thief, Doktor Nem [Doctor No, an obvious reference to the British James
Bond franchise] is intent on rewriting history by stealing patents from all
Hungarian inventors throughout time. He has already begun by rewriting
the Wikipedia page on the “Doktor-Nem Kocka” [Doctor No Cube], a link
to which was also provided.61 In the competition, the scouts received a
small vial of “pannoannominium” to travel through time portals — the
forest — and help Hungarian inventors reclaim their inventions and to
collect the scattered element. Having set history aright and gathered the
pannoannominum, the climax of the event occurred at the campfire, when
Ernő Rubik recognized that the concentrated “pannoannominium” was a
hazard to humanity and blew it up with the help of Ede Teller in a magni-
ficent mushroom-cloud.
The 2011competition’s style of frame narrative presents a very
different take on nationality and community. Rather than representing a
specific group of people acting at a specific point in time in a way that
represents heroism or patriotism, there are inventors living in very dif-
ferent contexts, whose lives are not defined by geographical borders and
who are not limited to actions of national importance. The pannoanno-
minium, whose name derives from the Roman Carpathian province of
Pannonia, functions ironically as an elemental idea of Hungarian identity
that can traverse time and space without changing. The need to physically
possess pannoannominium in order to ensure the security of Hungarian-
ness and the vulnerability exposed by Doktor Nem’s theft points to the
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weakness of such an idea. Indeed, that Teller — here lionized — left
Hungary in the 1920s because of the Anti-Semitic Numerus Clausus Law
points towards the danger of such a narrow definition. Despite the serious
implications of pannoannominum, it is presented as ridiculous. Doktor
Nem, who wishes to concentrate diffuse inventions through time into pure
glory and honour is a parody of a Bond villain. What the frame narrative
of the 2011 Akadályverseny presents is a new idea of cultural identity that
reflects a North American post-Soviet relationship between the diasporic
community and the home country. It has no enemy to define itself against
and must relinquish the fantasy of a return to a glorified homeland.
More Humane Humans: Frame Narratives at Patrol Leadership
Training Camp
Although the Scout competition emphasizes and experiments with the
KMCSSZ concept of “more Hungarian Hungarians,” frame narratives are
also used to try to shape “more humane humans” in örsvezetőképző
tábórok [patrol leadership training camp or ÖV for short]. In contrast to
the Akadályverseny, the ÖV camps are meant to transition Scouts in their
mid-teens from learning Scouting skills to becoming responsible leaders.
Unlike the competition, in order to participate in the camp, Scouts aged
over thirteen must pass exams based on a year-long curriculum in Hun-
garian literature, history and geography.62 The requirements of patrol
leadership training camp also require familiarity with the details of Ferenc
Molnár’s 1906 novel A Pál utcai fiúk [The Paul Street Boys] and must
write an about group leadership in the text.63 Unlike the competition frame
narratives’ playful submersion into adventure, The Paul Street Boys deli-
berately provokes a self-conscious investigation into the consequences of
losing oneself in narrative.
The plot of The Paul Street Boys initially presents the mix of
adventure and serious make-believe made familiar by the Akadályverseny.
The titular group of school-age boys and their protection of the grund, the
lumberyard they play in, against a rival gang, the nefarious Redshirts. Near
the beginning of the novel, the leader of the Redshirts, Feri Áts, steals the
Paul Street boys’ flag from the grund, while his cronies challenge the boys
to an all-out battle for possession of the lumberyard. The youngest member
of the boys, Nemecsek, is blamed for negligence leading to the theft of the
flag, and after much deliberation, the leader of the Boys, János Boka, puts
Nemecsek on probation from the group.  Nemecsek goes on a mission to
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vindicate himself and retrieve the flag.  At this point in the plot, the novel
form complicates the moral absolutes of mock warfare.
While Molnár initially presents the Paul Street Boys as noble and
the Redshirts as thuggish, he unsettles the reader’s identification with the
Paul Street Boys’ childish interests by extending the plot beyond the stakes
of the battle for the grund. Nemecsek, who catches pneumonia on his
mission for the flag, sneaks out of his room to fight in the battle for the
lumberyard.  He collapses after sealing the victory and dies at home a few
days later.  While the gang’s elected leader, Boka, rules his peers with a
just hand throughout the novel, Nemecsek’s illness causes him to
reconsider his position. The post-battle chapters detail the growth of his
consciousness from that of a boy amongst boys to that of a young adult. In
the section of the novel dealing with Nemecsek’s declining health, Boka’s
behaviour is characterized in the same manner as Nemecsek’s impoveri-
shed parents. He is one of the three “adults” who keep the child in comfort.
By comparison, the rest of the Paul Street boys are still children unable to
think beyond their own interests; they visit Nemecsek in an attempt to
absolve themselves of formerly rejecting him.64 The novel has transitioned
from childish adventure to an analysis of patriotic feeling and of the role of
leadership.
Boka’s example purposefully disturbs the binaries which have
dominated the morally simple world which the Scouts have previously
encountered. Nemecsek cannot live into adulthood precisely because his
idealism and fire cannot survive past childhood.  Boka’s greatest error as a
leader is to be too invested in the game he plays with the other boys, to
mistake the stakes of a game with those of real life. Because he cannot
distinguish between the two, one of his friends dies. Boka’s example acts
as a warning to patrol leaders always to be conscious of the boundaries
between enthusiasm and zealotry, to be mindful of the artificial constructs
of frame narratives in events like the competition. In his analysis of The
Paul Street Boys, the literary critic Franco Moretti identifies the wisdom of
the novel in its disavowal of blind patriotism. Rather than an automatic
obligation, “collective ideals are no longer a duty to which one is called by
the fanfare of the Fatherland’s authorities, but a choice.”65 When the grund
is slated for development, Boka does not mourn the loss of a kingdom, but
feels relief that his dead friend’s illusion of victory remained undis-
turbed.66 Although literary disillusionment is often followed by a rejection
of the standing social order, Boka’s mental estrangement with his former
peers strengthens his resolve to watch over them.67 Just so, the camp’s
success depends upon the candidates’ decision to engage with the frame
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narrative and with Scouting material in self-conscious and deliberate
fashion.
At the camp, the director plays Boka and his or her assisting
leaders take on the roles of other Paul Street Boys.68 All patrol leader can-
didates are assigned roles as probationary boys. “Boka” has the responsi-
bility of teaching the lessons on being a good role model, dealing with
conflict and with discipline, while his or her supporting leaders introduce
the concept of lesson plans, methods to teach songs and crafts. While the
frame narrative guides the details of camp life (the candidates play
marbles, patrol for Redshirts and refer to the campground as the grund),
Boka remains most important role in the camp. The use of “role” instead
of “figure” is deliberate, because Boka’s leadership characteristics are
meant to pass from the camp-director and his or her leaders to the candi-
dates themselves. Divided into patrols of four to six teenagers, the
candidates rotate the role of Boka/patrol leader every day to experience
responsibility for others than themselves. Several times over the course of
the ten day camp, the candidates also practice their Boka persona by
leading younger Scout patrols from a camp run within the same Scout Park
in activities for an hour and a half each day.69 While the original frame
narrative followed one boy’s maturation, the patrol leadership camp is
designed to present responsibility as a conscious choice to facilitate
younger children’s desire for adventure while protecting them from the
potential dangers of immersive play.
More Humane Humans and more Hyphenated Hungarians in a
Changing World
The narratives used within Scouting reflect back into how this Hungarian
diasporic community’s understanding of cultural identity has evolved over
the past sixty-five years. As Bodnár writes in his A Magyar Cserkész-
tisztképzés Anyaga [Material for the Evaluation of Hungarian Scout-
masters], as immigrants, the Hungarian Scouting community will inevi-
tably absorb some characteristics of its host nation.70 Similarly, in his 1969
Hungarian Boy Scout Handbook, he states that Hungarian Scouts have two
tasks: “They will faithfully work for that country which accepted them, or
in which they were born. But just as faithfully, they will also serve the
Hungarian community, to which they are tied by culture, tradition and
family.”71 In such statements, Bodnár places Hungarian Scouts in a posi-
tion of hyphenated identity.72 They cannot be only Hungarian, but to divest
themselves of all cultural associations would be to divest themselves of the
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family either with them or the family they left behind. In such cir-
cumstances an essentialist conception of Hungarianness is inadequate.
Instead, Bodnár demands a commitment to Hungarian identity from his
Scouts. Rather than chalking Hungarianness up to their social sur-
roundings, he tells them: “Te, Magyar cserkész, mondd ezt: Szolgálom a
magyarságot, mert kötelességemnek tartom” [You, Hungarian scout, say
this: I serve the Hungarian community, because I hold it as my duty].73
While duty suggests rather weighty connotations, the true core of the
sentence, as in all sentences, lies in the verb. To say “kötelességemnek
tartom” or “I hold it as my duty” makes cultural participation a voluntary
duty, rather than a blood right or privilege.
This acknowledgement of a flexibility of cultural identity within
Hungarian Scouting links to historically significant choices of identity. In
his 1934 History of Hungarian Literature, Antal Szerb emphasized that
one of Hungary’s greatest poets and heroes of the seventeenth century,
Count Miklós Zrinyi, was a Croat by birth, but chose to be Hungarian by
writing in Hungarian and acting in their national political realm.74 The
same is true for Hungary’s nineteenth century national poet, Sándor Petőfi,
the son of Serbian immigrants who was baptized under the surname
Petrovics. Thus, if nationality is “an attitude, a matter of choice,” Hungari-
anness and participation in Hungarian Scouting cannot be exclusive.75
Such a conception of cultural identity, paired with immersion in
cultures across four continents has opened up Hungarian Scouting to
anyone who wishes to enact the version of Hungarianness promoted by the
organization. As a result, there are Hungarian Scouts and indeed Hun-
garian Scout leaders and Scoutmasters who have Canadian (or even Irish-
Canadian), American, Venezuelan, Brazilian, African-American, Polish,
Japanese, German, Austrian and Russian backgrounds. In addition, while
Hungarian Scouting has historically been a strongly Christian movement,
though non-denominational, in recent years Scouts of Jewish and Muslim
faith have entered its ranks, first as Scouts, then as leaders. It is possible to
link new interpretations of Scouting frame narratives such as the 2011
Akadályverseny/Scout competition to both these changing demographics
and to the rise of multicultural and transnational rhetoric.
Indeed, according to contemporary Hungarian Scouting practices,
as long as a child speaks the language and wishes to participate, they are
included. However, if a child is of “one hundred percent Hungarian
heritage” but cannot speak the language, they are told to attend Hungarian
language lessons and return when they are able to hold a conversation.
Thus, while political scientist Safran identifies of “language, memory, and
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religion as elements of collective identity and ingredients of cultural
reproduction,” it seems that within the Hungarian Scouting community,
the language is of greatest importance.76 Language offers a bond between
diasporic Hungarian children convening from Spanish, Portuguese,
French, German and English speaking countries, and through reading
identical Hungarian Scouting manuals and frame narrative source books,
they gain a common set of Hungarian cultural markers. By requiring all
leaders to have a grasp of Hungarian literature, and to have pondered the
ambiguities presented by Molnár’s Paul Street Boys, the organization
prompts its members to look beyond the nationalistic and dogmatic ele-
ments of a national literature and to develop a true appreciation for it, and
through that appreciation, an affirmation of the worth of Hungarian cul-
ture. While Scouts learn to throw themselves into a story, as leaders, they
have learned to take responsibility for others, to think of the others’ safety
before they think of their own. Like Boka, they must cast their childish
illusions away, and to see life and narrative in all their complexity. Like
him, they cannot linger in the space between. They cannot retreat into
childhood but must step into adulthood where they must recognize
identification as a game to be played wisely.
The recognized importance of creating and maintaining a com-
munity through narratives, might be best expressed in the words of Zoltán
Kodály quoted in the curriculum for Hungarian Scoutmasters: “Kultúrát
nem lehet örökölni. Az elődök kultúrája egykettőre elpárolog, ha minden
nemzedék újra meg nem szerzi magának” [You cannot inherit culture. The
culture of ancestors evaporates, if each generation does not acquire it for
themselves].77 Reading through the frame narratives of the KMCSSZ
shows a Hungarian diaspora making and remaking its vision of com-
munity. Some stories it is determined to pass on, others it has slowly let go
of. The old sex-segregated Cserkészkönyvek [Scouting Handbooks] have
been replaced with a new unified curricula that lack frame narratives
altogether, strengthening the power of the annual Akadályverseny/Scout
competition text. Milan Kundera expresses the danger of a “nation’s
possessiveness towards its artists’ works as a small-contexts terrorism that
reduces the entire meaning of a work to the role it plays to its homeland,”
and a danger lurks in the creative potential of the Scout competition as it
distributes roles to be interpreted by leaders from many cities and many
opinions.78 This continuous reconsideration and presentation of Hungari-
anness in ever-changing forms, reflects the need of diasporic cultures to
change and recreate themselves, for good or ill.
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young at heart, who let me watch them and learn from them.
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19; Imre Lendvai-Lintner, “A Cserkészet újra indul nyugaton” [Scouting begins
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12 Will Kymlicka, “The Origins of Liberal Multiculturalism: Sources and
Preconditions,” in Multicultural Odysseys (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), 3-4.
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43 Eva Tirczka Piller, Leánycserkészkönyv, II. Kötet [Girl Scout hand-
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teremtettünk. Minden Magyar ifjúnak kezébe adjuk a szükséges és megfelelő
könyveket.” Bodnár, A Magyar Cserkésztisztképzés Anyaga, 21.
50 Ibid., 29.
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52 Ibid., 9-11. “Őseink korában még nem ismerték a puskát.  Legfőbb
fegyverük a nyil volt; ezt használták a harcaikban, ezzel vadásztak, halásztak.”
Bodnár, Cserkészkönyv I., 24.
53 “FONTOS tanítasi és nevekési eszköz.” Benkő, “Kerettörténet,” 1.
54 Ibid.
55 “Lehet: történelem, néprajz, földrajz, hires ember, stb,” Ibid.
56 Ibid., 2.
57 Irén Dala, “Akadályverseny” [Competitions], in Központi Segédtiszti
Tábor: Emlékeztető. [Central assistant troop leader training camp: memos] (Fill-
more, N.Y.: Külföldi Magyar Cserkészszövetség, 2006), 1.
58 Dala, “Akadályverseny,” 2.
59 Imre Lendvai-Lintner, János Nádas, Gábor Szorád. Híres Magyar Fe-
ltalálók és Tudósok [Famous Hungarian inventors and scientists] (Garfield, N.J.:
KMCSSZ, 2010).
60 The description of the following section is based on the cited sources
as well as my own observations.
61 Imre Varga, “Email Rubik Ernőtől az Eötvös Loránd Tudomány
Egyetem (ELTE) rektorához: Dr. Mezey Barna” [Email from Erno Rubik to the
director of the Eotvos Lorand University: Dr. Barna Mezey] Akadályversenyi
központ [Scouting competition headquarters], email, 1 May 2011.
62 The literature portion of the curriculum is the first and longest,
focusing on poetic works with a range of thematic concerns, from Károly Kis-
faludy’s diasporic “Szülőföldöm Szép Határa,” [Borders of My Land of Birth],
Reményik Sándor’s linguistic fetishism in “Az Ige” [The Verb] and Dezső Kosz-
tolányi’s verbal coloratura in  “Mostan Színes Tintákról Álmodom” [Now I’m
dreaming of coloured inks]. Veremund Tóth, ed., Magyarságismeret Örsvezetők
Számára [Hungarian cultural instruction for patrol leaders] (Garfield N.J.:
KMCSSZ, 2006), 1. 11-12. Incidentally, the KMCSSZ’s preoccupation with liter-
ature and narrative extends to the highest levels of leadership. A full fifty-four of
the ninety pages of required reading for Scoutmasters comprises of language and
literature and literary analysis. Haza a magasban [Home on high ground], A
KMCSSZ E-könyvtára, KMCSSZ. Website accessed 10 July 2013.
http://www.kmcssz.org/.







68 The camp in the Sík Sándor Cserkészpark has been co-educational
since 2007. Before that, two concurrently run single-gender camps simultaneously
enacted the same frame narrative. The following observations are based upon my
presence at the camp in 2007, 2009 and 2011.
69 Endre Szentkirályi, “Napirend” [Day’s schedule], Örsvezetőképző
Tábor 2007 [Patrol Leader training camp 2007], Sík Sándor Cserkészpark, 7
August 2007.
70 “A külföldi magyarok eltérő körülmények között élnek.  Környezetünk
erös hatást gyakorol életünkre.” Bodnár, A Magyar Cserkésztisztképzés Anyaga,
22.
71 “Becsülettel dolgoznak azért az országért, amely befogadta őket vagy
ahol születtek. De éppúgy szolgálják a magyarságot is, amelyhez kulturájuk,
hagyományaik és családjuk köti őket.” Ibid., 2. In discussion with one of my in-
formants on this particular quotation, a concern arose over its translation. Does
“magyarság,” in being an adjective describing the state of being Hungarian, trans-
late to mean one’s personal understanding of Hungarian identity, to the local Hun-
garian community, to a nation understood in cultural terms, or to the political
entity? I have chosen “community,” an intermediary between individual and nati-
on, because it captures the social construction of culture without tying it to a parti-
cular political or geographic entity.
72 Indeed, one of my informants described Bodnár’s great enthusiasm for
America in the following story.  While still based in the displaced persons camps,
the scouts went to a camp where there was a group of extremely sloppy American
Boy Scouts.  At a group campfire, the Americans were asked to sing their national
anthem…and they did not know the words.  Bodnár and his Eagles promptly stood
up, clapped their hands to their hearts and sang the American anthem. The
recollection of this event brought tears of mirth to my informant’s eyes as she
described the Eagles as being better Americans than the Americans.
73 “Te, Magyar cserkész, mondd ezt: Szolgálom a magyarságot, mert
kötelességemnek tartom.” Bodnár, A magyar cserkésztisztképzés, 2.
74 Lendvai, The Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat, 6.
75 Ibid.
76 William Safran, “The Jewish Diaspora in a Theoretical and Compa-
rative Framework,” Israel Studies 10, 1 (2005): 36-60, 41.
77 Zoltán Kodály, quoted in Haza a magasban, 169.
78 Kundera, “Die Weltliteratur: How we read one another,” 31.
Scouting in the Hungarian Diaspora 159
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1956 Forradalom. [The 1956 Revolution] New Brunswick, N.J: Külföldi Magyar
Cserkészszövetség, 2006.
Ablonczy, Balázs. Pál Teleki (1874-1941): The Life of a Controversial Hungarian
Politician. Trans. Thomas J. and Helen D. DeKornfeld. New York: Co-
lumbia UP, 2006.
Baden-Powell, Robert. Scouting for Boys: A Handbook for Instruction in Good
Citizenship. 1908. Ed. Elleke Boehmer. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005.
Bakay, Kornél. Ragyogj, cserkészliliom! [Shine, Scouting fleur de lis!] Intro. Imre
Sinkovics. Budapest: Metrum, 1989.
Benedek, Micsinay Mária. “Gödöllő – IV. Világzsembori: “Az egész ország
dzsemborija — A csodaszarvas nyomában.” [Gödöllő – 4th World
Jamboree: “The Entire Country’s Jamboree — in the footsteps of the
White Stag.” Száz Éves Magyar Cserkészet [Hundred years of Hungarian
Scouting]. Ed. Imre Lendvai-Lintner. Garfield, N.J.: Külföldi Magyar
Cserkészszövetség, 2010. 7-8.
Benkő, Zoltán. “Kerettörténet.” Központi Segédtiszti Tábor: Emlékeztető [“Frame
Narratives.” Central Assistant Troop Leader Training Camp: Memos].
Fillmore, N.Y.: Külföldi Magyar Cserkészszövetség, 2006.
“Bodnár Gáborról szóló irások.” [Writings about Gábor Bodnár] 2. Bodnár
Gábór Cserkész Csapat. 2. Bodnár Gábór Cserkész Csapat, 12 Nov.
2013. Web. 22 Nov. 2012. <http://boston-cserkesz.org/2012/11/bodnar-
gaborrol-szolo-irasok/>.
Bodnár, Gábor. A Magyarországi Cserkészet Története [The history of Scouting in
Hungary]. New Brunswick, N.J: Magyar Cserkészszövetség, 1980.
———. A Magyar Cserkésztisztképzés Anyaga [Material for the evaluation of
Hungarian Scoutmasters]. New Brunswick, N.J: Külföldi Magyar Cser-
készszövetség, 1996.
———. Cserkészkönyv I. [Hungarian Boy Scout Manual for Age Group I.]
Garfield, N.J.: Magyar Cserkészszövetség, 1969.
Boehmer, Elleke. “Introduction.” In Robert Baden-Powell, Scouting for Boys: A
Handbook for Instruction in Good Citizenship. 1908. Ed. Elleke Boeh-
mer. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005.
Chumak-Horbatsch, R. “Language change in the Ukrainian home: from trans-
mission to maintenance to the beginnings of loss.” Canadian Ethnic
Studies 31.2 (1999): 61-75.
Clifford, James. “Diasporas,” Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twenti-
eth Century. Cambridge MA.: Harvard UP, 1994. 244-279.
Csicsery, George, dir. Troop 214. Zala Films, 2008. Film.
Katherine Magyarody160
Dala, Irén. “Akadályverseny.” Központi Segédtiszti Tábor: Emlékeztető [“Scout-
ing Competition.” Central Assistant Troop Leader Training Camp:
Memos]. Fillmore, N.Y.: Külföldi Magyar Cserkészszövetség, 2006.
Gárdonyi, Géza. Egri csillagok [The eclipse of the Crescent Moon]. Budapest:
Corvina Press, 1991.
Gémes Istvánné, Réka. “Tábortűzvezetés” [Leading a Campfire] Központi
Segédtiszti Tábor: Emlékeztető [“Frame Narratives.” Central Assistant
Troop Leader Training Camp: Memos]. Fillmore, N.Y.: Külföldi Magyar
Cserkészszövetség, 2006.
Gergely, Ferenc. A Magyar Cserkészet Története 1910-1948 [The History of
Hungarian Scouting 1910-1948] Budapest: Göncöl Kiadó, 1989.
Guardado, Martin. “Speaking Spanish Like a Boy Scout: Language Socialization,
Resistance, and Reproduction in a Heritage Language Scout Troop,” The
Canadian Modern Language Review / La revue canadienne des langues
vivantes 66.1 (2009): 101-129.
Haza a magasban [Home on high]. A KMCSSZ E-könyvtára. [Hungarian Scouting
Association in Exteris library] Külföldi Magyar Cserkészszövetség. 10
July 2013. 2012. http://www.kmcssz.org/.
Hirsch, Marian. “Past Lives: Postmemories in Exile,” Exile and Creativity:
Signposts, Travellers, Outsiders, Backward Glances. Ed. Susan Rubin
Suleiman. Durham and London: Duke UP, 1998.
Horvath, Attila. “War and Peace: the Effects of the World War II on Hungarian
Education.” Education & the Second World War: Studies in Schooling &
Social Change. Ed. Roy Lowe. London: Falmer, 1992. 139-150. Print.
“KMCSSZ Csapatai.” KMCSSZ. Külföldi Magyar Cserkészszövetség. 12 Nov.
2013. Web. 2012. <http://www.kmcssz.org/>.
Kymlicka, Will. “The Origins of Liberal Multiculturalism: Sources and Pre-
conditions,” Multicultural Odysseys. Ed. Will Kymlicka. Oxford: Oxford
UP, 2007. 61-87.
Kundera, Milan. “Die Weltliteratur: How we read one another.” Trans. Linda
Asher. The New Yorker 8 Jan 2007: 28-35.
Kürti, László. The Remote Borderland: Transylvania in the Hungarian Imagina-
tion. Albany: SUNY P, 2001.
Lendvai, Paul. The Hungarians: A Thousand Years of Victory in Defeat. Trans.
Ann Major. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003.
Lendvai-Lintner, Imre.  “A Cserkészet újra indul nyugaton.” Száz Éves Magyar
Cserkészet. [“Scouting begins again in the West.” A hundred years of
Hungarian Scouting] Ed. Imre Lendvai-Lintner. Garfield, N.J.: Külföldi
Magyar Cserkészszövetség, 2010.
Lendvai-Lintner, Imre, Pándine Uray, Erzsébet and Gábor Szórád, eds. Szent
István. [Saint Stephen] KMCSSZ E-könyvtára, KMCSSZ. 10 July 2013.
2000. <http://www.kmcssz.org/>.
Lendvai-Lintner, Imre, János Glaser, and Gábor Szórád, eds. Bethlen Gábor.
Scouting in the Hungarian Diaspora 161
[Gabor Bethlen] A KMCSSZ E-könyvtára. [Hungarian Scouting Associa-
tion in Exteris Library] Külföldi Magyar Cserkészszövetség. 10 July
2013. <http://www.kmcssz.org/>.
McCarthy, R.H. Magyar Cserkész. 9 August 1933. Masthead. Reproduced in
White Stag Leadership Development. 18 September 2010. Web. 10
November 2010. <http://www.whitestag.org/history/farewell.html>.
Molnár, Ferenc. A Pál utcai fiúk [The Paul Street boys] Budapest: Móra, 1994.
Moretti, Franco. Signs Taken for Wonders: Essays in the Sociology of Literary
Form. London: Verso, 1983.
Nádas, Tas. “Beodray Ferenc Gyaszjelentés.” [“Obituary for Ferenc Beodray”]
Clevelandi Magyar Cserkész Csapatok/Hungarian Scout Troops of
Cleveland. 12 Nov. 2013. Web. 10 May 2013.
< http://www.clevelandcserkesz.org/beodray-ferenc-gyaszjelentes/>.
Ormay, Gabriella, ed. 2008-as Májusi Akadályverseny: 1848 Forradalom. A
KMCSSZ E-könyvtára. [Hungarian Scouting Association in Exteris
Library] Külföldi Magyar Cserkészszövetség. 10 July 2013. 2008.
<http://www.kmcssz.org/>.
Petőfi, Sándor. János Vitéz [John the Valiant]. Trans. John Ridland. Budapest:
Corvina Press, 1999.
Pigniczky, Réka, dir. Inkubátor. [Incubator] 56 Films, 2009. Film.
Piller, Eva Tirczka, ed. Leánycserkészkönyv, II. Kötet. [Girl Scout manual,
Volume II] Garfield, NJ: Külföldi Magyar Cserkészszövetség, 1997.
Pintz, Katalin. “Huntarian Heritage Maintenance in the USA: New Brunswick
N.J. as a Magyar Ethnic Island.” Hungarian Studies Review 38. 1-2
(2011): 83-120.
“Plast Canada.” Plast Canada. Plast Canada National Executive, 2009. Web. 30
Oct. 2010.
Radhakrishnan, R. “Ethnicity in an Age of Diaspora.” Theorizing Diaspora. Ed.
Jana E. Braziel and Anita Mannur. London: Blackwell, 2003 119-130.
Safran, William. “The Jewish Diaspora in a Theoretical and Comparative Frame-
work.” Israel Studies 10. 1 (2005): 36-60.
Sökefeld, Martin. “Mobilizing in transnational space: a social movement approach
to the formation of diaspora.” Global Networks 6.3(2006): 265-284.
Szentkirályi, Endre. Napirend [Day’s Schedule]. Sík Sándor Cserkészpark, NY. 7
August 2007.
———. “Growing up Hungarian in Cleveland: case studies of language use.”
Hungarian Studies Review. 40. 1-2 (2013): 39-68.
Veremund, Tóth, ed. Magyarságismeret Örsvezetők Számára [Hungarian cultural
instruction for patrol leaders] Garfield N.J.: KMCSSZ, 2006.
Varga, Imre. “Email Rubik Ernőtől az Eötvös Loránd Tudomány Egyetem
(ELTE) rektorához: Dr. Mezey Barna” [Email from Ernő Rubik to the
director of the Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE): Dr. Barna Mezey.]
Akadályversenyi Központ 1 May 2011. Web. 1 May 2011.
Katherine Magyarody162
Xiao, H. “Chinese language maintenance in Winnipeg.” Canadian Ethnic Studies
30. 1 (1998): 86-96.
Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XLII, Nos. 1-2 (Spring-Fall, 2015)
Miscellany:
László Réthy and the Quest for an
Ancient Hungarian Homeland
Nándor Dreisziger
Hungarians live surrounded by peoples who speak Indo-European lan-
guages but their own tongue is quite different. Where did this language
come from? And where was the ancient Hungarian homeland where the
Magyar language developed? These questions have puzzled Hungarians
for centuries and historians, anthropologists, paleo-linguists and archaeol-
ogists have given widely divergent answers to these questions. Especially
disparate were the explanations that some enthusiastic amateur scholars
have offered, some of whom placed this “ancient homeland” in such exotic
locations as the Near East, North Africa, Siberia, in what are now North-
Western India, even Ecuador, and an island in the Pacific Ocean that had
disappeared a long time ago. Miklós Érdy in his book A magyarság keleti
eredete [The eastern origin of Hungarians] enumerated nine locations
where Hungarian and international scholars (as opposed to amateur histori-
ans) had placed the land where the Hungarian language and its linguistic
relatives developed. Not one of these experts, according to Érdy, pointed
to the present homeland of the Hungarians.1
A few students of the Magyar past, however, begged to differ.
They placed the ancient Hungarian homeland, where the Magyar language
had developed, right where Hungarians are living today, in the Middle
Danube Basin of Central Europe. And, as far as we know, the first scholar
to do so was László Réthy.
Réthy, or Réthi as he spelled his name when he was a young man,
was born in 1851. He attended school in Budapest, Vienna and in the
Polish city of Krakow. From early on he had an interest in languages and,
in addition to studying several European ones he familiarized himself with
such exotic tongues as Armenian and Sanskrit. As a professional scholar
he is best known for his work in numismatics, especially the coin-making
of Muslim tradesmen in medieval Europe. For much of his adult life he
was a member of the Department of Coins and Ancient Artefacts of the
National Museum of Hungary. In this field he is best known for the mas-
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sive two volume Corpus nummorum Hungariae. Magyar Egyetemes Érem-
tár [Hungarian compendium of coinage] I - II (Budapest, 1899-1907). As a
private person he wrote a large body of bawdy poetry under the pen name
Árpád Lőwy. He also had an interest in history, especially in the birth and
evolution of languages and nations. In this field he is perhaps most famous
for the monograph Az oláh nyelv és nemzet megalakulása [The genesis of
the Romanian language and nation] (Budapest, ca. 1887). Few people
know that Réthy also produced a work on the birth and evolution of the
Magyar language and its related tongues, which he published under the
title Hol van az urali nyelvek szanszkritja? [Where is the Sanskrit of the
Uralic languages?] (Vienna: Sommer, 1871). The conclusion of this pam-
phlet was that the Magyar language, in fact the Uralic languages col-
lectively, evolved in the Carpathian Basin of East-Central Europe.2
The afterlife of an idea
Réthy died in 1914, forty-three years after he announced his brave theory
about the Magyar, in fact Uralic, ancient homeland. It was also in 1914
that a book by Ármin Vámbéry, one of Réthy’s contemporaries, appeared
posthumously. The monograph was entitled A magyarság bölcsőjénél: A
magyar-török rokonság kezdete és fejlődése [At the cradle of Hungarians:
The beginning and evolution of Magyar-Turkish relatedness] (Budapest:
Athenaeum, 1914). This was Vámbéry’s third and last book about Hungar-
ian ethnogenesis and it was a summation of his ideas on the subject. His
theory can be considered an elaboration upon Réthy’s idea, except for the
fact that Vámbéry dealt only with the genesis of the Hungarian language
and not with the origin of all the Finno-Ugric tongues. Basically, his 1914
book underscored Réthy’s thesis: the Hungarian language developed in the
Middle Danube Basin where the ancestors of the Hungarians had lived
from Avar times, possibly from late-Roman times, or even earlier. Vám-
béry’s theory had an important corollary: the nomadic tribes that con-
quered the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century were Turkic-
speaking peoples who were few in numbers — “a few thousand” — and
who were in time assimilated by the masses of this land’s Magyar-
speaking autochthonous population.3
In less than two decades after the appearance of Vámbéry’s book
anther Hungarian scholar questioned the orthodox theory of the Hungarian
past, the one that holds that the ancestors of the Hungarians appeared in
their present homeland at the end of the 9th century a.d. This person was
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Lajos Kiss of Marjalak (in Hungarian: Marjalaki Kiss Lajos). Through his
archaeological studies and his examination of old Hungarian place names
Marjalaki Kiss also came to the conclusion that Hungarians must have
been living in the Carpathian Basin since time immemorial and that their
language had no doubt developed there — long before Prince Árpád’s
nomadic warriors arrived in that land. Parts of Marjalaki Kiss’s views are
worth quoting:
At the time of [Prince] Árpád’s [arrival] the land [that later
became] Hungary was a densely populated place. The regions of
this… fertile land… were inhabited by a Hungarian-speaking… set-
tled people. These peaceful fishers, tenders of animals and tillers of
the soil, during the millennium before the Hungarian conquest…
had changed masters so many times that they never even thought of
resisting Árpád and his conquerors. Their masters of the time were
not of their people, and [the struggle for their land] was not their
business but that of the people who ruled them….
After these comments Marjalaki Kiss explained that the con-
querors of the late 9th century became assimilated by their subjects just as
the [Turkic] Bulgar tribes who conquered the Lower Danube Basin were
assimilated by their Slav subjects; the [Scandinavian] Varangians who
moved to Novgorod, by the Russians; the Germanic Longobards who
conquered much of the Italian peninsula, by the Italians; the Germanic
Goths and Franks by the French; the French-speaking Normans who
occupied England, by the English; the Mongolian conquerors [of China]
by the Chinese; and so on.4
Neither Vámbéry’s nor Marjalaki Kiss’s views received much
attention or sympathy in the Hungary of their times. Both of these authors
were outsiders in the Hungarian society of the first half of the 20th century.
The former was the son of impoverished Jews and the latter was of peasant
background. Neither carried much credibility in the eyes of their country’s
political and intellectual elites. Their works were ignored or became for-
gotten, but the idea that the ancestors of Hungarians — and the Hungarian
language — had been in the Carpathian Basin long before 895 re-surfaced
with vengeance in the second half of the 20th century.
First to resume the assault on the orthodox theory of Hungarian
ethnogenesis was Gyula László. He was a native a Transylvania who com-
pleted his university education in Budapest where he studied art, art his-
tory, ethnography, geography and archaeology. He began his career in
various museums and later became the head of the Medieval Department
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in Hungary’s National Museum. In 1957 he joined the faculty of Eötvös
Loránd University in Budapest where he taught until his retirement in
1980. Starting with the 1940s he was involved in numerous archaeological
investigations, mainly in his native Transylvania. László’s examination of
7th to 10th century graveyards led him to an interpretation of Hungarian
ethnogenesis that resembled the theories of earlier critics of historical
orthodoxy. The evidence he found, rather than reinforcing in him the idea
that the ancestors of Hungarians arrived in the Carpathian Basin at the end
of the 9th century, suggested to him that the vast majority of them had
settled there during the Avar Age of Central European history. One cir-
cumstance that buttressed his questioning the orthodox interpretation of
the “Hungarian conquest” was the fact that his study of contemporary
graves and cemeteries told him that the subject peoples of 10th century
Hungary greatly outnumbered the newly-arrived conquerors. The ancestors
of the Hungarians lived in large villages and their cemeteries contained the
remains of thousands, while the graves of the newly-arrived numbered in
the dozens. When 20 members of the military elite lived among 2,000 of
their subjects, who assimilated whom? — László asked. László tried to
popularize his theory until the very end of his life. He said that he didn’t
mind if his name was forgotten, as long as his ideas survived. He died in
1998 while he was on another lecture tour of the towns and cities of his
native Transylvania.5
In the last two decades of László’s life, and in the nearly two
decades since his death, at least half-dozen more high-profile Hungarian
academics have questioned the orthodox version of Magyar ethnogenesis,
all of them arguing that the ancestors of Hungarians had arrived in the
Middle Danube Basin long before the end of the 9th century. In a short
study such as this one it’s not possible to outline in any detail these dissi-
dent scholars’ arguments. We can do not much more than list their names
and academic affiliations. First to be mentioned should probably be János
Makkay, an archaeologist who was a close associate of László and who for
many years had defended László’s views after his death in 1998.6 Still
another scholar who should be alluded to in this connection is archae-
ologist Dezső Simonyi who placed the arrival of the Hungarians in the
Carpathian Basin in the 5th century a.d.7 Still another high-profile historian
who came out with similar views was Pál Engel who for much of his
career was a professor at Hungary’s premier university, the Eötvös Loránd
(ELTE), in Budapest. In one of his English-language studies Engel pointed
out that of the ca. 2,100 graves known from the 11th to 13th centuries in
Hungary, ca. 95-97 percent contained remains that were “Europoid”.8
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About half decade after the publication of Engel’s last study on
this subject there appeared a book by another ELTE professor, Gábor
Vékony. One remarkable feature of this book was the conclusion that
when the nomadic warriors of Prince Árpád had settled in their newly-
conquered homeland they constituted about “one percent” of the inhabi-
tants there — an observation that harked back to Vámbéry’s estimate of
the size of the conquering population of the late 9th century. Another
noteworthy suggestion made by Vékony was that the conquerors might
have been mainly or predominantly Bashkirs.9
A few years after the publication of Vékony’s book there appeared
still another work that questioned the timing of the arrival of Hungarians in
the Carpathian Basin. The new book was by veteran linguist-historian
Péter Király and it dated this development to the end of the 6th century a.d.
Király had examined the archives of numerous Central and Western Euro-
pean monasteries and over the decades found some five dozen references
in them to a group or individuals by the names of Ungar, Ungari, Ungarus,
Wenger, Hungarius etc. who, according to the authors of monastic docu-
ments, lived in the Middle Danube Basin or had migrated — or in a few
cases, raided — from there to places further West in Europe.10
About half-a-decade after Király’s book appeared there came
another work, also by a historian, that claimed that speakers of the Magyar
language had lived in the Middle Danube Basin long before the end of the
9th century. The new book was by Elek Benkő, and what was notable about
it was that it was published by one of the institutes of Hungary’s Academy
of Sciences.11 Much of volume 2 of this work was devoted to the subject of
Hungarian origins and the main author of this section was Erzsébeth Fóthi.
Since Fóthi is a paleo-anthropologist a few sentences should be said about
the opinions of anthropologists on this subject.
One of Hungary’s most noted anthropologists was Pál Lipták. He
taught at the University of Szeged and later at ELTE. Through his exam-
inations of the anatomy of the nomadic warriors who conquered the Car-
pathian Basin at the end of the 9th century he came to the conclusion that
Hungarians are the descendants of the peoples who lived there before the
conquest and that they probably arrived there in several waves of migra-
tion starting with the second half of the 5th century.12 Some three decades
later another anthropologist, the above-mentioned Erzsébet Fóthi, came to
similar conclusions. After studying for many years the skeletal remains of
conquerors she began arguing that Árpád’s warriors were different ana-
tomically both from the commoner population of 10th century Carpathian
Basin and from the population of present-day Hungary. At the same time,
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according to Fóthi, the population of some of Transylvania’s Székely
villages was remarkably similar anatomically to the pre-10th century
peoples of western Transdanubia. In fact Fóthi argued that in their ana-
tomy the conquerors resembled more the people, the Bulgar-Turkic tribes,
who conquered the Lower Danube Basin centuries earlier than they did the
autochthonous populations of 9th century Carpathian Basin — and that
populations similar to the conquerors existed then and later in the southern
Urals. Furthermore, according to Fóthi, the anatomical features of the pre-
895 population of the western parts of the Carpathian Basin must have
developed in the preceding centuries from people with European features
that had intermixed in that land with smaller groups of individuals with
Asian anatomical characteristics. For Fóthi then, the “ancient homeland”
where the anatomy of Hungarians had evolved was the western half of the
Middle Danube Basin.13
In the nearly century-and-a-half since László Réthy penned
what must have appeared at the time an outlandish opinion about the anci-
ent Hungarian homeland, not much progress has been made in this regard.
Most members of Hungary’s academic establishment and a large majority
of the country’s politicians continue to place the ancient homeland of Hun-
garians in the distant east, somewhere in Central Asia or at least east of the
Volga River. In the meantime the genetic identity of an increasing number
of present-day Hungarians — and also of people who have lived long time
ago in various parts of Eurasia, is becoming known.14 According to this
wisdom, the overwhelming majority of Hungarians — judging from the
DNA testing that has been done on thousands of them — belong to genetic
groups whose ancestors have been living, for at least a few thousand years,
in Central Europe — and only exceptionally east of the Volga River or in
Central Asia. For how long more will official historiography — and politi-
cal opinion — in Hungary place the “ancient homeland” of the Hungarian
people to places where it could not have possibly been? We may also ask
for how long more will László Réthy, Armin Vámbéry, Lajos Kiss of Mar-
jalak and their successors be ignored or forgotten in the face of new
scientific evidence that strongly suggests that the ideas of these scholars —
at least regarding the location of an ancient Hungarian homeland — are
probably much closer to the truth than those of their detractors.
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10Péter Király, A honalapítás vitás eseményei: A kalandozások és a
honfoglalás éve [The disputed events of the establishment of a homeland: The
marauding expeditions and the year of the conquest] (Nyíregyáza: Nyíregyházi
Főiskola, 2006). See especially p. 214 of this work. Király nearly lived to age 100.
11Elek Benkő, A középkori Székelyföld [The Székelyland of the Middle
Ages] (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóköszpont, Régészeti Intézet,
2012), 2 volumes. For Benkő’s own views on the subject see pp. 429-430.
12Lipták published many books on he subject but for a succinct overview
of his ideas see “A finnugor népek antropologiája [The anthropology of the Finno-
Ugric peoples] in Uráli népek: nyelvrokonaink kultúrája és hagyomanyai [Uralic
peoples: the culture and traditions of our linguistic relatives], ed. Péter Hajdú
(Budapest: Corvina, 1975): 129-137. One of Lipták’s books is available in Eng-
lish: Avars and Ancient Hungarians (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1983) see es-
pecially p. 30.
13Erzsébet Fóthi, Zsolt Berner, Tamás Hajdu and Ivett Kővári, “Közép-
kori embertani leletek a Székelyföldön” [Medieval anthropological specimens in
Székelyland] in A középkori Székelyföld [The Székelyland of the Middle Ages]
author and editor Elek Benkő (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudomáyi Kutató-
központ Régészeti Intézet, 2012), vol. 2, 473-552, especially p. 506.
14Carl Zimmer, “DNA Deciphers Roots of Modern Europeans,” The New
York Times, 10 June 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/science/dna-
deciphers-roots-of-modern-europeans.html?sm... This article is a summation of a
scientific study that appeared under the name of forty-four scholars a day earlier:
Morten E. Allentoft et al. “Population genomics of Bronze Age Eurasia,” Nature
vol. 522 (11 June 1025): 167ff. Available to selective audiences online. Allentoft
and his co-authors speculate about the arrival in Europe of the people of the
Yamnaya culture whom they assume, with some reservations, to be the ancestors
of today’s Indo-Europeans. The article’s authors, however, say nothing about the
ancestors of the Uralic peoples — where they might have lived during the Bronze
Age — so their homeland before some of them had apparently settled in the
Middle Danube Basin remains a mystery.
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Katalin Fenyves. Képzelt asszimiláció? Négy zsidó értelmiségi
nemzedék önképe [Imagined assimilation? The self-image of four
Jewish intellectual generations]. Budapest: Corvina, 2010. 304
pages. ISBN 9789631359220.
Katalin Fenyves’s monograph explores what it was like to be a Jew in
Hungary in the long 19th century. She mined József Szinnyei’s biogra-
phical encyclopaedia The life and works of Hungarian writers, and dug
beyond the clichés for the personal insights. Her conclusion is that indi-
vidual Hungarian Jews responded to the transformation of everyday life
through the adaptation of differing identities.
It was inconceivable for the Jewish community to remain un-
touched by the fundamental cultural and political changes that affected
every aspect of Hungarian society in the 19th century. The most important
priority for the country’s ruling classes was national unification and the
establishment of a uniform language. This attitude presumed that all
residents of Hungary would accept these language demands and assimilate
into the national culture. The country’s Liberal politicians assumed that
Jewish integration was not sufficient and presumed that civil rights granted
to Hungarian Jews would result in their assimilation. This presumption
was characteristic of the era, not only in Hungary.
Szinnyei’s encyclopaedia was a compendium of detailed biogra-
phical information about Jewish Hungarian authors from the Enlighten-
ment to 1918. Fenyves takes advantage of sociological statistical analysis
to mine this database. She analyzes name changes, language use, educa-
tion, career, and family structure. Using the Szinnyei encyclopaedia’s
lengthy autobiographical sketches combined with the authors’ writings and
other available primary sources, Fenyves provides colourful and insightful
examples. Fenyves’s book is divided into four parts, defining four genera-
tions. Each chapter is constructed around three different biographies,
which encapsulate the range of pitfalls and potentials for each generation
with 30 years between each generation. Fenyves believes, the golden years
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of the Jews in Hungary were the period between the reform era and the
creation of a constitutional democracy.
The study deals with four generations. The authors of the first
generation were born between 1780 and 1810; the second generation bet-
ween 1811 and 1840; the third generation between 1841 and 1870, and the
final generation, who presumably experienced World War I, were born
between 1871 and 1900. An introductory chapter discusses the forerunners
amongst the Jewish writers (authors who were born between 1750 and
1780). They were the first representatives of the Jewish Enlightenment,
were Yiddish speaking, but helped spread the ideas of the German Enlight-
enment in Hungary. The works of this “generation” created a rich and new
Hebrew literature and culture in Hungary. These books, still written in
Hebrew, were written not only for the rabbis but members of the Jewish
community and the themes of the books were also varied, from scientific
works to children’s books and textbooks. One of the well-known figures of
this group was Áron Chorin, a rabbi from Arad (Oradea), who suggested
the introduction of the German language homilies (hitszónoklat) next to
the Hebrew ones. He did so, a few years before Joseph II’s Edict of Toler-
nce (1782), which forced the Jewish people to use German instead of
Hebrew or Yiddish in public discourse, and instituted forced acquisition of
German-sounding family names. Chorin’s suggestion was not popular
among other rabbis forecasting the resistance a few years later to Joseph
II’s reforms.
In Fenyves’s treatment of the forerunner generation, the reader
comes to appreciate the series of little steps taken by the Jewish com-
munity. As Fenyves wrote in her book “one of the most important aims of
the Jewish Enlightenment was to move the Jewish society out from its
cultural isolation, redefining the Jewish doctrine in the European Enlight-
enment.”(p. 39)
Neither the German nor the Hungarian language became dominant
in Jewish circles until the second half of the 19th century. The Jewish
population living in the Hungary of the times used Yiddish in their every-
day conversations. The chapter of the first generation focuses on three
Jewish authors, Joseph Bach, Moris Saphire Gotlieb and Joseph (Rosen-
zweig) Ágai. Unfortunately, Fenyves didn’t explain why she chose these
particular authors. Each had a religious education; after which their careers
went in different directions: rabbi, businessman/journalist, and doctor.
Although their comfort level in Hungarian probably differed, each chose at
some point to use Hungarian professionally: Bach produced a Hungarian
sermon in the 1840s; Saphire wrote in several languages, and Ágai com-
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pleted his dissertation in Hungarian. In this chapter Fenyves raises general
questions and engages current literature about language acquisition, multi-
lingualism, and cultural identity. These are still timely questions.
The longest chapter and the book’s main body revolves around the
second generation, authors who were born between 1811 and 1840. Their
adult life overlapped with the Reform era, the 1848 Revolution, and the
Ausgleich of 1867. In this chapter Fenyves also examines the roles of
urbanized, emancipated, and secularized Jews in the 1848 Revolution and
in the establishment of the modern nation state in Hungary. The second
generation was the so-called “magyarization generation” and we can find
here Lipót Löwl, Ármin Vámbéry, or Miksa Falk among its representa-
tives. According to Fenyves the members of this generation had the
opportunity to integrate into Hungarian society without renouncing their
Jewish identity (p.140). However, this chapter includes descriptions of
pogroms against Jewish communities during the revolution, and the
resulting fear-filled withdrawal of many Jews into their communities.
These events are not well known facts in the standard Hungarian histo-
riography of 1848. Despite this, many Hungarian Jews supported the Hun-
garian revolution and freedom fight as soldiers or publicists.
The end of the 19th century brought the most dramatic change in
Hungary’s Jewish communities. The gap between urban and provincial
Jews became deeper. This is well represented in the biographies chosen by
Fenyves for the third generation. After the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of
1867, Hungarian liberalism sought to integrate the Jews, but in normal-
izing the state relations toward the Jewish faith, they set off a schism
between Orthodox and Neolog, e.g., between traditional and modernizing
elements. For lay readers these terms needed to be better explained. The
division was so acerbic, that the internal invective provided fuel for the
anti-Semitic movement in the 1880s. While the new governments counted
on Jewish intellectuals, they also hindered Jewish advancement to totally
assimilated individuals. Jews were still excluded from the highest offices
of the realm as a Christian baptismal certificate was required for those
aspiring to the high bureaucratic or legal positions.
The 4th generation, born between 1871 and 1888, was comprised
of adults in World War I, but their careers had not reached their pinnacle
in time for Szinnyei’s encyclopaedia. This generation generally published
in Hungarian and was as a result isolated from Jewish writers in other
countries. Their work gained only minimal notice abroad.  However, they
could read broadly, and were open to idealist thought, including socialist
ideas.
Book Reviews174
Although the Hungarian middle class was largely a Jewish middle
class, many kids were raised without consciousness of their Jewishness.
Sándor Brody, for example, only discovered he was Jewish late in child-
hood. To be born Jewish for many didn’t mean anything but was simply a
formality. The traditional Jewish family became smaller, with the number
of children per family dropping from ten to just a couple. This new middle
class focused especially on quality education for their children.
During these years the inhabitants of the capital, Budapest, were
tarred as “strangers” to the country. At the same time being more cosmo-
politan meant being less of an authentic Hungarian citizen. This trend
could also be observed in other counties’ big cities, but the gap between
the “nation” and Budapest was exceptional. Later this difference, between
the county and the capital, would be linked to the image of a “sin city”
(bűnös város). Budapest was treated as if it was not really Hungarian, but
the city where the assimilated and educated Jewish people lived. Accord-
ing to the census in 1910 the Jewish population of Hungary was less than
5% of the total, while Budapest’s Jewish population was around 23%.
When Theodore Roosevelt visited Budapest, one of his hosts,
Count Albert Apponyi, told him that Budapest was not Hungarian and that
he should, instead of spending time there, visit the countryside. The writer
Ferenc Molnár wrote:
Where one million people run after wealth, nobody has time to remember
those elements of Hungarianess that characterize life in the countryside…
Budapest became a big city. Apponyi told Roosevelt that the capital is not
Hungarian. He took him to the countryside to show him Hungary. Roose-
velt would never have told Apponyi that New York is unpatriotic, be-
cause it had no prairies and the real… farmers are not living there.
In the meantime assimilated urban Jews were ironically solidifying their
Magyar identities by distancing themselves from the rural, Orthodox
Jewry.
Fenyves argues that the positive results of Jewish assimilation are
still visible in Hungarian culture; such as its scientific language, in Hun-
garian literature, fine arts, music, architecture and other disciplines. And





Tibor Glant. Amerika, a csodák és csalódások földje. Az Amerikai Egyesült
Államok képe a hosszú XIX. század magyar utazási irodalmában.
[America, the Land of Wonders and Disappointments. The Image of the
United States of America in the Hungarian Travel Literature in the Long
19th Century]. Debrecen: University of Debrecen Press, 2013. 259 pp.
Historian Daniel Boorstin defined the difference between a traveler and a
tourist in his 1962 book titled Image, as “The traveler was active; he went
strenuously in search of people, of adventure, of experience. The tourist is
passive; he expects interesting things to happen to him. He goes “sight-
seeing.” Travel writing, done by travelers, is an interdisciplinary art; it
includes the field of history, geography, cultural studies, anthropology and
ethnography. The goal of travel writing is to inform the reader of little
known traditions, exotic peoples and about the unknown lands, and cust-
oms. Tibor Glant’s book looks at the picture painted by Hungarian trav-
elers to the USA about the USA for the Hungarian public, by analyzing
over 80 books and several scholarly articles.
The travelers to America can be put into two broad categories,
those that traveled to the US before the Civil War and those that visited
after the War, after 1870. To explain the books to the current day Hun-
garian reader, the first and the fifth chapter are explanations to the politi-
cal, economic, cultural changes that the US underwent in the two periods.
The corresponding changes in Hungary are also included.
The first books about America in Hungarian were translations. The
very first was a translation of Increase Mather’s missionary work amongst
American Indians, and was published in Kolozsvár in 1694. The first
American travel book translated into Hungarian was Isaac Weld’s — an
Irish writer — Travels Through the States of North America, which was
sixth in an eight volume series of travel writings published in Pest between
1816-19. The most well-known pre-Civil War writers were Bölöni Farkas,
Nendtvich, and Haraszthy whose focus was on the political liberty, politi-
cal freedom and economic well-being that they found in the USA. All
three believed that the political model they found in the USA could be
transplanted to Hungary. Another group of pre-Civil War travelers were
those Kossuth followers who were forced to flee Hungary after the failure
of the Hungarian War of Independence. Though they were close in
biological age to the previously mentioned authors, their works were
published much after their tours of the America and for political reasons,
and fear of retribution, concentrated on discussing Kossuth’s American
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tour and their own impressions of the country.
Béla Széchenyi’s tour of America in early 1860s falls between the
pre- and post-Civil War era. Béla, was the son of István Széchenyi, whom
Kossuth called “the greatest Hungarian”. Béla’s tome, published in 1863,
even though titled “My American Travels”, is not really about America or
about his travels, but is a collection of theoretical musings on politics.
The end of the Civil War and the Austro-Hungarian Compromise
of 1867 bought economic and political changes in both countries. At the
same time the political relationship between the two countries became
closer. Both countries opened Embassies in each other’s capital, and
communication between them improved because of the transatlantic cable
network that was laid. Information traveled faster and interest in America
deepened and widened. American statistics show that between 1900 and
1909, 338,151 Magyars immigrated to the USA and their remittances
represented a significant flow of funds ($42,193,906.62) to Hungary.
News and information from and about America reached wider audiences,
as both American pulp fiction and literary works (Harriet Beecher Stowe,
Cooper, Mark Twain) were translated into Hungarian and popular
Hungarian authors (Jókai, Mikszáth) wrote stories set in America.
Of course there were many Hungarian travelers to the USA in
between 1870 and 1914. Many came to study various aspects of the
American economy, especially agriculture and the educational system.
Often the travelers’ were sent on fact finding missions and their reports
were published. The writings of Count Imre Széchenyi (Béla Széchenyi’s
cousin), István Bernát, Adolf Loosy, Iván Ottlik and Zoltán Szilassy are
the best known from this group. Although they were critical of many
things they saw in America, there were many agricultural innovations that
they believed should be transplanted to Hungary, e.g. land security
achieved through the Homestead Acts, public health regulations, etc. The
three World Fairs (1876 Philadelphia, 1893 Chicago and 1904 in St.
Louis) also attracted official Hungarian visitors and five books were
written on the fairs. Kecskeméthy’s book on Philadelphia, Miklós’ on
Chicago and Gelléri’s on St. Louis were scholarly works. It is interesting
to note that Zsigmond Falk’s book on his tour and the Chicago World Fair,
which had several self-published editions — he was the head of the Pesti
Könyvnyomda Rt. (The Book Printing Company of Pest, Inc.) — was
negative about everything in America, which may be explained by the fact
that he did not speak English.
Writing to specialized Hungarian audiences were scientists who
visited the USA. For example, Dr. René Berkovits, a medical doctor, wrote
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about medical care, medical, nurse and midwife training and financing
research in the USA. Jenő Cholnoky and his student, Pál Teleki, later to
become the prime minister, were guests at the NY Geographical Society’s
conference in 1912. Cholnoky not only published several studies on
America, but his photographs are now available on the net
(http://hagyatek.cholnoky.ro/kulfold-album/?wppa-album=27&wppa-
cover=0&wppa-occur=1).
Two women published travel books. Mrs. István Jakabffy’s
travelogue was published in 1893 and Mrs. Béla Mocsáry, née Mária Fáy
who toured the USA in 1896, but published her book only in 1902. Both
are more traditional tourist books as they describe beautiful scenery,
tourist sites. Of the two, Jakabffy also wrote about American political life,
understandably as she was the wife of a member of parliament, and was
critical of racial discrimination, and the plight of the homeless. She wrote
about the role of women in America, who she saw as openly expressing
their opinions and are viewed as equal partners.
Tibor Glant’s book analyzes several more dozen books written for
Hungarians about America. In the last chapter he condenses the changes in
travel writing about America since the 1920s and the issues surrounding
the starting, in Hungary, in the 1960s of an American Studies department
at the University of Debrecen.
Travel writing is always as much about the author as it is a
memoir. This book is a wonderful read, it is not only an analysis of the
books, but each book is placed in the Hungarian and American historical
context in which it was written.
Susan Glanz
St. John’s University, New York
Judit Kádár. Engedelmes lázadók: Magyar nőírók és nőideál-
konstrukciók a 20. század első felében [Obedient Rebels: Hungarian
Women Writers and Constructions of the Ideal Femininity in the
First Half of the 20th Century]. Pécs: Jelenkor, 2014. Pp.305. ISBN
978-963-676-540-8.
In this study of selected Hungarian women prose writers and poets who
were active and very well received on the Hungarian literary scene during
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their lifetime only to be ‘forgotten’ or, as the author formulates it, “shut
out of literary history” (6) after World War II, Hungarian university
lecturer and literary scholar Judit Kádár attempts to raise two points: one,
she searches for the authors’ personal and professional histories; and two,
she examines patriarchal gender roles, cultural norms and ideologies left
over from a feudal system as reflected and/or challenged in the selected
works. The focus of Kádár’s analysis is sexual norms, identities and
practices in the selected authors’ chosen prose writings and poems. As the
title Engedelmes lázadók [Obedient Rebels] suggests, Kádár follows the
ways in which these writers and poets, on the one hand, resisted and
challenged the dominant gender and racial ideologies and, on the other
hand, to what degree they absorbed these very same ideologies in their
works. Finally, she also looks into the mechanisms that led to the “shutting
out” i.e. marginalization and trivialization of these writers whose works by
no means only follow aesthetic standards of ‘light’ literature, and reflects
on what has or has not changed with respect to what can and cannot be
said in Hungary about gender and sexuality in the 21st century.
Kádár divides her book into twelve chapters which are preceded
by a brief introduction and followed by a bibliography and an appendix.
The first chapter gives a succinct overview of women’s organizing and the
fight for women’s educational and political rights in the second half of the
19th and at the beginning of the 20th century. The following six chapters
are each dedicated to a different writer. Although the appendix features the
names of thirty women writers as well as their schooling and professional
activities (where known), only the six writers receive a thorough analysis
in Kádár’s book, other names are merely mentioned in passing. The
writers analyzed in great detail and to whom at least one chapter is dedi-
cated (with the exception of Renée Erdős who receives two chapters) are,
other than Erdős, Anna Tutsek, Terka Lux, Cecile Tormay, Margit Kaffka,
and Mrs. Kosáry (Kosáryné) Lola Réz. The latter is, by far, the writer on
whom Kádár places the greatest emphasis. The chapter dedicated to
Kosáryné is divided into four sub-headings whereas Kaffka, the only
writer from this list who had not been “shut out” from literary history, is
definitely short-changed when it comes to the inclusion of her major works
that do not get discussed at all. While this could be justified given the
imbalance in the existing scholarship between Kaffka and the other
writers, especially Kosáryné, such justification should have been provided
in one form or the other. What does provide a balance in the selection of
the writers discussed, however, is the variety regarding their backgrounds,
life and career paths, and the literary styles and genres they used. This is
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what makes these six biographical chapters a very interesting read and a
valuable contribution to scholarship.
From chapter eight to eleven, the volume turns to a variety of
topics. Chapters eight and nine discuss a number of women poets, most
notably Minka Czóbel and Renée Erdős. Whereas in the previous six chap-
ters the emphasis was on the writers’ biographies and the development of
gender and racial themes in their selected prose works, here Kádár is
interested in why these supremely modern and subversive poets still have
not received the full recognition they deserve. She convincingly argues for
giving back especially Erdős her due place in Hungarian literary history
(which has suffered from a sexist bias) as the modern poet who introduced
a fresh new voice in Hungarian poetry and influenced Endre Ady, not the
other way around as claimed by some.
Chapter ten and eleven are, in our opinion, the least convincing
and fitting parts of this otherwise important and well-argued book. Chapter
ten turns to the image of femininity as manifested in three selected week-
lies between 1900 and 2001: Új idők [New Times], A nő [Woman], and
Nők lapja [Women’s Magazine]. This time frame clearly goes beyond the
time frame defined by the volume’s subtitle. Whereas chapter ten offers
relevant insights into the role magazines play in shaping gender ideologies,
the inclusion of Nők lapja, established by the Communist Party in 1949,
breaks the announced time frame of Kádár’s study. The subtitle should be
changed accordingly to omit “in the first half of the 20th century” and
leave simply “in the 20th century”. Otherwise, should the author want to
limit herself to the study of women’s magazines in the first half of the 20th
century, she should definitely include A nő és a társadalom [Woman and
Society], the official organ of the Feminist Association (Feministák
Egyesülete) between 1905 and 1914 when it changed its title to A nő. Her
conclusion regarding Hungarian women’s magazines from the first half of
the 20th century that they were all dominated by a conservative ideal of
femininity, as she claims on page 243, would then have to be modified as
A nő és a társadalom was very much a progressive journal.
Chapter eleven introduces the theme of sexual taboos, such as
homosexuality and incest in 20th century Hungarian translations of
selected English and French language literary works, among them Oscar
Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, Balzac’s Le Père Goriot, and
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway. Based on selected passages from various
translations, Kádár concludes that what earlier Hungarian translators tried
to deemphasize not to say censure regarding “other” manifestations of
human sexuality becomes sayable in the newer translations at the end of
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the 20th century. Although we find this chapter interesting, metho-
dologically speaking it constitutes the weakest part of the book. Why rely
on translations from English and French literature to demonstrate that even
in Hungary sexual taboos have become less strict and more open to
discussion by the end of the 20th century? There are very interesting
examples from Hungarian literature proper, and Kádár could have stuck to
women writers, too, to prove her point. Kaffka’s novel Hangyaboly [Ant
Hill], which she mentions in her chapter on Kaffka, could have been a
starting point for analyzing lesbian love in Hungarian literature and
whether this aspect of the book received any reception at the time or later.
As a comparison with more recent works by women writers on the same
topic, Kádár could have included Erzsébet Galgóczy’s Törvényen kívül és
belül [Outside and Inside the Law, 1983] and Agáta Gordon’s Kecskerúzs
[Goat Lipstick, 1997]. This would have kept the scope of her study within
the frame set by the title that only mentions women writers and construc-
tions of femininity.
Despite the noted weaknesses, Engedelmes lázadók is a significant
book. It is extensively researched and includes hitherto unknown material,
such as interviews with family members, photographs and excerpts from
letters and manuscripts. All in all, this study of Hungarian women writers
with an emphasis on sexuality, gender and racial ideologies in Hungary is




International scientific conference: 350. obljetnica smrti Nikole
Zrinskog VII i pada Novoga Zrina (350th anniversary of the death of
Zrínyi Miklós VII and the fall of Zrínyiújvár), held in Donja
Dubrava, Republic of Croatia, on 5th July 2014
Zrínyi Miklós VII (1620-1664; in Croatian: Nikola Zrinski VII), Hungarian
and Croatian statesman, military leader and poet, a distinguished warrior in
the wars against the Ottomans, still remains a figure of intense historical
interest both in Hungary and in Croatia. As a way of shedding new light on
his actions and his time, and especially on the history of one of his most
famous castles, Zrínyiújvár (Croatian: Novi Zrin), numerous Croatian
Book Reviews 181
organisations have organised an international conference taking place on
5th July 2014. It was held in Donja Dubrava, a Croatian place closest to the
site of the castle of Zrínyiújvár, today in Hungary. The conference’s main
organisers were the Croatian cultural societies “Zrinski Guard Čakovec”
and “Brethren of the Croatian Dragon”, the Military College “Petar
Zrinski” and the Croatian cultural institution “Matica Hrvatska Čakovec”.
The main patron of the conference was Ivo Josipović, President of Croatia.
Fourteen historians and other scholars participated in the conference, and
three of them were Hungarian researchers. Speakers had fifteen minutes to
present their exposés in Croatian or Hungarian, and during the presenta-
tions, questions and debates the organisers provided consecutive (a few
sentences at a time) interpretation from Croatian and Hungarian and vice
versa.
After the welcoming speeches of the organisers’ representatives
the presentations started. The assembled researchers shared their latest
findings. At the beginning of the conference’s first part, Hrvoje Petrić
presented an exposé on the role of Miklós Zrínyi VII and the castle of
Zrínyiújvár played in the defence from the Ottomans in the light of new
archive research. Petrić described the situation in Central Europe after the
Peace of Westphalia was signed, in 1648, Zrínyi’s attitude towards the
changes in international political relations of the time, and the con-
temporary situation in the lands ruled by the house of Zrínyi. Ivica Mandić
spoke on the topic of Zrínyi as a military strategist and concluded that he
was a fine strategist who, nevertheless, naively interpreted the politics of
Habsburg rulers. Ivo Zvonar held a talk on Zrínyi’s poetic legacy and cited
a number of poetic works that still have not been presented before a wide
audience. Vladimir Kalšan talked about the town of Čakovec in the time of
Zrínyi, based on the historical sources which mention the town, especially
the ground plans of the Čakovec castle, its moat, and its inhabitants. Juraj
Kolarić presented a paper on the religious life in the Muraköz (Croatian:
Međimurje) region in Zrínyi’s time, on the cooperation of the Zrínyi
family with the Protestant and Catholic powers in their common struggle
against the Ottoman Empire, and on the re-conversion to Catholicism of
the Muraköz region in the period before the Great Turkish War (1683-
1699). Darko Varga gave an exposé of fruit and vegetable production in
the gardens of Zrínyi’s house, thus contributing to the knowledge of
everyday life in the 17th century.
On the beginning of the second part of the conference, Aleksej
Milinović held a talk on new contributions to Tacitism and Machiavel-
lianism in Zrínyi’s political and military theory, basing his findings on
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Zrínyi’s works and on his commentaries about the political events of
contemporary Europe. Vladimir Kapun spoke on the topic of some lesser
known facts of Zrínyi’s time, more precisely on Zrínyi’s relations with the
Catholic Church and his contributions to the construction of the town of
Čakovec. Marijan Varga presented an exposé on the Zrínyi family and
Zrínyiújvár as the impetus for the cooperation of municipalities around the
confluence of the Mura and Drava rivers, which started in 2005 through
the European IPA Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes, and still
continues. Three Croatian and five Hungarian municipalities actively
supported that cooperation and based it on their common legacy, i.e., the
legacy of the house of Zrínyi.
The first of the three Hungarian researchers, Lajos Négyesi, gave
an exposé on the research of the Zrínyiújvár castle in the Hungarian histo-
riography. Hungarian scientists explored the castle’s location and the
congruence of their findings and the surviving maps of the castle. Négyesi
emphasised the influence of cooperation with the local population during
the mentioned research. József Padányi spoke on the topic of Zrínyiújvár
in the light of the newest archaeological research conducted on the site of
the castle. Padányi presented a map demonstrating the excavation site and
the artefacts found on the site: Ottoman cannon balls, remains of the castle
walls, etc. László Vándor held an exposé on the significance of Zrínyiújvár
in the defence and liberation of the Kanizsa Generalate from the Ottomans.
Vándor pointed out that, during the 16th and 17th centuries, the whole
defence system was in the hands of the members of the Zrínyi family.
Krešimir Regan talked of Zrínyiújvár’s architectural and defence charac-
teristics. Zrínyiújvár was built in 1661 on the most critical point of the
defence of the Muraköz region against the Ottomans. The contemporary
reports on the castle state the condition of its moat, bastions and numerous
other characteristics of the castle, which was conquered by the Ottomans
in 1664 and never rebuilt. Dragutin Feletar and Petar Feletar presented a
paper on the role of Zrínyiújvár in the defence of the Légrád Captaincy
and on the functioning of the town of Légrád (Croatian: Legrad) as a part
of the Military Frontier (Croatian: Vojna krajina).They concluded that the
functioning of the Military Frontier in that region so far hasn’t been suf-
ficiently researched in Croatia.
In the closing words of the conference, Juraj Kolarić thanked the
Organisational Committee, all the speakers for coming and sharing their
research, and everyone who assisted in the organisation of the conference.
The meeting in Donja Dubrava was an expression of a fruitful collabora-
tion between Croatian and Hungarian scholars researching the still under-
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researched topics of their mutual history. The gathered researchers agreed
that the conference comprised valuable presentations, that it covered a
wide range of topics, and that it should serve as an incentive for similar
conferences in the future.
Anđelko Vlašić, PhD,
Independent scholar, Zagreb, Croatia
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Gábor Vermes was not yet ten years old when his — and his family’s —
situation went from bad to worse after Nazi Germany occupied Hungary in
March of 1944. He survived the persecutions and deportations of the rest
of that year by living in an orphanage for Christian children in Budapest.
After the war he completed his basic schooling and in 1952 embarked on
his university studies. His real interest in humanities but the communist
ideological orientation of the time pushed him into studying something
more in line with the requirements of the new socialist society and he
undertook a post-secondary program in earth sciences. In 1956 he gradu-
ated and in the fall of the same year he began working in one of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences’ research institutes. Soon a great change
took place in his life: after the crushing of the Revolution by Soviet troops
he fled Hungary.
He arrived in New York in February of the following year. Soon
Gábor had the opportunity of following a course of studies in his field of
real interest, history. With the help of a scholarship he entered Stanford
University. By 1962 he was ready to commence his doctoral research the
subject of which was the political career of Hungarian statesman István
Tisza. Gábor began his teaching career as an instructor at Stanford but in
1972 he joined the History Department of Rutgers University and began
teaching on this university’s Newark campus. He remained on the faculty
of Rutgers till his retirement in 2001.
Professor Vermes’s teaching fields were the history of modern
Central and Eastern Europe while his research continued to focus on the
history of Hungary in the 19th and 20th centuries. In 1985 his work on
Tisza was published in book form: István Tisza: The Liberal Vision and
Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist (Boulder CO: East
European Monographs), which was followed by a Hungarian edition. A
quarter century later Gábor published another book, this time in Hun-
garian: Kulturális változások sodrában: Magyarország 1711 és 1848
között [In the current of cultural changes: Hungary between 1711 and
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1848] (Budapest: Balassi, 2011). In the meantime he also produced several
articles and numerous book reviews. Some of these appeared in our
journal. The most recent one, “‘Extra Hungarian Non Est Vita’ and the
Baroque in 18th and Early 19th Century Hungary” saw the light of day in
volume 39 (2012).
While he served as president of the American Association for the
Study of Hungarian History (AASHH), Dr. Vermes was instrumental in
establishing a formal link between that organization and the Hungarian
Studies Review. Later the AASHH changed its name to the Hungarian
Studies Association but the link between the two scholarly ventures re-
mained.
For his teaching, research and other academic activities Professor
Vermes was awarded several prizes and decorations.
Nándor Dreisziger
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